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PARADING OURSELVES: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AT
THE FEAST OF ST. PATRICK
LARRY W. YACKLE*

Three things are true. First, American society is now absorbed in yet
another great civil rights movement, this one on behalf of gay, lesbian, and
ambisexual citizens, which will lead ineluctably to the elimination of legal
burdens on the basis of sexual orientation.' Change will come slowly, with
much backing and filling, and at an awful price measured in human pain.
Intolerance for the homosexualities that exist among us, and the homosexual
* Professor of Law, Boston University. I would like to thank Mary L. Bonauto,
Maura R. Cahill, Chester Darling, John Mahan, James Mansfield, Julie Netherland,
Gretchen Van Ness, and Karen Wilinski for helping me piece together the background
materials I explore in this piece. I received helpful comments on the manuscript from
Kathryn Abrams, C. Edwin Baker, Christian Kimball, Susan Koniak, Pnina Lahav,
Tracey Maclin, David Seipp, Avi Soifer, and the participants in the Boston University
Law School faculty workshop. Rob Kwon, Kenneth Westhassel, and especially Brendan
Crowe rendered excellent research assistance.
I Better said, we are now groping our way toward "straight liberation-liberation
from the myths, stereotypical thinking and consequent forms of discrimination that, in
turn, engender defensive postures among gays." RICHARD WOODS, ANOTHER KIND OF
LOVE: HOMOSEXUALITY AND SPIRITUALITY 65 (1977). By common account, the modern gay and lesbian civil rights movement began in the wake of the Stonewall riots in the
summer of 1969, when gays and lesbians resisted rough treatment by the police in Greenwich Village. See generally JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970
231-39 (1983); TOBY MAROTTA, THE POLITICS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 71-99 (1981). But
see ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL
RIGHTS, 1945-1990 (1992) (recognizing that the movement has longer roots). For a
sketch of the many faces of the movement today, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social
Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda,
102 YALE L.J. 333 (1992). For popular accounts, see Andrew Kopkind, The Gay Movement, THE NATION, May 3, 1993, at 577; Andrew Sullivan, The Politics of Homosexuality A New Case for a New Beginning, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993, at 24. The
potential political power of the movement is plain. See Karen De Witt, Clinton to Meet
with Gay Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at A20; Anthony Duignan-Cabrera, Gays
Give Riordan Warm Welcome, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at BI (reporting that the
newly elected conservative Republican mayor of Los Angeles found it politically advisable to appear in the local Gay & Lesbian Pride parade and publicly to embrace one of its
leaders); Kay Longcope, Gays, Lesbians Callfor National Mobilization to Influence Elections, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1990, at A21 (describing a meeting of the Sixth International Conference of Openly Lesbian and Gay Appointed and Elected Officials and the
formation of the Gay and Lesbian Association Political Action Committee); Adrian
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behavior in which many of us engage, will persist in quarters where the law
cannot reach.2 Yet private homophobia, deprived of legal sanction, will ultimately be discredited and forced to the margin. Second, the fundamental
Walker & Scot Lehigh, Gays Hope to Influence Mayor Race: CandidatesPerceive a Potent
Voting Bloc, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 12, 1993, at B13.
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of the profound movement under way is the very
ubiquity of episodes in which sexual orientation plays an important role-episodes that
find their way into the public press virtually every day. E.g., Gay-Rights Groups Rally for
Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1990, at B5 (describing a demonstration promoting
"bias crime" legislation); Jane Gross, A Milestone in the Fightfor Gay Rights: A Quiet
Suburban Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, at D16 (describing the migration of gays and
lesbians to the suburbs); Douglas Martin, Strictly Business: ChristopherStreet Rebounds
as Thriving Gay Mecca, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1993, at B3 (noting the economic strength
of merchants catering to the gay and lesbian community); John J. O'Connor, Gay Images.TV's Mixed Signals, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1991, at BI (reporting objections from gays
and lesbians to the depiction of homosexuality on television). The movement is not rigorously progressive, of course. For every step forward, it seems there is often a step backward. While many religious groups show increasing tolerance, others stubbornly persist
in historical intolerance. Cf. Colum Lynch, Conservative Religious Alliance Targets NYC
School Election, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 1993, at 21 (reporting that "conservative"
Christians hoped to unseat gay and lesbian school officials in the next election). Compare
Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Gays Welcomed at D.C Church, WASH. POST, June 7, 1993, at B4
(reporting that a Unitarian congregation in the District of Columbia had decided to
acknowledge homosexual relationships in church bulletins) with Ari L. Goldman, Conservative Branch Rejects Proposal to Allow Gay Rabbis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at
A34 (reporting that the Conservative movement among American Jews had rejected a
proposal to permit homosexuals to serve as rabbis) and Peter Steinfels, Church Keeps Ban
on Gay Ministers, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1993, at A15 (reporting the Presbyterians' decision to retain a ban on appointing "sexually active" gay ministers). Most employers still
do not extend benefits to gay partners, but the trend is in a more promising direction.
E.g., Jordana Hart, Benefits at Harvardto Cover Gay Partners,BOSTON GLOBE, May 21,
1993, at 17; Jonathan P. Hicks, A Legal Threshold is Crossed by Gay Couples in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al. In a time of such swift change, it is perhaps not
surprising that reports of violence against gays and lesbians are all too common. See
GARY D. COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 3 (1991); Anti-Gay
Crimes Are Reported on Rise in 5 Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1992, A12. But see Raymond Hernandez, Healing Wounds and Seeking Understanding.Police and Gay Residents
of the 115th Precinct Work Together to Find Common Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
1993, at BI.
2 Individuals may indulge in "wilful ignorance," but we will have done with "legally
enforced invisibility." RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 27 (1988). For illustrations of the backing and filling we will see, one
need only look to England. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON RELIGION AND THE HOMOSEXUAL
ET AL., THE CHALLENGE AND PROGRESS OF HOMOSEXUAL LAW REFORM (1968) (citing the British decision to abandon criminal penalties for homosexual relations between
consenting adults); STEPHEN JEFFERY-POULTER, PEERS, QUEERS & COMMONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR GAY LAW REFORM FROM 1950 TO THE PRESENT 234-35 (1991) (citing
more recent reversals but pointing out that setbacks may have galvanized the movement).
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principles of political order we have drawn from, or ascribed to, the Constitution must be deployed once again to manage our differences, promoting
respectful exchange. We require of our basic law that which is basic: a structure for mapping our future-together. Third, the constitutional principles
and rules we have developed to date will disappoint us at every turn. We
will find no fixed and firm doctrinal markers along the perilous path before
us. Paradoxically, it is far easier to predict where we will come out in the
end than it is to specify and appreciate how we will get there. The mess we
are in is a real and human mess; it will not be disciplined by abstractions
alone.
I mean in this Article both to demonstrate that this third proposition is so,
and to insist that, on reflection, things could scarcely be otherwise. The
imperfections in our constitutional law are no cause for despair. We can
muddle through as we always do, relying on formal legal categories as guides
to clear thinking, but eschewing any attempt simply to label problems away.
On the one hand, we must pursue the essence of conventional methodology.
We must draw distinctions, identify relationships, capture events within definitional boundaries, and work out the implications. On the other hand, we
must immerse ourselves in the vagaries of experience, distrusting the very
neat and tidy boxes that conventional analysis seems to demand. The trick
is to strike the proper balance between analysis and description.
I focus on a graphic confrontation between the civil rights movement now
gathering momentum and the old order now retreating, however grudgingly,
from the field: the battle royal over whether gay and lesbian groups are entitled to participate in annual St. Patrick's Day parades in New York and
Boston. The parades plainly reflect the larger social and political developments currently under way and must be seen in that overarching context
along with other, related flashpoints-gays and lesbians in the military,
same-sex marriages, dependent benefits for gay partners, and dozens of
others.' Yet the parades also offer an especially rich source of materials by
which to demonstrate both the need for and the flaws in our constitutional
framework for orchestrating the national debate in which we are engaged.
Loose analogies between seismic cultural developments can be misleading.
I dare say, though, that the current situation shares common ground with
3 For a good sampling of the case law, see generally Rhonda R. Rivera, Our StraightLaced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979); Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference
Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1981). On gays in the military, see Meinhold v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1453, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993), and compare Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569, 587-88 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(involving a challenge to the exclusion of homosexual visitors to the United States). On
same-sex marriages, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). On ballot initiatives
meant to frustrate statutes and ordinances that bar discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, see Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285-86 (Colo. 1993); Citizens for
Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 655-58 (Ct. App. 1992).
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the struggle against de jure racial segregation a generation ago.4 A lot of
constitutional law was required to manage the sit-ins, pickets, demonstrations, and parades by which African Americans demanded full recognition
and participation in American life. Constitutional principles and rules were
needed, and for that reason they were forged to guide us through those troubled times.5 Back then, and however belatedly, we made some crucial
choices. We decided in a number of cases, one of them called Brown,6 that
everyone, black or white, was free to associate with his or her chosen comrades in the public streets and other common areas, and to preach brotherhood, hatred, or anything in-between-at least as long as things remained
peaceful. By contrast, we decided in another Brown case 7 that segregationists were not free to choose their associates as they pleased and thus to deny
access to the public schools on the basis of race. Today, we enjoy the benefits of those decisions, but their wise use demands practical, insightful judgment. Human rights problems don't really change all so much. They don't
get any easier, either.'
At the most superficial level, the St. Patrick's Day parades present a classic conflict-pitting those who are included (and want to exclude others)
against those who are excluded (but want very much to be included). The
occasion cries out for doctrinal categories that allocate entitlements between
the competitors and declare winners and losers. Do the parades constitute
the exercise of the organizers' speech, religious, and associational rights to
rally round a pure sectarian message, uncorrupted by the participation of
gays and lesbians who represent contrary ideas? Or are they places of public
accommodation, from which citizens may not be excluded on the basis of
sexual orientation? Are governmental officials simply disinterested arbiters
between warring camps? Or are they responsible for the invidious discrimination over which they preside? At a deeper level, however, the parades
bristle with intricate theoretical problems that resist easy resolution. Liberty
claims grounded in the First Amendment are not set over against equality
4 Cf. JONATHAN DOLLIMORE, SEXUAL DISSIDENCE 28-29, 344-45 (1991) (cautioning
against assimilating homophobia and racial prejudice, but recognizing that properly disciplined comparisons can be revealing). Obviously, one might also draw analogies to our
experience with gender discrimination. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual
Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161.
I See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

(1965) (discussing the impact of the civil rights movement on First Amendment
jurisprudence).
6 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1966) (concerning a public library).
I Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
8 See Kenneth L. Karst, Boundariesand Reasons.: Freedom of Expression and the Subordinationof Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 117-22 (sketching the linkage between the
gay liberation movement and the evolution of First Amendment doctrine); cf. Deborah
L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 106 (1987) (recalling Herbert
Wechsler's argument that in its rush to outlaw racially segregated schools the Supreme
Court ignored the associational rights of white students).
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claims resting on the Fourteenth; both kinds of claims are sprinkled over the
arguments open to the parties. The crucial matter at issue, self-identification, demands attention-but gets almost none from the pigeonholes available for selection. Government's role is not delineated and confined, but
diffuse and problematic. We cannot deal with the parades simply by invoking one Brown precedent or the other.
I will begin with a summary of extant positive law, drawing primarily on
the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions in point, but ranging as well
over civil rights statutes that may be brought to bear. Within that discussion, I will identify both places where participants in the parade cases may
try to gain a handhold, and ways in which their grip may slip. Next, in the
body of the Article, I will explore the factual backdrop that calls all these
legal arguments into play in the first instance: the character and history of
the New York and Boston parades; the individuals, organizations, and communities involved; the nature and basis of the desires, fears, and anxieties
that come to light; the role and significance of pertinent religious dogma; and
the development of the current controversy. In the final section, I will offer
suggestions for bringing constitutional doctrine to bear on the richly textured complexities implicated in the parades. Even if I am right in thinking
that the human problems we face will not submit easily and comfortably to
conceptual analysis (and I am pretty sure I am right about that), I appreciate that at some point we will have to do something with the parades. They
are not the first of their kind,' nor will they be the last. If we do our job well,
we will fortify the foundation we will need as we grapple with the profound
social and political upheaval at hand. Squabbles over who gets to march up
Fifth Avenue, or down Telegraph Street, may seem trifling or merely illmannered. Yet they offer an opportunity to brace our law (and ourselves)
for the greater work that lies ahead.'"
9 See, e.g., Gay Veterans Ass'n v. American Legion, 621 F. Supp. 1510 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (involving an attempt by a gay and lesbian veterans organization to gain access to
an annual parade conducted by the American Legion); Jacques Steinberg, Gay Dispute
Fails to Dim Israel Parade, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1993, at BI (reporting that the
organizers of the Salute to Israel parade had refused to permit a largely gay and lesbian
congregation to participate under its own flag). Most major cities now have annual Gay

Pride parades. See, e.g., Catholic War Veterans of the United States, Inc. v. City of New
York, 576 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (involving an attempt by a veterans group to
enjoin the Gay Pride parade); see also Lisa Atkinson, Gays, Lesbians Parade Their Pride
by the Tens of Thousands in Boston, BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 1993, at 44 (describing the
similar parade in Boston); Clifford J. Levy, Thousands March in a Celebration of Gay
Pride, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at B4 (describing the most recent Gay Pride parade in
New York); Jeffrey Schmalz, March for Gay Rights: Gay Marchers Throng Mall in Appeal
for-Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at Al (reporting an extraordinarily large rally on
the Mall in Washington, D.C.).
"0 A rich body of excellent work has recently been done at the level of "grand theory"
touching free speech. E.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH (1989);

LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986);

FREDERICK
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I will urge city officials in New York and Boston to take responsibility for
planning and conducting these two great municipal street parties and, in so
doing, to ensure both that all members of the community may attend and
that anyone who wishes by attending to express a message is free to .doso.
Concomitantly, city authorities should weed discriminatory features out of
their existing schemes for dispensing permits for privately sponsored
parades. Such permits should be freely distributed to competing groups,
whose messages should be considered only to promote expression. Officials
should try to accommodate a group's special interest in a particular street or
date, but should not be obliged routinely to turn major arteries over to private processions. When the precise character of a message warrants it, city
officials should exempt a parade from the local anti-discrimination ordinance. If a group seeks such a dispensation, it should be invited to explain
how its compliance with anti-discrimination law would dilute its message,
and city officials should make that explanation known to the public. As a
general matter, then, city officials should take parade cases as they comeattempting to be genuinely neutral with respect to permit applicants, but
recognizing that the proper result in a case often requires an investigation of
the facts and hard judgment. Suffice it to say, I think the Constitution
should be read to endorse this practical approach.
I.

PARADE LAW IN THE BOOKS

The constitutional law governing parades begins with the First Amendment, which prohibits government from enacting laws prohibiting the "free
exercise" of religion, or "abridging the freedom of speech" or the "right of
the people peaceably to assemble."" Stated as absolutes, these injunctions
have always been understood and treated as predispositions that accommoSCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990); David A.J. Richards, A
Theory of Free Speech, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1837 (1987). In this Article, I am guided by
that literature, but I focus my attention at a lower level of generality-namely workaday
constitutional doctrine that delivers acceptable results in trying circumstances.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Inasmuch as the parade organizers in New York and Boston insist that they wish to exclude gay and lesbian participants on religious grounds,
there is a rather clear Free Exercise Clause element in the parade cases I am about to
explore. E.g., Complaint at 8-9, New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibernians
v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (93 Civ. 0281) (alleging violations of both
the organizers' freedom of speech and association and their "free exercise" rights). In
addition, there are occasional contentions that city authorities violate the Establishment
Clause if they permit parade organizers to employ a traditional parade to advance a sectarian message. E.g., Otway v. City of New York, 818 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(summarily rejecting such a claim); accord Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981).
As these cases have evolved, however, claims grounded in freedom of speech and association have tended to enjoy central attention, making any independent concern for free
exercise largely redundant. Cf. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2146 (1993) (relying entirely on free speech grounds to hold that
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date countervailing values and interests. The precise limits the First
Amendment places on governmental regulation are not self-evident; they
require reasoned elaboration. Like it or not, they require balancing.
A.

Basics

A parade "falls well within the sphere of conduct protected by the First
Amendment.' 12 Indeed, one can scarcely imagine a more definitive and
graphic way for a citizen to manifest himself to the world than to march
down the street, arm-in-arm with friends and neighbors, displaying his allegiances for all to see. To abandon the anonymity of the crowd and take a
place in the lists is to affirm as few other actions can the ideas and people one
calls her own. To parade is to proclaim who, what, and of what you are-to
identify yourself with a community of thought and comradeship in the most
elemental sense. This does not mean (necessarily) that a city or town must
allow citizens to use all its public streets for parades at their every whim.
Yet it is widely understood that if there is any publicly controlled real estate
3
that must routinely be open for expressive activity, it is an ordinary street.'
And, anyway, neither New York nor Boston has been inclined (recently) 4 to
ban street parades en masse. In these two towns, as elsewhere in America,
public streets "have immemorially been held in trust" for purposes of "communicating thoughts between citizens."' 5 In common parlance, a street is a
quintessential "public forum," in which expression usually can be regulated
only in a way that is indifferent both to the subject matter speakers wish to
take up, and to the viewpoints they wish to expound. 16 In any given
an organization could not be refused access to public facilities because its viewpoint with
respect to an otherwise approved topic was religious in nature).
12 Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969).
13 In Cox v. Louisiana, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the validity of the
"uniform, consistent, and nondiscriminatory application of a statute forbidding all access
to streets and other public facilities for parades and meetings." 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965)
(footnote omitted). In Greer v. Spock, however, the Court recognized in dictum "the
long-established constitutional rule that there cannot be a blanket exclusion of First
Amendment activity from a municipality's open streets, sidewalks, and parks." 424 U.S.
828, 835 (1976); cf. David Cole, Beyond UnconstitutionalConditions. ChartingSpheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 717-18 (1992) (contending that to the extent government must open public forums like streets for speech, it
is commanded by the First Amendment to subsidize private expression).
14 But see Massachusetts v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895) (Holmes, J.) (declaring that a legislature may "forbid public speaking in a highway or public park").
15 Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
16 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980). On the public
forum idea generally, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1. For recent treatments, compare Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-NeutralRestrictions,54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987) with Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 1992 Sup. CT. REV. 79 and
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instance, the task is, first, to determine whether and how freedom of expression is burdened by the governmental regulation under attack, and, second,
to decide whether the governmental interests17asserted in support of the regulation are nonetheless sufficient to justify

it.

Streets constitute a scarce resource, and from that premise alone it follows
that their utilization must be allocated among competing users-ordinary
people who merely want a fast track to the office, the factory, or the supermarket, as well as other parade organizers and would-be participants. For
this administrative task, the Supreme Court has approved a licensing
scheme, notwithstanding the traditional presumption against "previous
restraints" on expression.' Potential marchers can be asked to give fair
notice of their plans, so that the authorities can mitigate the disruption of
ordinary traffic, avoid conflicts with other uses, and generally provide good
policing.' Suffice it to say for now that both New York and Boston maintain licensing systems for street processions, under which parades can usually be held only on the authority of a permit. 20 Those schemes have special

features touching the particular parades we are investigating, but we will get
into that later.
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
17 E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding that New York
City had a compelling interest in controlling noise levels).
18 Compare Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 712-15 (1931) (articulating the traditional view that previous restraints on speech are more troublesome than subsequent penalties) with Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV.
533, 539 (1951) ("The generalization that prior restraint is particularly obnoxious ...
must yield to more particularistic analysis."), quoted in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957). On the prior restraint doctrine generally, see Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of PriorRestraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977); Vincent Blasi, Prior
Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1482 (1970); Vincent Blasi, Toward a
Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); John C.
Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking PriorRestraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983); Martin H. Redish, The
ProperRole of the PriorRestraint Doctrine in FirstAmendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV.
53 (1984). But see BAKER, supra note 10, at 144 (arguing that even a neutral permit
requirement constitutes an impermissible restriction on the right to free speech).
19 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Put graphically, there is no unconditional constitutional right to hold a street meeting "in the middle of Times Square at the
rush hour." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
20 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 10-110 (1990):
Processions and Parades.
a. Permits. A procession, parade or race shall be permitted upon any street or in
any public place only after a written permit therefor has been obtained from the
police commissioner. Application for such permit shall be made in writing, upon a
suitable form prescribed and furnished by the department, not less than thirty-six
hours previous to the forming or marching of such procession, parade or race. The
commissioner shall, after due investigation of such application, grant such permit
subject to the following restrictions:
1. It shall be unlawful for the police commissioner to grant a permit where the
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An administrative plan for coordinating parades cannot confer unbridled
commissioner has good reason to believe that the proposed procession, parade or
race will be disorderly in character or tend to disturb the public peace;
2. It shall be unlawful for the police commissioner to grant a permit for the use
of any street or any public place, or material portion thereof, which is ordinarily
subject to great congestion or traffic and is chiefly of a business or mercantile character, except, upon loyalty day, or upon those holidays or Sundays when places of
business along the route proposed are closed, or on other days between the hours of
six-thirty post meridian and nine ante meridian;
3. Each such permit shall designate specifically the route through which the procession, parade or race shall move, and it may also specify the width of the roadway
to be used, and may include such rules and regulations as the police commissioner
may deem necessary;
4. Special permits for occasions of extraordinary public interest, not annual or
customary, or not so intended to be, may be granted by the commissioner for any
street or public place, and for any day or hour, with the written approval of the
mayor;
5. The chief officer of any procession, parade or race, for which a permit may be
granted by the police commissioner, shall be responsible for the strict observance of
all rules and regulations included in said permit.
Boston, Mass., Traffic Rules and Regulations, art. VIII, § 1 (Jan. 2, 1988):
Section 1. Parades, Processions and Formations
No person shall take part in any parade, procession or other organized formation
of persons or vehicles, other than a funeral procession or a picket line, in or upon
any street, way, highway, road, or parkway under the control of the City unless the
Commissioner of Transportation has granted a permit for such parade, procession,
or formation. The Commissioner of Transportation shall issue such permit in all
cases except where the time, place, and manner are not in conformity with the Rules
set forth below, or where the permit would conflict as to time or place with a permit
previously issued. No fee shall be charged for any such permit.
1. The written request for the permit shall be filed with the Commissioner of
Transportation at least seventy-two hours prior to the occurrence and should
include the following:
(a) The date and starting time.
(b) The name, address, and telephone number of the applicant and name of the
organization involved.
(c) The formation or assembly area and time therefor.
(d) The route of the parade or motorcade and what portions of the streets traversed may be occupied by such parade or motorcade.
(e) The approximate number of people and vehicles in the parade or motorcade.
2. No permit shall be issued authorizing a parade, procession, or formation under
the following conditions:
(a) When the sole purpose is advertising any product, goods, wares, merchandise, event, or is designed to be held for private profit.
(b) When the time, route, and size will disrupt the use of any street or any
public place, or material portion thereof, which is ordinarily subject to great
congestion of traffic and is chiefly of a business or mercantile character,
except upon those holidays or Sundays when places of business along the
route proposed are closed.
(c) When it is of a size or nature that requires the diversion of so great a number
of police officers of the City to properly police the line of movement and the
areas contiguous thereto, that allowing the parade or motorcade would deny
reasonable police protection to the City.
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21
discretion on local officials to grant or withhold permits as they see fit.
That, of course, would invite discrimination on the basis of the content of
applicants' expression or, worse, the viewpoint they wish to put forward.
However repugnant a message may be, it still is entitled to an opportunity to
be heard.22 By the same token, neither public officials nor judges can subject
would-be speakers' views to an objective test for truth. 3 If investigations of
that sort were permissible, they would threaten freedom through intimidation. As a general rule, private opinions or religious beliefs are entitled to
protection whether or not they are "acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others., 2 4 At the same time, however, citizens can scarcely
throw up a false free speech objection to any regulation they don't like.
When the sincerity of opinions or religious commitments is seriously in
doubt, public authorities can look further-albeit with appropriate sensitivity to the obvious dangers of the enterprise.2 5
Generally, then, city authorities are constitutionally limited to "reasonable" regulations of the "time, place and manner" of the parades for which
licenses are sought.2 6 I hasten to say, though, that the principle of neutrality
that is so crucial in this context does not translate into a simple, mechanical
rule barring city officials from considering what would-be speakers have to
say. Sometimes the authorities must take account of content and viewpoint
in order to distribute parade time and space in a (sensibly) neutral waywhen, for example, a would-be speaker's message is linked to a particular

Special permits for occasions of extraordinary public interest, not annual or customary, or not so intended to be, may be granted by the Commissioner of Transportation for any street or public place, and for any day or hour, with the approval of a
majority of the Boston Transportation Commission.
The Commissioner of Transportation shall have the authority to modify the route,
time, and place of a parade to facilitate crowd control in the interest of relieving
congestion and promoting public safety, provided that the applicant's right of free
speech is not denied thereby.
21 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (involving a permit requirement for
leafletting); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972) (illustrating the
routine application of this principle to public assemblies).
22 E.g., Smith v. Collin, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. I11.), affd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (the famous case involving an apparently disingenuous
attempt by the National Socialist Party of America to obtain a permit to march through
Skokie, Illinois); see Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (1992)
(invalidating a permit scheme under which local officials were given discretion to adjust
parade fees according to the level of policing they thought was needed-a matter not
unrelated to their attitude toward the expression in each instance).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
24 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
25 Ballard, 322 U.S. at 83-84; see Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch.,
Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986).
26 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941); accord Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).
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time or place, when the intensity of one speaker's need to march is demonstrably greater than that of another, or when a speaker's access to a unique
audience depends on using a particular street at a particular time. 7 In order
to sort out complexities like this, the courts must engage in close, fact-specific analysis of the circumstances in which disputes arise.28
All this should be specifically spelled out in the relevant local ordinanceor, at the very least, should be clear from authoritative state court decisions
in point.29 The Supreme Court condemns vague or overbroad statutes regulating expression for a range of self-evident reasons: they offer inadequate
notice regarding what is required of applicants; they fail to constrain the
officials they are supposed to guide; and they "chill" the expression of citizens who may censor themselves rather than risk prosecution under an ordinance that appears on its face to forbid what they have in mind."0 In this, of
course, the Court squeezes local regulators from the other direction. If the
authorities adopt blanket prohibitions on speech to avoid being charged with
invalid discrimination, they may find their handiwork vulnerable for overbreadth.3 ' Legal doctrine that makes inconsistent demands would be obnoxious in ordinary circumstances. Yet where expression is concerned, sharply
circumscribed limits on policy making are perfectly proper. Government is
supposed to have a hard time regulating freedom of speech.
These foundational propositions granted, both sides in the parade cases
may fairly insist that the law is on their side. Parade organizers may assert
that while they may be required to obtain a permit, city officials are constitutionally charged to oblige them. Any limits imposed must be justified by
reasonable, that is, neutral, interests in public convenience and safety. Once
problems of that kind are laid to rest, organizers are entitled to pursue their
Ronald A. Cass, FirstAmendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV.
1287, 1323-24, 1339-40 (1979).
28 E.g., Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire v. District of Columbia, 919 F.2d 148, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (setting aside a preliminary injunction and
remanding for a more thorough exploration of the effect that shortening a parade route
would have on the effectiveness of the event). On claims to use a particular route in order
to convey a special message or to reach a potential audience, see Sixteenth of Sept. Planning Comm. v. City of Denver, 474 F. Supp. 1333, 1340 (D. Colo. 1979); Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667, 674-75 (N.D. I11.
1976); cf. Catholic War Veterans of the United States, Inc. v. City of New York, 576 F.
Supp. 71, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (summarily dismissing an attempt to enjoin the Gay Pride
parade from passing by St. Patrick's Cathedral-ostensibly on the ground that the
marchers would violate the free speech and free exercise rights of parishioners).
29 See Cox, 312 U.S. at 574-77.
30 On overbreadth, see Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522-25 (1972); on vagueness,
27

see Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). See generally Anthony Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the FirstAmendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975).

31 E.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575-77 (1987).
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plans without interference. Even if the views they use the parade to advance
are offensive to the authorities or others, the organizers' freedom to speak is
entitled to respect. By the same token, gay and lesbian groups may fairly
claim that they, too, are entitled to the same treatment. They, too, effectively seek permission to parade their message, and the authorities are constitutionally barred from favoring their adversaries. As a first pass at the
resulting conflict, one might reasonably suggest that separate parades be
scheduled at different times or over different routes.3 2 That course may be
helpful in some instances.3 3 Yet we will see that simply multiplying the
number of parades does not offer a complete and satisfying answer. We cannot resolve the conflicts within St. Patrick's Day parades by ceding that day
to some claimants and relegating other claimants to a different celebration at
another time and place.
B.

Refinements

Increasingly beyond this point, parade law must partake of decisions in
other contexts in which the Court has articulated free speech doctrine that
seems, in principle, to be equally applicable here. To begin, the Court has
often made it clear that when citizens take their turn in a public forum,
government has no business telling them what to say. The central value
protected by the First Amendment is "freedom of belief," the individual's
right to think as she pleases.3 4 Moreover, that entitlement takes on special
power when the thought in question touches politics or religion, the latter
being a matter of independent First Amendment concern. 5 No official,
"high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
[or] religion.",3 6 The freedom to think begets, in turn, the freedom to
speak-to manifest one's personal commitments to others willing to listen
and thus to serve the public interest in the exchange of information and
opinion regarding "all matters of public concern. '37 The freedom to speak
one's mind includes, in turn, the freedom to hold one's tongue. For the
See, e.g., Memorandum of Law Submitted on Behalf of the New York Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 3, 13, New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (93 Civ. 0281) (copy on file with the
Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter NYCLU Memorandum, Federal Court].
3 For example, the courts have had some success in settling squabbles over demonstrations in front of St. Patrick's Cathedral during the Gay Pride parade in New York by
ordering that Dignity (a gay and lesbian organization) and the Defense of St. Patrick's
Cathedral Committee (an opposing group) must share the sidewalk-by alternating
groups of 25 representatives each at 30-minute intervals, with a police barricade between
those who are demonstrating and those who are waiting to demonstrate. Olivieri v.
Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1986).
34 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1976).
15 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713-16 (1977).
36 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
31 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978) (explaining that the
First Amendment protects society's interest in hearing what speakers have to say).
32
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freedom "not to speak publicly" ' serves "the same ultimate end as freedom of
speech in its affirmative aspect. ,38
The freedom to speak or not to speak includes, as well, the freedom to
decline to mouth the messages of others. When government mandates
"speech that a speaker would not otherwise" utter, it "necessarily alters...
content."' 39 The First Amendment thus protects citizens from being punished for failing to endorse an ideological cause for which they have no sympathy,4° and, accordingly, refusing to enhance "the relative voice" of
"opponents.", 41 Said another way, it protects citizens from being made the
unwilling instruments by which government dispenses its own estimate of
right thinking, 41 or, indeed, anything else thought to be of interest and
value.43 If the authorities really think people should hear something, the
direct approach is available. In some instances at least, they can seek information regarding speakers' messages through official channels and then can
44
publish the material itself.
Finally, the freedom to speak, not to speak, and to speak only what one
will spills over into a wider body of freedoms, commonly denominated rights
of association. The Supreme Court purports to recognize two kinds of associational rights.45 One, the right of "expressive association, ' '46 sounds
plainly in freedom of speech and therefore is manifestly pertinent here. The
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (quoting
Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)).
31

39 Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).
40 E.g., Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 15 (invalidating a rule requiring an objecting utility
company to include outsiders' newsletters in billing envelopes); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (holding that a union may not tax objecting members for
funds to advance causes unrelated to the union's duties as their collective-bargaining representative); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974) (setting aside a statute requiring newspapers to allow political candidates space in which to
reply to editorial criticism).
41 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
42 E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (holding that citizens cannot be
forced to display the state motto-popular among many but repugnant to some).
43 Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-801 (regarding the disclosure of the percentage of receipts
actually spent by fundraisers on the causes for which they solicited contributions).
41 Id. at 800 (noting that North Carolina authorities might have protected consumers
from fraud by publishing the "detailed financial disclosure forms" that professional fundraisers were required to file); accord Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637-38 (1980). But see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958) (holding that NAACP members could not be required
to disclose their affiliation to state investigators).
4' E.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 620-21 (1984); accord
New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1988); Board of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544-49 (1987).
41 William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U. L.
REV. 68, 69, 76-77 (1986).
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other, the right of "intimate association," 47 derives from a less particularized

corpus of human liberty, tied to personal affection, camaraderie, and ethnic
connection, and thus is less obviously relevant. On closer scrutiny, this second brand of associational freedom breaks down further into at least two
sub-categories: freedom respecting relationships that are genuinely "intimate" in the personal, typically sexual or familial sense, and freedom
respecting relationships that are more attenuated and better understood as
"cultural" in nature.48 Ultimately, all three kinds of associational freedom
are implicated in the parade cases. Yet clear analysis demands that they be
distinguished and approached seriatim.
The right of expressive association rests on the First Amendment itself,
which protects both the individual's freedom to speak alone and his freedom
to associate with others for the purpose of magnifying his voice. This kind
of associational right is preeminently volitional and purposeful. The individual's deliberate choice of what to say is inextricable from her choice of the
company in which to say it-in order to get it said in the most effective way.
Think here of political parties49 and other voluntary groups formed to promote a fairly specific normative agenda.5 ° There is both a positive (inclusive)
side to this and a negative (exclusive) side. The freedom to associate for the
advancement of one's views "necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify
the people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to
those people only."'"
Herein, of course, parade law appears to take a turn in favor of original
organizers. In combination, the individual's freedom to decline to endorse a
cause with which she disagrees and her freedom to exclude from her associates those who would undermine a group message yield a proposition of
ostensible significance. The Constitution recognizes and protects an entitlement on the part of parade organizers to band together for the purpose of
speech-and, importantly, to police the purity of the collective message that
results by barring those who dissent from the party line. I hasten to say,
however, that the mere existence of this constitutional protection does not
resolve anything. As we will see in a moment, gay and lesbian groups, too,
are served by the recognition of a fairly sweeping right of expressive association. For even as intolerant parade organizers capitalize on this right to
resist accepting homosexuals formally into their community, gays and lesbi47 Id. at 76-80; see Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE
L.J. 624 (1980).
48 Marshall, supra note 46, at 84-88; see KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA:

EQUAL CITIZENSHIP

AND THE CONSTITUTION

81-104 (1989) [hereinafter

KARST, BELONGING]; Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging.- The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986).
49 E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976).
50 E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (civil rights organizations);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (same).
51 Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981);
accord Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214-15 (1986).
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ans depend on their own, similar right of expressive association to rally
together in the pursuit of that very community acceptance.52 Moreover,
interests and values that compete with the freedom of expressive association
must still be identified and weighed.
The freedom of intimate association rests more generally on the liberty
safeguarded by the Due Process Clauses and extends to relationships of a
different order.5" Think here of close ties to spouses, children, family in general-and about personal decisions touching sex and procreation.54 Intimate
associations are sometimes volitional and sometimes not. People choose
their friends, but not their relatives; they choose their sexual partners, but
not their sexual orientation.55 Individuals draw "much of their emotional
enrichment" ' from their close relationships around the kitchen table, before
the family hearth, and upstairs in bed. The right of intimate association,
suffice it to say, plays an important, if oblique, role in the parade cases we
are investigating.
The right of cultural association shares with the right of intimate association somc, but not all, its emphasis on human connection. Think here of
more diverse human groups, which by dint of their "size, purpose, policies,
selectivity, [and] congeniality" 5 7 offer a "private" shield against governmental overreaching and thus foster pluralism within mass society. Think,
indeed, of ethnic and religious associations by which "shared ideals and
beliefs" are cultivated and transmitted between generations. 58 In some
instances, the freedom of cultural association covers involuntary relationships into which an individual is thrust by accident of birth and out of which
even the most existential among us rarely escapes. It is one thing to abandon
a father's commitment to FDR and quite another to stop being Jewish. In
other instances, this third kind of associational freedom is, like the others,
very much a matter of individual choice.5 9 Protestants don't have to be
Masons. In practice, it is often hard to say whether the cultural associations
one has were received or selected.60
52 KARST, BELONGING, supra note 48, at 92-93 (making this point generally about
subordinated minority groups).
53 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-20 (1984).

4 E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (marriage and family);
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (family); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (procreation). When, in Roberts, 468 U.S. at
619, Justice Brennan cited these and other cases behind the point in the text, he neglected
the abortion case, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). I suspect that omission was deliberate-not because Roe was inapposite, but because an explicit citation might have intimated general approval and thus jeopardized Justice Brennan's unanimous judgment.
" See discussion infra notes 323-27 and accompanying text.
6

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.

57 Id. at 620.
58
59
60

Id. at 619.
Id. at 617-18.
Aviam Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and Insular. Involuntary Groups and the
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Both the freedom of intimate association and the freedom of cultural association include, as a necessary corollary, some principle of inclusion and
exclusion. For every human grouping must have its defining contours. Yet
the reasons that some would-be members are included in, and others are
excluded from, these liaisons are different. Intimate associations insulate a
small sphere of personal endearment, passion, and physical fulfillment. Cultural associations screen out threats to broad-based ethnic and similar relationships that balance the great power of the state. 61 Indeed, the life-blood
of expressive groups (the identification and promotion of a clear ideological
message) can, and often does, pose a threat to intimate and cultural associations. The latter groups celebrate other bases of human connection and
actively discourage any focus on ideological differences about which participants may well disagree.
All three forms of associational freedom are vitally linked to self-identification. The freedom to think and to say what you think is part and parcel of
being human; the right of expressive association merely adds the communal
touch to an otherwise individualistic idea. The freedom to love is equally
basic, the freedom of intimate association merely the doctrinal recognition of
that truth. Finally, even in modem liberal society, for all its cold isolation,
individuals still identify themselves, at least in part, by their cultural links
with others. Individuals locate themselves in the universe not only by reference to those they vote with or sleep with, but also those they drink with, go
to church with, live and die with. By the people they care for-and the
people who care back. Here again, however, even as the different faces of
associational freedom share a common theme in self-identification, they can
be in tension one with another. We will see in the parade cases that expressive association, which contemplates a discernible collective message and
gathers strength as that message is sharpened, competes with cultural association, which flourishes best when potentially divisive ideological issues are
ignored.6 2
Ango-American Judicial Tradition, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 381, 383 (1991) (observing
the problematic nature of legal categories that purport to define basic social units such as
families, tribes, and racial, ethnic, religious, or national groups).
61 Not just any club, irrespective of its size and character, can select its members as it
chooses. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
The rights-oriented freedom of association asserted by any particular group must be given
its constitutional due as against more communitarian claims of equal access-but only in
light of the "objective characteristics of the particular relationships at issue." Board of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 547-48 n.6 (1987)
(quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620); see Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom of Association After
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1878, 1881, 1903 (1984) (identifying

the liberal/communitarian tension in the background). In all three of the Supreme
Court's principal cases in point, Duarte, Roberts, and New York State Club Ass'n, state
anti-discrimination laws were applied to the gender-conscious membership policies of
clubs with a substantially commercial raison d'tre.
62 See discussion infra note 347 and accompanying text.
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In any case, to understand all that is at stake in the parade cases, we must
explore the sense in which the organizers' efforts to exclude gays and lesbians, and equally gays and lesbians' attempts to participate, respond to deeper
yearnings for self-definition through association. The right of expressive
association is very much in the middle of this, but we will see that the rights
of intimate and cultural association may be even more influential. Associations that are only distantly linked with the expression of any particular
message may, in the end, reach all the way to the fundamental divisions
from which the controversy over the parades arises in the first instance.
C.

Complications

What we have said so far is hardly the end of parade law. To complete the
whole, we must consider two further points that cloud the picture
considerably.
1. The State Action Conundrum
The affirmative speech and associational rights we have discussed depend
on a crucial premise, namely that only private citizens bear responsibility for
what is said by way of a street parade and who is included or excluded. That
premise is often perfectly sound. Certainly if local authorities restrict themselves to administering a neutral permit scheme for the very purpose of
ensuring that private speakers have a chance to press their views without
governmental interference, it would be circular to hold the state accountable
for the message that private licensees express or the way in which they define
the association through which they express it.6" If government is constitutionally obliged to play the role of disinterested referee, then it can scarcely
be faulted for doing so. Herein, of course, orthodox constitutional doctrine
indulges a crude version of the public/private distinction, much maligned in
academic circles.64 Put concretely, the Constitution speaks only to the state,
63 The notion that government officials approve the speech of those who are permitted
to express themselves would presumably (and invalidly) imply that the authorities can
and should allow only speech with which they genuinely are in sympathy. See Toward a
Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F. Supp. 642, 645
(D.R.I. 1976) (refusing to accept as a basis for denying a gay organization the use of a
public facility the argument that the authorities thought that they would be approving
the organization's point of view). The Court has noted that while government cannot
subvert the Fourteenth Amendment simply by delegating authority for public facilities to
private groups that discriminate on the basis of race, the wholesale refusal of state authorities to permit such organizations to use public facilities because of their views would

infringe their freedom of association. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575

(1974).
.6' See, e.g., Symposium, The Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289
(1982). For a nuanced recent treatment of the many forms the distinction, and arguments about it, may take, see Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/PrivateDistinc-

tion, 45

STAN.

L.

REV.

1 (1992).
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not to private citizens and their organizations. 6' And while the administration of a permit system clearly is "state action," the use to which licensees
put their permits is not.'
If, by contrast, local authorities depart from the role of neutral moderator
and involve themselves in the enterprise, entirely different implications flow.
Once public officials act in league with private citizens, the Constitution does
address what is going on in the street, imposing the same standards for a
joint venture between government and private actors as for governmental
behavior alone. It follows, for example, that racial discrimination would be
permissible only in the most extraordinary circumstances.6 ' Discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation may not receive an equal measure of judicial concern, but so long as we are now talking about a classification according to status, rather than differential treatment according to behavior,68 the
blanket exclusion of gay and lesbian participants would be exceedingly difficult to defend.6 9 Moreover, if the basis of exclusion is not sexual orientation
6s The literature on the "state action" doctrine is massive. See, e.g., Barbara R. Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth
Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1053, 1053 n. I (1990) (collecting illustrative authorities).
6 See National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1016 (4th
Cir. 1973) (explaining that "[n]o case suggests that in maintaining a street ... a state
espouses the views which may be there expressed"). Of course, here, too, variations on
the facts can have doctrinal significance. Cf. O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (holding that District of Columbia authorities did not endorse the Pope's religious message in violation of the Establishment Clause merely by providing police and
fire protection during a mass on the Mall). Compare Gay Veterans Ass'n v. American
Legion, 621 F. Supp. 1510, 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that a parade licensed by the
City of New York but conducted by the American Legion without public funds was
"private" and thus not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment) with North Shore Right to
Life v. Manhassett Am. Legion, 452 F. Supp. 834, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (reaching a different result where the relationship between city authorities and parade organizers was
arguably closer). But see Gilfillan v. City of Phila., 637 F.2d 924, 928 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that public expenditures for a special platform from which the Pope administered mass did violate the Establishment Clause).
67 In Gilmore, the Court noted that "invidious discrimination takes its own toll on the
freedom to associate, and it is not subject to affirmative constitutional protection when it
involves state action." 417 U.S. at 575.
68 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986) (validating state sodomy laws
applied to gays). See generally WALTER BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPRESSIVE SEX LAWS

(1973) (laying the groundwork for the arguments that should have prevailed in Bowers).
69 For cases applying close judicial scrutiny to classifications on the basis of sexual
orientation, see Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1551-52 (D. Kan. 1991); Society for
Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399, 402 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Gay Law
Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 597-98 (Cal. 1979). But see BenShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-66 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that such classifications need only be "rational"). Compare High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clear-
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itself, but the views that gays and lesbians hold regarding their homosexualities, it would seem that, in this different state of affairs, the First Amendment would no longer protect private parade organizers' efforts to bar
homosexuals because of their dissenting views, but, instead, would prohibit
public and private organizers acting jointly from excluding gays and lesbians
on that very basis.70 Here, of course, we return to ground we covered earlier. 7' Even when they join forces with private actors, public officials are
charged to be impartial with respect to the content of would-be speakers'
messages and the viewpoints they wish to advance.7 2
By this account, everything turns, again, on the doctrinal box in which a
parade is placed: if it is legitimately an exercise of private constitutional
rights within a neutral framework, we get one result; if it is a governmentally
sponsored event, we get another. The line the Court uses to delineate these
two categories establishes no bright and sharp test to be applied mechanically. We know only to look for "a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."'73 In the parade cases,
it is not always easy to know such a nexus when you see one. True, the
Court has not been inclined in recent years to hold local authorities responsible for many of the calamities that occur about them-even when they know
what needs to be done but fail to take action within their authority and thus
ance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (declining to invoke "strict scrutiny" with
respect to a sexual orientation classification touching security clearances) with High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 376 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby &
Norris, J.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing) (insisting that "strict scrutiny" was
appropriate). See Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation:Homosexuality
as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Developments in the Law.

Sexual Orientationand the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1557-59 (1989); see also Richard Delgado, Fact, Norm, and Standardsof Review-The Case of Homosexuality, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 575 (1985) (probing more subtle doctrinal issues). Since I am now
merely sketching largely noncontroversial legal doctrine, it is unnecessary to examine
critically the status/behavior dichotomy implicit in cases like Bowers. Suffice it to say,
though, that such a distinction will not withstand scrutiny. At the very least, the Court is
inconsistent on the point. RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS,
SOCIETY, AND LAW 189 (1988) (noting that religious practices as well as beliefs receive
constitutional protection). One has to think, too, that the authority of the decision in
Bowers has been weakened by Justice Powell's public admission that his (decisive) concurring vote was "probably" a "mistake." Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May
Have Been Wrong, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3.
70 See also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983) (recognizing the cases in
which classifications bearing on free speech have received special judicial attention); cf
MOHR, supra note 69, at 39-41, 188-89 (making the point that if homosexual orientation
is a matter of choice it would seem to be protected after the fashion of free speech). But
see discussion infra note 362 and accompanying text.
71 See discussion supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
72 See discussion supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.

73 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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permit, if they do not commit, harmful behavior.74 Yet some decisions
attach significance even to official participation in the "scheduling" of events
on public property.75
2.

The Police Power

Finally, the conceded constitutional protection to which parade
organizers and participants are entitled is not absolute, but must be balanced
against the reasons that government may have for restricting constitutional
freedom. We have already mentioned government's legitimate interests in
traffic management and public order, which explain and justify subjecting
parades to previous restraints. Further regulation may be warranted to serve
other, equally legitimate objectives. Specifically, the Supreme Court has regularly held that government has a compelling interest in combating invidious
discrimination and thus may legislate a state of affairs it has no constitutional obligation to sponsor.76 In this, of course, the Court acknowledges a
field of operation for discretionary, majoritarian, legislative police power.
Both New York7 7 and Boston" have ordinances that expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of "sexual orientation" in "places of public accommodation." And the courts and agencies responsible for enforcing those
laws have found them applicable to the St. Patrick's Day parades. 79
74 E.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97,
201 (1989).
7 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974).
76 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). Compare Gilmore, 417 U.S. at 573-74 (hesitating to hold that city authorities would violate the Fourteenth Amendment merely by permitting racially segregated groups to use public
facilities) with United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 486 (E.D.
La. 1974) (holding that the race discrimination practiced by a private football league

violated Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). On the general question, see Runyan v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(4) (Supp. 1992):
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner,
lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, resort or amusement, because of the race, creed,
color, national origin, age, gender, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, alienage, or citizenship status of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold
from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or

7 N.Y.C.

privileges thereof.
L. ch. 272, § 98 (1992):
Whoever makes any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of race,
color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, which shall not include
persons whose sexual orientation involves minor children as the sex object, deafness,
blindness or any physical or mental disability or ancestry relative to the admission of
any person to, or his treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or
amusement, as defined in section ninety-two A, or whoever aids or incites such distinction, discrimination or restriction shall be punished ....
79 Ancient Order of Hibernians in Am., Inc., Complaint No. MPA-0362, slip op. at 3
(City of N.Y. Comm'n on Human Rights Oct. 27, 1992) [hereinafter HRC Decision];
78 MASS. GEN.
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Here again, we have boxes to fill, labels to attach. Here again, the effort
we spend in that direction brings us closer to a confident result-but fails
actually to get us there. Just as it will not do simply to characterize the
parades as private affairs administered by disinterested governmental traffic
cops, and to insist on that basis alone that organizers may exclude gays and
lesbians, it will not do, in the alternative, simply to characterize them as
public events, wherein even private actors may be asked to comply with local
anti-discrimination laws. 0 To appraise fully the constitutional implications
of parading ourselves, we have to get deeper into the experiential backdrop
of the parades. We are ready to do that now.
II.

PARADES IN THE STREETS

Let us be clear at the outset that we are not here discussing just any of the
thousands of street processions held both regularly and irregularly in the
United States each year. Nor are we investigating any of the two hundred or
so parades scheduled annually on March 17 in various towns around the
country."' Those parades may be flavored by Irish attachments and sentiIrish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v. City of Boston, Civil No. 92-1518, slip
op. at 3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 1993). The state courts are authoritative regarding the
reach of these state statutes. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 11 (1990). It is open to
argue that a parade is such an obvious exercise of free speech that it should not be held to
be a place of public accommodation. E.g., Reply Memorandum of Law Submitted on
Behalf of the New York Civil Liberties Union at 8-12, Ancient Order of Hibernians (No.
MPA-0362) [hereinafter NYCLU Memorandum, HRC] (making this argument with
respect to the New York parade). Yet the power of such an argument depends on the
particular circumstances of the case at hand. It is also open to argue that a parade is not
a "place" within the meaning of these ordinances. Cf. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742

F. Supp. 1413, 1421 (N.D. Il1. 1990) (declining to apply Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act to the Boy Scouts because that organization was not a "place" for Title II purposes).
It is not unusual, however, for local agencies and courts to read anti-discrimination statutes more generously in aid of their remedial objectives. E.g., National Org. for Women
v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); see
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 334 (Ct. App. 1984)
(reviewing the history of less accommodating judicial decisions regarding a similar statute in California-and the legislative response).
80 See Keller, 496 U.S. at 11 (making clear that an authoritative state court decision
regarding the nature of an organization for state law purposes does not control any federal constitutional implications). The analytical point, of course, is that state and federal
issues arise seriatim. It must first be decided whether a parade is a public accommodation under state law. Only if it is does one need to reach the further question whether
such state anti-discrimination law can be applied in a particular instance, consistent with
the federal Constitution. But see Ward v. South Boston Allied War Veterans Council,
Docket No. 92-BPA-0014, slip op. at 2 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination May 29,
1992) (Investigating Commissioner's Order) (on file with the Boston University Law
Review) (erroneously suggesting that a decision that a parade fits the state statutory definition of a place of public accommodation precludes further First Amendment issues).
81 Affidavit of Bartholomew Murphy, Vice President of the New York County Board
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ments and may be named for Ireland's patron saint, St. Patrick. Yet they
are not
"the" 2 St. Patrick's Day Parade up Fifth Avenue in Manhattan or
"the"83 Evacuation Day Parade in South Boston. The New York and Boston events are singular in the profound significance they bear for all New
Yorkers and Bostonians, for all Irish Americans and, indeed, for the country
as a whole. Let's take a moment to review their history.
A.

The New York Parade
1. History

By conventional account, the parade in New York finds its origins in several small celebrations in the eighteenth century, undertaken by Irish immigrants to commemorate the feast day of St. Patrick, the cleric said to have
introduced Christianity to Ireland.84 In 1766, for example, a fife and drum
team from a local military unit circulated among the homes of prominent
Irish families, awakening everyone at dawn. Over the succeeding century,
parading up Fifth Avenue on March 17 evolved into an annual event. Two
developments in the middle of the nineteenth century bore telling, definitional significance-the appearance of a regular sponsor for the event and
the emergence of the parade as an Irish-Catholic counterpoint to the nativism of the annual Independence Day parade in the city. A third development in recent years, the emergence of the parade as a situs for working
through modern political disputes, forms the crucial backdrop for the current controversy we are exploring.
The parade began to take on genuine staying power in 1853, when it found
a reliable annual sponsor in the New York County branch of the Ancient
Order of Hibernians (AOH), a privately organized, not-for-profit organization with roots in medieval Ireland, whose members must be Roman Catholic men of Irish descent."5 There were occasional gaps. The parade was
of the Ancient Order of Hibernians at 3, New York Country Bd. of Ancient Order of
Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (93 Civ. 0281) (on file with the
Boston University Law Review) (hereinafter Murphy Affidavit]; cf. Calvin Sims, To Save
Money, City Hall Considers Cutting Parades,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at B3 (reporting
that New York City alone was the site of approximately 750 parades and 3000 street
events in 1991).
82 Murphy Affidavit, supra note 81, at 3; see also discussion infra notes 86, 180, 194
and accompanying text.
83 Joint Stipulations, Ward v. South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, Docket No.

92-BPA-0014, slip op. at 2 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination filed Mar. 15, 1993)
(on file with the Boston University Law Review).
84 John T. Ridge, The History of the St. Patrick'sDay Paradein New York, IRISH AM.
MAC., Mar./Apr. 1993, at 68.
85 Joint Statement of Uncontested Facts at 1-3, Ancient Order ofHiberniansv. Dinkins
(93 Civ. 0281) [hereinafter Joint Statement]; Recommended Decision and Order at 4,
Ancient Order of Hibernians in Am., Inc., Complaint No. MPA-0362 (City of N.Y.
Comm'n on Human Rights filed Mar. 13, 1992) [hereinafter HRC Recommended Order].
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canceled in 1880 in order that scarce funds might better go to famine relief
efforts in Ireland. And it was split apart on two occasions, 1858 and 1885,
because of bickering between rival Hibernian groups. In 1885, one contingent marched uptown from Cooper Union, while the other proceeded downtown and across the bridge to join a third parade in Brooklyn. In 1916, the
police commissioner awarded the parade permit to a minority faction of proBritish Hibernians. After winning the resulting court battle, that group
managed only a small procession on Fifth Avenue, boycotted by most other
Irish societies. The New York County group that had previously served as
sponsor refused an invitation to march on an alternative street that year.
Responsibility for the parade was soon restored to the county AOH, and
that organization has organized and conducted it ever since. For as long as
anyone can remember, the police department has reserved "the" permit for
"the" parade up Fifth Avenue on March 17 for this "traditional" sponsor,
refusing to consider awarding "the" permit to any other applicant-a practice, by the way, that Judge Constance Baker Motley approved in 1985.6
86 Gay Veterans Ass'n v. American Legion, 621 F. Supp. 1510, 1516 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(noting a similar practice with respect to the Veterans Day parade, the Labor Day
parade, and the Gay Pride Day parade). Gerald J. Kerins, the Assistant Chief of Police
at the time, testified in the Gay Veterans case as follows:
Q: Chief Kerins, on what basis do you approve or disapprove an application for a
parade permit?
A: Well, there are certain parades that are held annually, some of them going
hundreds of years, and we routinely approve those parades without any question or
any reservation.
There are a variety of other parades, some of them new, some of them on an
individual basis, that are just one-time affairs and that we review the route, the time
of day, the area that they are looking to march, and based on our findings, we either
approve or disapprove of them. ...
Q: Can you tell us what a traditional parade is?
A: The traditional parades that we have are, you know, there are about 20 that go
down Fifth Avenue and involve mostly ethnic groups; the Italians, the Irish, the
Spanish. They march at the same-either on the same date every year or on the
same Sunday or Saturday of the week ....
Q: Are these parades also in the same location each year?
A: Yes, they foloow [sic] the same parade route.
Q: And does the police department give these traditional parades a priority when
the applications come in?
A: Yes, we do.
Q: The police department doesn't go on a first come-first served basis, does it?
A: No, no, we don't.
Q: Why does the police department give a priority to these traditional annual
parades?
A: Well, I think that every parade group-I don't know of any that over the
course of years has not had some dissident elements in it; the Irish with the No Raid
Committee, and the signs, anti-Britain, the JDL in the Salute to Israel parade, the
Puerto Ricans have a socialist group that used to march in their parade that upsets
the parade committee. Any one of these groups, to embarrass the regular annual
parade, could file a petition ahead of time and if we were to follow a first come-first
served, it could exclude parades like St. Patrick's, which has been going for over 200
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Under the current ordinance, indeed, it appears that traditional sponsors for
annual Fifth Avenue parades need not even apply for permits.8 7 The Hibernians purport to do so only to ensure efficient cooperation with the police."8
Under the auspices of the county AOH, the parade on March 17 matured
in the last half of the nineteenth century in parallel with the Independence
Day parade on July 4. Early on, anti-Irish and anti-Catholic forces in the
city resisted Irish participation in the July 4th parade. In 1853, the Convention of Irish Societies bowed to the threat of violence and declined to send
representatives. When Hibernians attempted to take their place, they ended
up in a brawl with "Know Nothings." Thereafter, the March 17 parade,
with all its attention to people and ideas distinctly Irish, came to be understood as an Irish rejoinder to the July 4th parade, the symbol of an overarching, national society from which many Irish immigrants felt excluded.8 9
On the one hand, the March 17 parade has always had a certain edge to
it-a sense of resentment and alienation born of rejection by the larger community. The martial character of the March 17 celebration reflects this contentious history. To this day, the St. Patrick's Day parade in New York is
escorted by military units-most prominently the "Fighting 69th," a regiment of the state militia that historically included many Irish recruits. 9° The
self-evident religious overtones are, in some sense, to the same effect. The
parade is preceded each year by a special mass, conducted at St. Patrick's
Cathedral by the Cardinal of the Archdiocese of New York. Representatives
of the Fighting 69th routinely attend the mass, as do other principal participants. By common account, the parade reaches its zenith when it passes the
Cathedral and the Cardinal's traditional reviewing stand, where the Cardinal himself extends the grand marshal an official greeting. 9' Many units in
the parade carry banners bearing the traditional seal of an Irish county on
years, and some of the other parades, so it has been the policy of the police department to continue to give the parade permits to the organizations that traditionally
hold them.
Trial Transcript at 93, 95-97, Gay Veterans (No. 85 Civ. 8539) (on file with the Boston
University Law Review) [hereinafter Kerins Testimony].
87 The current ordinance expressly exempts longstanding parades (and thus their

traditional sponsors) from any permit requirement:
b. Exemptions. This section shall not apply....
3. To processions or parades which have marched annually upon the streets for
more than ten years, previous to July seventh, nineteen hundred fourteen.
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 10-110(b)(3) (1990).
88 Affidavit of Timothy V. Hartnett at 8, Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins (Civ.
0281) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter Hartnett Affidavit]
(insisting that "[t]he police department reserves the route for the sponsor and does not
issue a permit to anyone else"); see also discussion infra note 170 and accompanying text.
89 HRC Recommended Order, supra note 85, at 4 (locating the "roots" of the parade
in efforts to eliminate "discrimination against Irish New Yorkers").
90 Ridge, supra note 84, at 69.
91 Murphy Affidavit, supra note 81, at 9; HRC Recommended Order, supra note 85,

at 5.
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one side and representations of St. Patrick on the other.92 These traditional
features attest to a definite sense of difference-the pride that flowers in a
people spurned.
On the other hand, and perhaps paradoxically, the parade also projects
the image of Irish inclusion. According to the organizers, the parade celebrates not only Catholic ideology and Irish heritage, but also the proposition
that "all Americans, native and immigrant alike, enjoy the freedom of the
City on the streets of New York and, by implication, throughout our
land."93 The Hibernians thus enthusiastically invite participants and spectators from all quarters to a massive, civic event that aspires to pluralistic
unity. Even the military escorts and the tributes to the Cardinal fit this additional model. The presence of units like the Fighting 69th makes the point
that Irish-Americans, too, are ready to fight for their country. The orchestrated deference to the Cardinal invites religious tolerance.
The parade has seen many controversies over the last century-many of
them touching Irish politics. I have mentioned some already. There are
more. In 1860, the commander of the Fighting 69th was court-martialed for
refusing to allow his troops to participate in a tribute to the Prince of Wales.
The following year, the March 17 parade constituted a "tribute" to the regiment-which continues to be the most-honored contingent on Fifth Avenue. 94 In succeeding years, the parade provided a forum for debating, or
fighting over, conditions in Ireland-with Irish nationalist groups like the
Fenian Society pitted against Protestant proponents of the Crown like the
Orange Order. In 1915, the chair of the arrangements committee held up
the parade until a band stopped playing "It's a Long Way to Tipperary," the
song used by British recruiters to persuade young Irishmen to join the British Army. In 1969, marchers wore black arm bands to express solidarity
with Northern Ireland nationalists. And in 1990, members of NORAID, an
organization providing assistance to the victims of violence in Northern Ireland, wore bandages over their mouths to protest the organizers' refusal to
allow them to carry signs supporting the imprisoned IRA leader, Joe
Doherty. 95
The parade has also reflected, and been affected by, domestic political
alignments and disputes. At the outset, anti-Irish sentiments among Republicans kept politicians away.96 Yet when the number of immigrants in the
92
93

HRC Recommended Order, supra note 85, at 5.
Id.

14 Ridge, supra note 84, at 70.
95 Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition to Reverse and Vacate at 33 n.24,
Beirne v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, Index No. 92-29840 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
filed Dec. 10, 1992) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter Hibernian Memorandum, State Court].
96 See GEORGE E. REEDY, FROM THE WARD TO THE WHITE HouSE 52-54 (1991)
(contrasting the industrialists then in control of the Republican Party with urban working-class Irish immigrants).
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city swelled in the late nineteenth century, 7 Irish New Yorkers built their
own power base in the Democratic Party. Then, the parade began to attract
vote-seeking office holders and candidates. Occasionally, city mayors served
as grand marshals. When there were two parades in 1885, Mayor W.R.
Grace, himself an Irishman, attended both.98 In 1966, the liberal Republican mayor, John Lindsay, walked the entire route. 9 Through the 1980s,
political figures from all three New York parties regarded an appearance at
the parade as de rigueur, both to participate actively in one of the city's
premier events and also to signal a bond with, and concern for, Irish-Americans and their interests.'0° For many years, and again in 1993, the city permitted organizers to paint an "emerald" green line on Fifth Avenue to mark
the parade route-yet another salute to the Irish roots of the celebration.' °'
Politicians sometimes spelled their surnames with an extra "0" on parade
day, and generally promoted the message of Irish inclusion implied in the
common refrain that "[o]n St. Patrick's Day, every New Yorker is Irish."' °2
0
In this way, the New York parade has grown both in stature and in size. 3
Participants in 1936 reportedly numbered 40,000. More recently, the figure
has consistently been many times that. Individuals march only in units
approved by the county AOH parade committee. Each unit may display its
own identifying banner, but other flags or signs are barred-particularly
placards promoting political candidates, social causes, or commercial products. Anti-abortion groups have been excluded, notwithstanding that many
Hibernians undoubtedly share their views, as have political candidates
attempting to march alone-among them Jimmy Carter and Robert Kennedy.'0 4 The Irish flag is everywhere, and one traditional banner reads:
"England Get Out of Ireland."'0 5 In recent years, the parade has included
labor unions, numerous police, military, and school bands, and units representing immigrant groups from other countries. 10 6 The official line of march
97 See 1 U.S. CENSUS OFFICE, NINTH CENSUS 1870, at 386-91 tbl. 8 (1872) (reporting
that Irish-born residents accounted for 21.4% of the city's population in 1870).
98 Mary Cantwell, St. Patrick's Gallimaufry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1993, at A20.

99 Ridge, supra note 84, at 78.
1oo Parading Bigotry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1992, at A22 (noting that the modern
parade "involves every politician in town").
101 Sam Roberts, One More Time, with Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1993, at B1
(reporting that the city refused permission to paint the Irish green line when other ethnic
groups began demanding that they paint their national colors on the avenue during their
parades-but that the green line was back in 1993).
102 Sara Rimer, All New York Turns Irish for St. Patrick'sParade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 1984, at A28.
"0I See Cantwell, supra note 98 (noting that the parade became larger after Irish immigration swelled in the mid-nineteenth century).
104 Hibernian Memorandum, State Court, supra note 95, at 24-26.
105 Id. at 26 n.17.
106 Respondent Commission's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Petition and
in Support of its Cross-Petition to Enforce Its Order at 6, Beirne v. New York City
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is a virtual honor role of ethnic Irish organizations and musical groups from
the region."' The crowd of onlookers has reached two million along the
parade route and millions more via television.10 8 Sponsors promote the New
York event as the "largest civilian annual parade in the world."' 9
Notwithstanding its success, the parade has recently come upon troubled
times. On the whole, it seems clear that the parade is a net economic benefit
to the city. According to one source, it generates $15 to $20 million in business each year." 0 Most of those profits go, however, to enterprises with a
distinct Irish flavor-from Irish pubs to companies that manufacture Irish
paraphernalia."' By contrast, merchants along Fifth Avenue protest that
the parade diverts their usual customers and thus actually reduces sales." 2
Residents of the area complain that they have only limited access to their
own homes, and the police report that as the parade has become larger it has
placed ever heavier demands on the department to manage congested traffic
and ensure public safety."' For their part, city authorities have encouraged
the AOH to reduce the length of the parade so that it can be completed
before dark-when police protection becomes more difficult." 4
As one might expect, patience with the parade has worn thin as the political power wielded by the Irish community in the city has worn out. Having
achieved some economic success, most Irish New Yorkers removed to the
suburbs-where many began to vote the Republican ticket. Barely ten percent of the city's voters now identify themselves as Irish-Americans, and, in
hard political terms, few of those genuinely matter to current city office
holders. Mayor David Dinkins, who has consistently supported gays and
lesbians who wish to march, received only eighteen percent of the white
Catholic vote in his 1989 victory over Rudolph W. Giuliani, who has generally sided with the Hibernians.11' In the main, the Hibernians who have
Comm'n on Human Rights, Index No. 92-29840 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 10, 1992)
[hereinafter HRC Memorandum].
107 OFFICIAL PROGRAM, 232ND ST. PATRICK'S DAY PARADE, Mar. 17, 1993, at 9 (on
file with the Boston University Law Review).
1os Richard Perez-Pena, Uncertainty over Parade Has Merchants Worried, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, at A31 [hereinafter Perez-Pena, Uncertainty].
109 Joint Statement, supra note 85, at 3.
110 Perez-Pena, Uncertainty, supra note 108, at A31 (reporting an estimate by Debra
Pucci of the European-American Affairs Bureau in the Mayor's office). My attempt to
obtain a more exact figure was unsuccessful. Telephone Conversation with Christina
Ampil, New York City Economic Policy and Marketing Group, June 11, 1993 (reporting
no information available on annual events like the parade).
ill Perez-Pena, Uncertainty, supra note 108, at A31.
112 John Thornton, What's a Parade Without Problems?, IRISH VOICE, Mar. 3, 1992,

at 10.
113 See id.; Parade Rest?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1990, at D18.
114 See Hartnett Affidavit, supra note 88, at 12 (describing the New York Police

Department's parade policy).
115 Richard Perez-Pena, Another Irish ParadeSequel: Despite Ruling for Hibernians,
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traditionally conducted the parade are of that older generation, now located
outside Manhattan.116 The Irish who now live in town tend to be younger
and politically more progressive. They read different newspapers, subscribe
to different visions of the good life, and, in many instances, recognize in
themselves a different sexual orientation. 11 7 By some estimates, ten to fifteen
percent of the city's electorate is gay. 11 As one knowledgeable observer has
put it, "[t]here are probably almost as many gay Irish as there are straight
Irish in this town.""' 9 In these demographic shifts lie the seeds of division
within the Irish community itself-a matter not unrelated to the current
controversy over gay and lesbian participation in the parade.
Issues reflecting generational differences have appeared in the parade
before. For many years, women were not permitted to march. After that
barrier was broken, attention focused on the conspicuous absence of any
Just Who Won is a Tough Call, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1993, at B3 [hereinafter Perez-Pena,
Sequel]; see Patrick Farrelly, The Gays and the Parade:The Inside Story, IRISH VOICE,
Mar. 23, 1991, at 23 (reporting that Dinkins was being told by aides that "thumbing his
nose" at the parade organizers would "do him no harm" and probably was a political
"plus"); Todd S. Purdum, A Resolute Dinkins, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at Al, B4
(quoting Dinkins' observation that those who jeered him when he marched with gays and
lesbians in the 1991 parade "wouldn't vote for me in the first place"); The Right to
March, IRISH VOICE, Mar. 16, 1991, at 12 (declaring that the Hibernians had "marched
smack into lobbies of more power in the city"-gays among them); Correction, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at A12 (withdrawing a previous report that Giuliani had been
"silent" on the parade issue and now reporting that he supported the Hibernians on First
Amendment grounds); see also Maurice Carroll, Is Church Still Powerhouse?, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 25, 1993, at 18 (reviewing election results and the political implications for Mayor
Dinkins); Maurice Carroll, Keeping a Rein on Irish Parade, NEWSDAY, Jan. 24, 1992, at
20 [hereinafter Carroll, Rein] (same).
116 See Joseph Berger, In New York City, Catholic Clout Wanes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1991, at D18 (reporting the movement of Irish immigrants to the suburbs and the concomitant decline of Church influence in Manhattan); Niall O'Dowd, Fighting Irish,
MarchingIrish, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1992, at A23 (doubting that there are many organizations "as fundamentally unyielding to change as the Hibernians"); Still in Charge,
IRISH VOICE, Apr. 27, 1991, at 16 (reporting that the Hibernians took "a lot of pride" in
the way their leaders "stood up to the forces of twentieth-century America").
117 Perez-Pena, Sequel, supra note 115, at B3. Empirical data on the point would be
difficult to come by, but it is widely understood in Manhattan that the Irish Echo, which
has taken the Hibernians' part, is typically read by older generations, while the Irish
Voice, which has supported gay and lesbian participation, is typically read by younger,
more progressive city residents. See Michael Dorman, What Really Makes New York
Work, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, pt. 2 (Magazine), at 42, 44 (reporting on New York's
ethnic publications and their readers); John McCarthy, St. Patrick's War, NAT'L REV.,
Apr. 12, 1993, at 26 (reporting on divisions between different generations of Irish
immigrants).
118 Perez-Pena, Sequel, supra note 115, at B3.
119 Roberts, note 101, at BI (quoting Professor Richard C. Wade of the City University Graduate Center).
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female names on the parade's long list of grand marshals. Formally, at least,
the charge of gender discrimination was met by the selection of Dorothy
Hayden Cudahy in 1989.120 The quarrel over gay and lesbian marchers,
however, dwarfs all previous internal disputes. Upon its resolution rests the
parade's very future. Politicians now avoid the parade, lest their presence be
regarded as an endorsement of bigotry.12 ' Attendance rates are off, profits
are down, 122 and there is a real possibility that the parade will not survive
the storm. The Times has flatly encouraged New Yorkers to stay home. 123
2.

The Current Controversy

The quarrel over gay and lesbian participation in the New York St. Patrick's Day parade may have begun in the winter of 1989, when an estimated
5,000 demonstrators, organized by two advocacy organizations, AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) and "Queer Nation," disrupted Cardinal
O'Connor's conduct of a mass at St. Patrick's Cathedral. 124 The protestors
reportedly chanted slogans, chained themselves to pews, threw condoms in
the air, and spat out morsels of consecrated wafer. 125 Then and there, by
some accounts, the Catholic hierarchy in the city equated all homosexual
activists with ACT-UP, and all activist tactics with desecration. 126 Later,
when the dispute over gay and lesbian participation in the St. Patrick's Day
parade arose, there were reports that the Cardinal might endorse a compromise resolution-if, in exchange, would-be homosexual marchers publicly
denounced the demonstration at the Cathedral' 27 By other accounts, how120

Richard Perez-Pena, Judge Allows Group to Bar Gay Marchers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

27, 1993, at A21, A25.
121 Perez-Pena, Sequel, supra note 115, at B3.
122 Id.; Perez-Pena, Uncertainty, supra note 108, at A31.
123 Right ParadeRuling, Wrong Message, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at A20 (arguing
that if the Hibernians do not relent, New Yorkers should ignore their "bigoted message"
and their "march").
124 On ACT-UP and its tactics generally, see Scott Harris, Gay Militancy, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 1991, at AI, A32. On the provocative use of the previously distasteful term
"queer" by Queer Nation, see Alessandra Stanley, Militants Back "Queer," Shoving
"Gay" the Way of "Negro", N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1991, at A23.
125 Jason DeParle, 111 Held in St. Patrick'sAIDS Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1989,
at 3; Thomas Maier, CardinalRules, NEWSDAY, May 16, 1993, at 22; Manuel PerezRivas & Ji-Yeon Yuh, Protest Siege at St. Pat's, NEWSDAY, Dec. 11, 1989, at 3.
126 See Patrick Farrelly, Why They Turned Their Backs on the Parade, IRISH VOICE,

Mar. 30, 1991, at 8 (quoting one traditionalist complaining that gay and lesbian marchers
were the same people who "invaded the cathedral and made a mockery of the Mass");
Bruce Weber, A Time of Trouble for Hibernians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1992, at B2
(reporting the views expressed by Hibernians). The following year, as many as 3000
parishioners and supporters from the region crowded into the cathedral, preventing demonstrators from entering the main chamber. Jim Dwyer, More Acting Up in the Cathedral, NEWSDAY, Dec. 10, 1990, at 2.
127 See Jim Dwyer, ACT- UP Sin, ILGO Penance, NEWSDAY, Jan. 18, 1993, at 2 [here-
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ever, the Cardinal steadfastly refused to consider any such accommodation
because he remained furious at what he regarded as disrespect for the
Church, reflected in the Cathedral episode. 128 By still other reports, the
leaders of the gay group seeking access to the parade found it objectionable
that they should be held responsible for actions taken by others, who happened also to be homosexual. 129 There is a sense, then, in which both gays
and lesbians seeking to march in the parade and its traditional Catholic
organizers and sponsors view themselves as put upon. Would-be homosexual participants think they were being unfairly excluded out of bigotry
("gay-bashing"), while Catholics think the point of the demand by gays and
lesbians to take part amounts to religious intolerance ("Catholic-bashing"). 30 And this notwithstanding that many of the gays and lesbians who
wish to march themselves profess to be Catholic.''
No one doubts that gays and lesbians participated in the parade from its
inception, marching with any of the many affiliated organizations. 3 2 In the
inafter Dwyer, Sin] (reporting an effort by Acting New York Supreme Court Justice
Alice Schlesinger to forge a compromise along these lines); Wendy Lin & Maurice Carroll, Secret St. Pat's Meeting, NEWSDAY, Jan. 15, 1993, at 6 (reporting the same alleged
discussions); Richard Perez-Pena, St. Patrick's Day Parade Threatened with Boycott,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1993, at A25 [hereinafter Perez-Pena, Boycott] (same).
128 E.g., Maurice Carroll, ParadeMess; Cardinal.:It's Mayor's Fault, NEWSDAY, Jan.
20, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Carroll, ParadeMess] (reporting that AOH leaders occasionally suggested that they might agree to a compromise approved by the Cardinal but that
he remained "furious" over the ACT-UP episode and refused to endorse conciliatory
efforts); Roberts, supra note 101, at BI, B6; cf. Paul Moses, Church Not Marching in
Step, NEWSDAY, Mar. 10, 1992, at 21 (reporting that Cardinal O'Connor had refused to
review the Hispanic Day parade until its organizers had withdrawn an invitation to ACTUP). See generally Maurice Carroll, Dinkins Now Has Catholic Problem, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 10, 1992, at 20.
129 Dwyer, Sin, supra note 127, at 2.
130 John Leo, The Gay Tide of Catholic-Bashing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 1,
1991, at 15; Bruce Weber, Tangle ofIssues in St. Patrick's Brouhaha, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 1992, at B3; see also Peter Steinfels, Cardinal Says Press Reports Reflect "Catholic
Bashing", N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1991, at B3 (reporting a recent column by the Cardinal
in a Catholic publication); Letter to the Editor from John Dearie, St. Patrick's Parade
UproarMasked an Anti-Catholic Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1992, at A22 (charging
gay and lesbian marchers with making an "unspoken enemy" of the Catholic faith). In
this vein, some observers have openly accused gays and lesbians of simply attempting to
"destroy the parade." E.g., Bruce Weber, Gay Irish Group Sues to March in Parade,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at B3 (quoting Patrick Gatins, an attorney for the Hibernians); cf. Catholic War Veterans of the United States, Inc. v. City of New York, 576 F.
Supp. 71, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (involving an attempt to divert the Gay Pride parade in
New York away from Fifth Avenue on the theory that the marchers meant to "desecrate" St. Patrick's Cathedral).
131 Jim Dwyer, City Witnessing Bigotry on Parade, NEWSDAY, Jan. 31, 1992, at 2
[hereinafter Dwyer, Bigotry] (quoting an ILGO representative).
132 See Hibernian Memorandum, State Court, supra note 95, at 2 n.3 (explaining that
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fall of 1990, however, just months after the Cathedral demonstration, a
group of about one hundred homosexual men and women of Irish descent,
the Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization (ILGO), applied to the AOH
parade committee for permission to join the procession as a formal unit,
flying the ILGO banner.'
ILGO had previously participated in the Gay
Pride Day parade in New York, and that positive experience led its members
to think that marching in the St. Patrick's Day parade would be equally
rewarding." 4 The parade committee chair, Francis P. Beirne, denied
ILGO's application and later gave two reasons for his action. In the main,
he simply considered ILGO ineligible to participate in the parade as a unit,
because the homosexual "lifestyle" the group promoted conflicted with the
teachings of the Catholic Church, the promotion of which he understood to
be a principal purpose of the parade." 5 Additionally, however, he said he
regarded ILGO's application as premature. In response to the city's request
that the parade be kept to a manageable size, the committee had developed a
waiting list of organizations seeking to participate. At the very most,
accordingly, Beirne insisted he could only put ILGO on that list, so that in
due course it might work its way to the top and be evaluated on the merits.
Beirne said nothing to ILGO about the conflict he saw with Catholic doctrine and, instead, promised to add ILGO to the waiting list like any other
new organization seeking a chance to march. 3 6 In fact, however, he hoped
that by postponing consideration of ILGO's application, he might effectively
avoid dealing with it at all. For by the time ILGO's name reached the top of
the list,137the idea of an ILGO contingent in the parade might have "blown
over."'
Convinced that the waiting list was a ruse, ILGO sought help from Mayor
Dinkins, who proposed a compromise: on this occasion at least, the parade
might be lengthened to accommodate small marching units from each of the
gays and lesbians were welcome to march "individually" as "guests" of affiliated units
and that the dispute between the parties had only to do with their request to march "as
an organization").
133 HRC Recommended Order, supra note 85, at 3-4.
134

Id.

Hartnett Affidavit, supra note 88, at 11.
Id. at 11-12; see also Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. New York State Bd. of Ancient
Order of Hibernians, 788 F. Supp. 172, 173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing the history
of the parade controversy).
'37 Hartnett Affidavit, supra note 88, at 11. When Beirne received ILGO's application, he did not treat it as he did other requests, but, instead, consulted the committee's
attorney. While he did file the application in the usual fashion on advice of counsel, he
later testified that he had no intention of including ILGO in the parade no matter where
its name might be on the waiting list. When the president of the state AOH board, Al
O'Hagen, saw Beirne's misleading letter to ILGO, he admonished Beirne that "there
[was] no substitute for honesty" and that Beirne's failure to say forthrightly that ILGO
had "no place" in the parade because of its agenda had put the organizers in "a compromising position." HRC Recommended Order, supra note 85, at 20-21.
13'
136
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forty organizations on the waiting list, including ILGO. If necessary, the
Mayor offered to provide city funds and volunteers to assist the Hibernians
in managing a larger event. 13 The AOH declined to agree to that arrangement and later offered three reasons: such a concession established for ILGO
alone might insult other groups for whom the Mayor had made no similar
effort in the past; the acceptance of public funds would draw the parade's
"private status" into question; and ILGO's participation "under its own
banner" would "compromise the religious values and message of the
Parade."'3 9 After further negotiations, however, the parties reached a settlement: ILGO members would be permitted to march as the anonymous
guests of a sympathetic AOH unit-that is, without their own identifying
40
standard.
The point of this arrangement was rather plain. The AOH hoped to
defuse any confrontation with ILGO and to appease Mayor Dinkins, but at
the same time to avoid any formal recognition of the gay and lesbian organization. That objective was wildly unrealistic. The Mayor not only
announced the compromise at a press conference, but also declared that he
would abandon his usual place at the head of the parade and march, instead,
with ILGO. He himself would substitute for the banner the settlement prevented ILGO from displaying.' 4' Dinkins did join the ILGO marchers for
part of the parade on March 17, 1991 and, in so doing, drew public attention
to the nature of the unmarked contingent around him. In addition, ILGO
members identified themselves by wearing T-shirts bearing the names of
ACT-UP and Queer Nation. Along the way, onlookers rained invective on
142
the Mayor and the gay and lesbian participants he had chosen to support.
When the group reached the Cardinal's reviewing stand, the Cardinal gave
Dinkins an "icy" reception.14 By some, albeit disputed, reports, some mem138
139
140

Irish Lesbian & Gay Org., 788 F. Supp. at 174.
Hartnett Affidavit, supra note 88, at 13.
The accommodating AOH unit was Division 7 of the New York County Hiberni-

ans, perhaps the only AOH affiliate that expressed sympathy with ILGO's cause. Within
a few months after the parade, the county organization edxpelled Division 7. Formally,
the ground was the division's failure to cooperate in a matter of procedure. Yet many
observers took the action to be punishment for the division's support of ILGO. Dennis
Hevesi, Irish Order Expels Hosts of Gay Group, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1991, at 23; see also
Dennis Hevesi, HiberniansBar Gay Irish from Parade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1991, at BI
(quoting a leader of Division 7 to the effect that his group was getting a "spanking"). The
state AOH organization soon overturned the expulsion and restored Division 7 to good
standing. Dennis Hevesi, New York City Irish Group Loses ParadePermit, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 10, 1992, at BI.
141

Jerry Gray, Mayor's Place in Paradeto Be with Gay Group, N.Y.

TIMES,

Mar. 16,

1991, at A27.
142 D.D. Guttenplan & Melinda Henneberger, Raining on the Parade, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 17, 1991, at 3.
143

Sam Roberts, Metro Matters.-Leading a Paradeof Diversity,from the Middle, N.Y.

TIMES,

Mar. 18, 1991, at B1.
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bers of the platform party turned their backs in an apparent show of disgust,144 while some ILGO members shouted expletives, sang provocative
chants, and made offensive gestures. 145 The scene, in sum, was hostile, confrontational, and disrespectful-and thus destined to fortify both ILGO's
resolve to march as a unit the following year and the Hibernians'
46
resistance.
Late in 1991, ILGO wrote to the parade committee on two occasions to
request a status report on its application to participate as a unit in the 1992
parade. When the committee failed to respond to either letter, city officials
attempted to negotiate another compromise. Informal discussions at City
Hall soon faltered, however, and the Mayor took a different tack. Since the
county AOH was intransigent, he attempted to bypass that group and deal,
instead, with the state AOH organization, which appeared to be more pliable. Despite the county organization's longstanding role in conducting the
parade, the Mayor awarded the permit for the 1992 parade to the state AOH
board. 47 That strategy proved futile, however. After litigation in the state
courts over the relative positions and authorities of the two AOH groups,
both the state and the national AOH organizations adopted the county
group's attitude toward ILGO. Irrespective of which AOH organization
148
held the permit, ILGO would not be welcome.
The Hibernians now gave two justifications for their position. First, they
purported to rest on a sense of civic responsibility to ensure that "New York
City's" annual parade not be used to insult spectators. In light of the "outrageous behavior" the Hibemians ascribed to ILGO and "non-Irish support
groups" (evidently, ACT-UP and Queer Nation) in 1991, ILGO would not
be invited back.141 Second, the Hibernians voiced their commitment to what
144 Farrelly, supra note 126, at 8; Bryan Rohan, Gay Powerand ParadePolitics, IRISH
VOICE, Mar. 23, 1991, at 22.
14' Hartnett Affidavit, supra note 88, at 14-15. But see Dwyer, Bigotry, supra note 131
(reporting that video tapes of the parade revealed no misbehavior by ILGO marchers).
146 See generally James Barron, Beer Shower and Boos for Dinkins at Irish Parade,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1991, at Al, A34. For the Hibernians' reaction, see Hartnett
Affidavit, supra note 88, at 14-15. For the Mayor's response, see David N. Dinkins, Keep
Marchingfor Equality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at A23 (explaining and justifying his
actions to the public); Robert D. McFadden, Dinkins Joins Gay Marchers in an Encore,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at Bi (quoting the Mayor insisting that he had done "the
right thing").
147 Letter from David N. Dinkins, Mayor of the City of New York, to Timothy V.
Hartnett, President, New York County Ancient Order of Hibernians at 2 (Jan. 16, 1992)
(on file with the Boston University Law Review).
148 See Hartnett Affidavit, supra note 88, at 28; Bruce Weber, Hiberniansin Accord on

Parade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992, at B3 (reporting that the state organization had
decided to permit the existing county parade committee to proceed).
149 The statement, issued jointly by the national and state boards, is reproduced in
Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. New York State Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibernians, 788 F.
Supp. 172, 174 (S.D.N.Y.
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they said was one of the parade's "main founding purposes," namely "to
uphold, defend and protect the Roman Catholic Church, its priests and bishops, its teachings and tenets." 5 ° A contemporaneous statement from the
parade committee underscored that, with respect to this second ground, the
Hibernians were not acting out of any sense of responsibility to the city, but
were, instead, asserting their proprietary interest in the parade as an instrument for advancing their own sectarian views: "[N]o group that has a position contrary to the teachings of our Catholic faith has a place in our
Parade."' 5 '
Two days later, the New York City Human Rights Commission (HRC)
issued a complaint charging the Hibernians with violating the city's ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places
of public accommodation.' 5 2 In hopes of disposing of the matter in time for
the parade in March, the HRC expedited its ordinary procedures. An
administrative law judge, Rosemarie Maldonado, held a hearing and thereafter made numerous findings favorable to ILGO-among them a determination that ILGO's formal place on the waiting list was a pretext and that the
Hibernians never meant to consider ILGO for participation in the parade.'5 3
Nevertheless, Judge Maldonado recommended that the complaint be dismissed in deference to the Hibernians' First Amendment rights.'
The
HRC itself did not review her recommendation immediately. Two members
[N]o organization or organizations are allowed to use New York City's 231st
Annual St. Patrick's Day Parade on March 17, 1992 as a vehicle to publicly insult
any person or group watching or reviewing the parade.
The outrageous behavior and conduct of the Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization
(ILGO), and its several well known, non-Irish support groups, on Fifth Avenue and
particularly in front of St. Patrick's Cathedral and at the Parade Reviewing Stand,
during the 1991 parade, mandated that ILGO not be permitted to participate in the
1992 Parade.
150

Id.

'5'

Id. (emphasis added).

152 HRC Recommended Order, supra note 85, at 33. The HRC enforcement bureau

did not suggest that the Hibernians' own membership policy was subject to the antidiscrimination ordinance. Since the AOH was a "benevolent" order within the meaning
of New York law, it was exempt from that ordinance and thus was free to exclude women
and non-Catholics. Id. at 16 n.7. Instead, the bureau claimed that the AOH had violated
the anti-discrimination law in that it had engaged in discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in the conduct of the parade-which the HRC viewed as a "public accommodation." Id. at 17.
...Id. (explaining that the argument that ILGO was placed on the waiting list "like
everyone else" was "clever" but "not supported by the evidence"). This is not to say that
there was no list at all. There was, and the Hibernians made it available. Brian Rohan,
Countdown, IRISH VOICE, Mar. 17, 1992, at 20 (reporting the "Official Parade Waiting
List").
' HRC Recommended Order, supra note 85, at 33. As the Hibernians put it:
The point is that if ... placing ILGO on the waiting list was pretextual and was
tantamount to denying ILGO affiliation, one must still look at the reasons why
ILGO was rejected ....
There is no question that the Parade Chairman took the
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recused themselves because of their relationship with, and support for,
ILGO's cause, and a schedule was established in contemplation of a final
decision in the fall.' 5 5
When it became clear that there would be no conclusive HRC ruling
before March 17, ILGO went to federal district court, seeking a preliminary
injunction forcing the AOH to accept ILGO into the line of march as an
identified unit. When the case came on before Judge Pierre N. Leval, the
contending arguments were precisely what we might have expected. ILGO
conceded that if the parade were truly a "privately sponsored event" fostering Catholic doctrine, the organizers would be entitled to exclude a homosexual group espousing a conflicting point of view. Yet ILGO insisted that
the parade was not "private" in that crucial sense at all-that it was, instead,
so "intertwined" with officialdom that the Hibernians had "come to act on
behalf of the City;" that AOH action was therefore "state action" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that, accordingly, ILGO members must be permitted to participate in the exercise of their rights to freedom of speech and association and against irrational discrimination." The
Hibernians, for their part, conceded that if the parade were genuinely a public event, sponsored by the city, it would follow that ILGO could not be
excluded out of deference to the Church. By contrast, however, the AOH
insisted that the parade was entirely private; that the organizers therefore
had no duty to respect ILGO's desire to express its message; and that,
indeed, they were constitutionally entitled to use the parade to express their
own views-however
distasteful those views might be to Mayor Dinkins or
57
anyone else.'

Faced with the issues framed in these classic terms, and pressed to reach a
resolution within the space of a few days, Judge Leval took evasive action.
On the day before the parade, he issued an order in which he explicitly
declined to decide whether the free speech right at stake in the case
"belong[ed]" to ILGO or the Hibernians 5 Before he could reach that
easy way out ... because he perceived ILGO to have an agenda and to be not in
accord with church teaching.

Hibernian Memorandum, State Court, supra note 95, at 8-9.
151 See discussion infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.

11 Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. New York State Bd. of Ancient Hibernians, 788 F.
Supp. 172, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). ILGO placed primary reliance on North Shore Right to
Life v. Manhasset Am. Legion, 452 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), in which Judge Weinstein concluded that in organizing a parade on Memorial Day, the American Legion
acted as a "fiduciary" for local government and therefore could not exclude a group on
the basis of its message. The North Shore case is a ubiquitous citation in parade litigation,
but usually is distinguishable on its facts.
157 Irish Lesbian & Gay Org., 788 F. Supp. at 176-77; see Donna Greene, Westchester
Q&A: John P. Hale, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, § 13 (Westchester Weekly), at 3 (quoting
a Hibernian leader declaring that ILGO's message was that "homosexuality is legitimate
behavior" while Catholic teaching has it that "homosexual behavior is morally wrong").
158 Irish Lesbian & Gay Org., 788 F. Supp. at 179.
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"provocative" issue, he insisted he must deal with the waiting list problem.
ILGO had asserted, but not proven, that the list was a sham. If it was genuine, and there were other organizations ahead of ILGO in line, then the
court could not very well give ILGO precedence over those groups-ordering the Hibernians to accept ILGO into the parade while leaving the others
to wait longer than they otherwise would. Even if ILGO could demonstrate
that Beirne had been disingenuous; if, as Judge Maldonado had found,
ILGO was not "meaningfully" listed with other applicants; and if the Hibernians could not lawfully refuse even to consider ILGO's application-still,
the court could at most redress only that wrong. As Judge Leval saw the
evidence, the parade was "full," and if an opening appeared it would presumably be filled by organizations near the top of the waiting list.' 9 Even if
he concluded, then, that ILGO must be given a "meaningful" place on that
list, it would be some time before the ultimate question whether the Hiberni60
ans must allow gays and lesbians to march in the parade would arise.'
Judge Leval's disposition of ILGO's request for a preliminary injunction
only temporarily eluded the problem in which we are interested. The crucial
question may be expressed either way: whether the Hibernians can validly
refuse even to consider ILGO's application to march (and thus can decline
to put ILGO on a genuine waiting list), or whether the AOH can simply
exclude ILGO from the parade. 6 ' Judge Leval's attempt to dodge it was
shallow at best. For he did not pause to ask how it was that "the" St. Patrick's Day Parade was "full" and who might be responsible for making it so.
Those questions, in turn, go to the very definition of the New York parade
and who is responsible for specifying that-matters to which we will
return. 162 Moreover, Judge Leval did not explain how it was that the groups
previously approved for participation could retain their positions in the
parade if it were assumed, for purposes of decision, that the AOH had
picked them on a discriminatory basis. If state authorities are shown to have
excluded African-American children from a public school, it hardly is open
to the principal to respond that blacks can nonetheless continue to be turned
away because the school is "full" of white kids who gained admission
because they were not black.
In the near term, differences unresolved in court were played out in the
streets on March 17, 1992. An hour or so before the AOH parade began on
44th Street, ILGO held its own independent parade over a different segment
of the traditional route, from 59th Street to 66th Street. Mayor Dinkins was
ill, but made it known that if he had been able to march, he would have
159

Id. at 177.

Id. at 177-78.
161 Cf. HRC Recommended Order, supra note 85, at 22-23 (recognizing that an allegedly invalid discriminatory act occurred when Beirne placed ILGO's name on the waiting
list with the "intent" that the gay organization would "never move[ ] off the list and onto
the line of march").
160

162 Irish Lesbian & Gay Org., 788 F. Supp. at 177.
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joined the ILGO procession and boycotted the AOH parade-a position
Cardinal O'Connor pointedly said he would not forget.'
Many political
leaders marched with ILGO; others, like Governor Mario Cuomo, stayed
away altogether.1'
Anticipating a disturbance, the police department
deployed thousands of officers along the parade route and at ports of entry
into the city. The ILGO marchers reportedly chanted as they walked:
"We're here! We're queer! We're Irish!' ' 165 There were insults and complaints from onlookers, but few violent incidents, and, in the main, the event
was less contentious than the previous year. The crowd in 1992 was sharply
diminished, however-down to an estimated 385,000.1' In October 1992,
the HRC rejected Judge Maldonado's view that the Hibernians were constitutionally entitled to exclude ILGO in order to preserve the purity of their
private religious message.' 67 By contrast, the HRC held that the parade was
a "secular event" in celebration of a wide range of religious and cultural
values and that the Hibernians' freedom to associate with others to advance
those values did not entitle them to bar ILGO solely on sectarian grounds. 68
The Hibernians promptly sought review of the HRC's action in state court,
where the HRC cross-claimed for enforcement of its order.
With the outcome of the litigation with ILGO in doubt, the Hibernians
were of two minds. On the one hand, their resistance to ILGO's participation was so strong that many preferred to scuttle the parade entirely rather
than bow to the city's wishes. Perhaps in pique, the state president told the
press that the AOH would not sponsor the parade in 1993.169 On the other
hand, given that the legal battle was scarcely over, the county AOH hoped
to reclaim its role as the traditional sponsor and thus to be in a position to
conduct the parade if the state courts overturned the HRC decision. AnticiSee Sylvia Moreno & Curtis Rist, We Will Not Forget That: The CardinalCalls the
Role at Cathedral, NEWSDAY, Mar. 18, 1992, at 4.
164 See In Solidarity. Who Marched, Who Refused, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992, at B3
(reporting what prominent politicians were doing during the parade).
165 Bruce Weber, Irish March, with Protests but No Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992,
at Bi, B3.
16.

166

Id. at B3.

167

HRC Decision, supra note 79, at 15-16.

168

The HRC found that

[the Hibernians] have defined the Parade quite broadly and, by their own admission,
have allowed a number of diverse groups to participate in their celebration of Irish
heritage without regard to those groups' members' race, color, sex or creed. Respondents' associational right is thus the right to associate with persons who support the
broad celebratory goals of the Parade rather than, as Respondents argue, the right to
associate merely with those who adhere to any one element of Irish heritage, such as
Catholicism.
Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
169 Dennis Hevesi, Groups FearNo March on March 17, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at
B3 (quoting Kevin Coggins to the effect that "the St. Patrick's Day parade in New York
City will not be sponsored by the Ancient Order of Hibernians" and Al O'Hagen to the
effect that "for the first time in over 200 years" there would be no parade in the city).
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pating that Mayor Dinkins might try again to grant the permit to a group
willing to include ILGO, the county Hibernians served notice that, in their
view, they had a prior claim-by virtue of longstanding police department
policy and the explicit provision in the city ordinance. 7 A few weeks later,
the police department asked the Hibernians for more specific information
about their plans, said to be needed in order to weigh the AOH application
against "several" competing requests for the permit. The information
sought went generally to managerial and logistical details-for example, the
number and kinds of units that would participate, the number and identity
of the marshals that would be used, the timing and orchestration of the initial formation, the names of the "feeder" streets that would be used, and
similar plans for the "conduct of the parade."'' Preserving their objection
to the consideration of competing
applications, the Hibernians supplied the
72
information requested.
Shortly after the turn of the year, Police Commissioner Raymond W.
Kelly announced that the permit for the 1993 parade would be awarded to
the St. Patrick's Day Parade Committee, an organization that had existed
only a few weeks. Kelly recognized that the county Hibernians had long
been the sponsors, but in light of the HRC decision that they had unlawfully
excluded ILGO in 1992, together with the city's "policy of inclusion," he
said that he and Mayor Dinkins had concluded that the permit should go to
a group with more "broad-based representation. ,17' The new committee
170

Letter from Tim Hartnett, President, New York County Board, Ancient Order of

Hibernians in America, Inc., to David N. Dinkins, Mayor of New York (Nov. 16, 1992)
(on file with the Boston University Law Review); see discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also Letter from Timothy Hartnett, President, New York County
Board, Ancient Order of Hibernians in America, Inc., to Bernard Morris (Nov. 12, 1992)
(on file with the Boston University Law Review) (an illustrative letter sent to AOH members admonishing them not to lend their names to any effort to displace the county AOH
as parade sponsor).
171 Letter from Sam Centamore, Chief of the Department's Office, to Timothy V.
Hartnett, President, New York County Board, Ancient Order of Hibernians in America,
Inc. (Dec. 10, 1992) (on file with the Boston University Law Review).
172 Letter from Timothy V. Hartnett, President, New York County Board, Ancient
Order of Hibernians in America, Inc., to Sam Centamore, Chief of Department's Office
(Dec. 18, 1992) (on file with the Boston University Law Review); Letter from John T.
Dunleavy, Acting Chairman of the Parade Committee, to Sam Centamore, Chief of
Department's Office (Dec. 22, 1992) (on file with the Boston University Law Review).
17' Press Release, New York City Police Dep't, Jan. 8, 1993 (on file with the Boston
University Law Review). In addition, city authorities fought another satellite battle with
the county Hibernians over whether their parent organization would allow them' to seek
the permit. By now, St. Patrick's Day parades around the country threatened to generate
lots of lawsuits of the kind the Hibernians faced in New York. Concerned that local
affiliates might run up substantial legal fees for which all Hibernians would be liable, the
national organization adopted a by-law forbidding any county unit from sponsoring a
parade, unless it did so in the form of a separate corporate entity. Dennis Hevesi, Gay
Irish Win Right to a ParadeThat Might Die, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992, at BI; see Letter
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was led by Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes, a prominent member
of the Irish-American community who had previously urged the AOH to
accept ILGO into the parade, and included Brian O'Dwyer, whose father
had once been both President of the City Council and a grand marshal of the
parade. 4 The group's spokesperson, Michael Keogh, explained that the
Hynes Committee would "save" the St. Patrick's Day parade in New York
in its familiar form, continuing "a tradition of more than 200 years," in
order to celebrate "the achievements of the Irish race in America" and
"build peace, unity, justice and democracy here and in Northeast Irefrom Jeremy Travis, Deputy Commissioner, Legal Matters, New York City Police Dep't,
to George Clough, President, Ancient Order of Hibernians in America, Inc. (Dec. 23,
1992) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) (requesting information about the
by-law); Letter from George J. Clough, Jr., President, Ancient Order of Hibernians in
America, Inc., to Jeremy Travis, Deputy Commissioner, Legal Matters, New York City
Police Dep't (Dec. 28, 1992) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) (acknowledging the by-law). Citing the new by-law, city authorities in New York took the position that they need not consider the New York County AOH application. Letter from
Jeremy Travis, Deputy Commissioner, Legal Matters, New York City Police Dep't, to
Timothy V. Hartnett, President, New York County Board, Ancient Order of Hibernians
in America, Inc. (Dec. 30, 1992) (on file with the Boston University Law Review). As
might have been expected, the county Hibernians objected that any difficulties they might
have with the national organization were entirely an internal affair and therefore could
not be the basis of city action. Letter from Thomas W. Gleason, Attorney at Law, to
Jeremy Travis, Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters (Dec. 30, 1992) (on file with the
Boston University Law Review) (stating the county Hibernians' position); see Maurice
Carroll, Two Groups Fight for Right to Run Parade, NEWSDAY, Nov. 19, 1992, at 4
(reporting that the county Hibernians were attempting to resolve any differences they
might have with the national organization). In due course, the county AOH formed the
separate corporation demanded under the by-law. Letter from Kevin Coggins, President,
New York State Board, Ancient Order of Hibernians in America, Inc., to Jeremy Travis,
Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters, New York City Legal Dep't (Jan. 6, 1993) (on
file with the Boston University Law Review). That action eliminated any argument that
the county Hibernians lacked authority within the larger, national Hibernian organization. On the other hand, it arguably weakened their contention that, as the traditional
sponsors of the parade, they were entitled to the parade permit as against competing
applicants. See Letter from Timothy V. Hartnett, President New York County Board,
Ancient Order of Hibernians in America, Inc., to Jeremy Travis, Deputy Commissioner,
New York City Police Dep't (Jan. 7, 1993) (on file with the Boston University Law
Review) (notifying the city of the new corporate entity and insisting that it must be considered the successor in interest to "the rights of the New York Hibernians"). Since the
city acknowledged no such right in the county AOH, the formal difference between that
organization and the separate corporation established to satisfy the national organization's by-law never actually proved significant.
174 See Maurice Carroll, $750K-That's a Swell Party, NEWSDAY, Nov. 20, 1992, at
20 (reporting that the new committee had been formed at a meeting in O'Dwyer's office
at which ILGO representatives were present); Two Rival Irish Groups Vie for Parade
Permit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1992, at B5 (reporting that the initial meeting was attended
by representatives of 60 Irish-American organizations in the city).
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land."' 75 To that end, he said that the 1993 parade would begin "in exactly
the same manner as in 1992" and would proceed up Fifth Avenue over the
usual route.' 76 Keogh invited potential participants to contact him and ran
advertisements in the Irish Echo meant to dispel suspicions within the Irish
community.' 77 For a time, then, it seemed that the city had finally won its
long battle with the Hibernians by diverting the crucial parade permit elsewhere. On that basis, the state courts concluded that their review of the
HRC order requiring the Hibernians to accept ILGO was moot. 178
The award of the permit to the Hynes Committee was poorly received in
the Irish community. The county AOH attacked it in a new lawsuit in federal district court, where the matter was assigned to Judge Kevin T. Duffy.
Cardinal O'Connor, for his part, not only denounced the move, but also
suggested that Catholic organizations might "shun" the parade if the Hibernians were elbowed aside. 179 The idea of a boycott gained currency quickly.
For it appeared to many that the committee was merely the Mayor's instrument for wresting the parade away from the county AOH in order that
ILGO might be allowed to march. The information the police department
had sought from the Hibernians in November now appeared to be in aid of
teaching the newcomers how to conduct the parade-thus reaping the benefits of the Hibernians' experience.' 8 0
175 Press Release, St. Patrick's Day Parade Committee, Jan. 8, 1992 (on file with the
Boston University Law Review).
176 Id.
17 E.g., Advertisement, Save the Parade, IRISH ECHO, Jan. 27/Feb. 2, 1993, at 17 (on
file with the Boston University Law Review).
178 Beirne v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, Index No. 92-29840 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1993) (on file with the Boston University Law Review). While the state
court held the case on its docket pending further developments, the subsequent determination of the merits of the dispute in federal district court made it unnecessary for the
state court to revisit the matter. See discussion infra note 191 and accompanying text.
By some accounts, the state judge who issued the mootness order, Acting State Supreme
Court Justice Alice Schlesinger, first attempted to mediate between the Cardinal and
ILGO in hopes of achieving a compromise that would permit ILGO to march in
exchange for ILGO's public denunciation of the behavior exhibited by ACT-UP at the
1989 demonstration at the Cathedral. Hartnett Affidavit, supra note 88, at 30; Dwyer,
Sin, supra note 127, at 2; see discussion supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
179 Joseph P. Fried, O'Connor Says Catholic Groups May Shun St. Patrick's Parade,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at B5; see Perez-Pena, Boycott, supra note 127, at A25; see
also Raymond Hernandez, ParadePermit is Questioned by Cardinal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
11, 1993, at BI (quoting the following excerpt from the Cardinal's statement: "Do the
Mayor and Police Commissioner agree to this arbitrary transformation from the religious
to the political? Will other religiously related activities become equally vulnerable to
arbitrary politicization in this land which boasts of its tradition of separation of church
and state?").
180 The Vice President of the New York County Board of the AOH, Bartholomew
Murphy, testified that
[t]he crowds along Fifth Avenue are there to see the St. Patrick's Day Parade. They
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Once the Hynes Committee was charged with "taking over"'' 1 the Hibernians' event, its resolve began to weaken. Hynes himself visited Cardinal
O'Connor to explain that his group meant only to find a compromise that
would settle the issue of ILGO's participation so that the parade could go
on. 8 2 The Cardinal reportedly refused to endorse that effort, however, and,
indeed, told Hynes that he held Mayor Dinkins "solely to blame" for the
difficulties surrounding the parade. 88 Thereafter, the Hynes Committee
capitulated. If, after all, the county AOH did wish to conduct the parade, if
the Cardinal and so many people in the community preferred that traditional sponsor, and if, accordingly, the committee's involvement threatened
to disrupt the very event it hoped to preserve, then many of those who had
lent their names to its effort thought it best to withdraw." a In early February, the committee returned the permit to Commissioner Kelly. Mayor
Dinkins commended Hynes, Keogh, and their associates for performing a
"significant civil service" in the "face of undue criticism," then solicited new
applications from other potential sponsors
of a parade he still hoped would
85
be "a successful and inclusive event.'
After the Hynes Committee withdrew, only the county AOH accepted the
Mayor's invitation to seek the permit. The city refused to agree, unless the
Hibernians were willing to allow ILGO to march. The AOH stood firm, and
the longstanding dispute over ILGO's participation was ripe for Judge
Duffy's decision on the merits. Now, of course, ILGO no longer contended
that the Hibernians acted on behalf of the state, such that the Fourteenth
Amendment of its own force applied to their decision to exclude gays and
come because of the spectacle and message we have created over the years with our
time, money and effort. In a real sense we have created the audience. To give a
group with whose [sic] message we -are at odds the benefit of our efforts would be
akin to theft. We are unwilling to contribute our resources to ILGO's or the City's

message.
Murphy Affidavit, supra note 81, at 11. But see Dwyer, Sin, supra note 127, at 2 (reporting that many of those involved in the Hynes group were Hibernians who had helped
organize the parade in the past).
181 Murphy Affidavit, supra note 81, at 7.
182 Carroll, ParadeMess, supra note 128, at 3.
183 Id.
184

In the interest of determining whether the county AOH did mean to conduct the

parade, the Hynes Committee questioned the national Hibernian organization about the
new by-law and the internal complications it had apparently generated. Letter from
Lawrence C. Downes, Attorney at Law, to George Clough, President, Ancient Order of
Hibernians in America (Jan. 21, 1993) (on file with the Boston University Law Review);
see also discussion supra note 173.
185 Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Statement By Mayor Dinkins On St. Patrick's
Day Parade Committee's Decision to Return Parade Permit, Feb. 10, 1993 (on file with

the Boston University Law Review). See generally James C. McKinley, Jr., St. Patrick's
Standoff: Gay Issue Still Unresolved, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1993, at A25 (reviewing these
events).
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lesbians. 8 Since the HRC had concluded that the discrimination the AOH
freely acknowledged violated local law, the question was whether the Constitution permitted the city to force the Hibernians to accept ILGO into the
parade, on pain of losing the permit if they declined." 7 Judge Duffy's own
statement of the problem plainly identified the doctrinal box into which he
thought the case should go. The issue, he said, was whether the city could
"compel" the AOH, "a private and long-standing sponsor of New York's St.
Patrick's Day Parade," to "alter" its message" by "requiring it to include, in
the Parade and under their [sic] own banner, the Irish Lesbian and Gay
Organization"-a group whose "tenets" were "allegedly inconsistent with
the message of the Parade's sponsors. '' l 88 In an extraordinarily shrill opinion, Duffy accused the HRC of behaving like Orwellian "thought police" in
"dramatically" rejecting the Hibernians' own characterization of the parade
89
and "substituting" a different meaning more to the commission's liking.1
In this, Judge Duffy declared, the HRC had attempted to tell citizens "what
they must think and how they must express themselves.' 190 Accordingly, he
concluded that the Hibernians were entitled to conduct the parade free of
any requirement, imposed by the city, to include "any contingent" that the
AOH itself would not "approve[]." 9
With respect to his stark articulation of the issue in the case, Judge Duffy
had the support and encouragement of the New York affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), which condemned any attempt by the
city to condition the Hibernians' permit on a commitment to include gays
and lesbians.192 With respect to his remedial decree, however, Duffy
186 New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp.
358, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Murphy Affidavit, supra note 81, at 1-2; see also discussion
supra note 156 and accompanying text.
187 See generally Deborah Pines, Denial of ParadePermit Sparks Sharp Questioningat
Hearing, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 23, 1993, at 1 (reporting the parties' arguments).
188 Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. at 360.
189 Id. at 369.

190 Id.

at 370.
192 NYCLU Memorandum, Federal Court, supra note 32, at 8-9 (relying on Invisible
Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281 (D.
Md. 1988) (holding that city authorities could not condition a parade permit awarded to
the Klan on its willingness to permit a group of NAACP members to participate));
accord NYCLU Memorandum, HRC, supra note 79, at 10 (arguing that the HRC sought
"to compel the Hibernians to accept and promote ILGO's message"); see also Memorandum of Law Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the St. Patrick's Society of Brooklyn et al. at l,
Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins (93 Civ. 0281) (reporting that other Irish-American groups in the city were "profoundly disturbed by the City's overt attempts to impose
its own political and ideological agenda on the message sought to be conveyed by a fellow
Irish-American organization"). But see Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Center for
Constitutional Rights, Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins (93 Civ. 0281) (supporting
the HRC decision); cf. Andrew Maykuth, Irish Danders up over Gay Rights in St. Pat's
Parade, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 15, 1992, at D12 (quoting an NYCLU leader compar191 Id.
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squarely rejected the NYCLU's suggestion that, having found that the
Hibernians could exclude ILGO from their parade, the court should equally
conclude that ILGO was free to conduct its own event and, accordingly, that
city authorities should allow the two groups to conduct separate parades on
Fifth Avenue at different times of the day.193 Rather, Duffy accepted the
Hibernians' argument that they were entitled to their role as traditional
sponsors and therefore could command the Fifth Avenue route over which
"the" St. Patrick's Day parade in New York had always moved.1'9 Therein
lay paradox. For the Hibernians' claim to Fifth Avenue as a situs of special
import and value played directly into the city's argument that Fifth Avenue
was, indeed, such a "unique and scarce resource" that its use for speech
purposes could be regulated by means that would be objectionable anywhere
95
else.

1

ing ILGO's attempt to march in the St. Patrick's Day parade with an attempt by
"skinheads" to participate in the Gay Pride Day parade); Daniel Wise, NYCL U's Role in
Gays' Challenge to ParadeMeets Little Objection, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 1992, at 5 (describing the NYCLU's internal discussion of the issues in the parade case).
113 NYCLU Memorandum, Federal Court, supra note 32, at 2-3.
19 See, e.g., Murphy Affidavit, supra note 81, at 9:
To ILGO and the [Hynes] Committee and the City it may be a matter of indifference
as to where the Parade takes place. To them-and in one sense it is true-one street
is as good as another. Not to plaintiff [the Hibernians]. To the AOH, the route
along Fifth Avenue on March 17 is infused with history and tradition. This is the St.
Patrick's Day Parade ....
To require ILGO ... or anyone else whose message is
purely ethnic or cultural to march elsewhere would be of no significance ....
The
Cathedral plays no part in their secular performance. To plaintiff it is central, and
its loss would dilute the message we wish to convey.
Accord Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum of Law at 18, 19-20, Ancient Order of Hibernians
v. Dinkins (93 Civ. 0281):
Any parade route offered by the City other than Fifth Avenue on March 17, St.
Patrick's feast day, would be inadequate. Fifth Avenue is regarded as the premier
marching route in New York; it is especially so for plaintiff because St. Patrick's
Cathedral is located on the avenue from which steps the Cardinal Archbishop
reviews the Parade....
Moreover, to permit another group to conduct a parade on Fifth Avenue would be
to cheat the public and to in effect steal from plaintiff. The large audience for the
traditional Parade has been created by plaintiff's time, effort and money. People
come to Fifth Avenue from all over to see the Parade; to give another parade with an
antithetical message access to that audience would in effect be a misappropriation.
This would be true-and here plaintiff parts company with Amicus New York
Civil Liberties Union-if two parades were permitted on Fifth Avenue. The City's
Parade would be parasitic. It would still be getting the advantage of plaintiff's efforts
in attracting the audience, including plaintiff's expenditures for grandstand and toilet facilities along the route. Plaintiff's message might be diluted by the close proximity of the opposing group. At best, the City's Parade would cast a pall over the
celebratory spirit of the day and at worst provoke the crowd to violence, physical or
verbal, that would mute the message plaintiff wishes to convey.
195 HRC Memorandum, supra note 106, at 8-9. The city drew an analogy to Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), in which the Court held that the scarcity
of the electromagnetic spectrum justifies regulation of broadcasting that would be invalid
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Since March 17 was only two weeks away, Mayor Dinkins declined to
appeal Judge Duffy's order and thus acceded to AOH control of the parade
for another year. Resisting calls to reconsider its position, the AOH again
refused to allow ILGO to participate.'9 6 The result was, again, predictable.
A group of activists staged a demonstration a few blocks from the Cathedral
and, by the end of the day, many had been arrested.' 97 There matters have
stood in New York ever since. Judge Duffy expressly limited his order to the
1993 parade, 198 so arrangements for the parade in 1994 will almost certainly
raise again the host of questions that his opinion purported (simplistically) to
resolve.
B.

The Boston Parade
1. History

Like the parade in New York, the Boston parade is an annual event of
long standing, covering a traditional route through some of the oldest streets
in the city. The Boston celebration occurs on a public holiday ostensibly
commemorating one of the first military victories of the Revolutionary
War-the British fleet's retreat from Boston Harbor in 1776."' According
to tradition, Washington massed his artillery on Dorchester Heights overlooking the harbor and thus convinced General Howe to weigh anchor without firing a shot. 00 The only connection between the British "evacuation"
and the patron saint of Ireland was Washington's use of "St. Patrick" as the
if applied to the print media. That particular line of argument probably only muddies the
waters. Red Lion appears to be alive and well in its own field, but its intellectual foundations are questionable. See, e.g., BRUCE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF
ExPRESSION 91 (1975) (explaining that the scarcity of the radio spectrum is no different
from the scarcity of other things-like trees and newsprint).
196 Richard Perez-Pena, Judge Allows Group to Bar Gay Marchers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 1993, at A21 (reporting the Mayor's decision not to appeal).
19' Francis X. Clines, Irish March up the Avenue, Gay Protesters at Bay, N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 18, 1993, at Al, Bi.
198 Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. at 370.

The official proclamation, issued at least since 1976, is as follows:
Now, therefore, I,
, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in accordance with Chapter 80 of the Acts of 1938, do hereby proclaim
March 17,
, as Evacuation Day and urge the citizens of the Commonwealth to give appropriate recognition to the observance of... a memorable day
in Bay State History.
Affidavit of Gretchen Van Ness at 4, Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v.
City of Boston, Civil No. 92-1518-A (Mass. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 12, 1993) (on file with
the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter Van Ness Affidavit].
199

200 JOHN BARKER, THE BRITISH IN BOSTON, BEING THE DIARY OF LIEUTENANT
JOHN BARKER OF THE KING'S OWN REGIMENT FROM NOVEMBER 15,

1774

1776 71 (Humphrey Milford ed., 1924). See generally CELEBRATION

OF THE CENTEN-

TO MAY

31,

NIAL ANNIVERSARY OF THE EVACUATION OF BOSTON BY THE BRITISH ARMY, MARCH

17, 1776 (George E. Ellis ed., 1876).
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password for his troops on the crucial day.2 ' Since the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the city's Irish community has capitalized on the
March 17 date fixed for "Evacuation Day" to shape the procession honoring
General Washington into a St. Patrick's Day celebration as well.2" 2
Organizers typically refer to the event as the "Evacuation-St. Patrick's Day
Parade," and the press routinely reports it in that way.20 3
In Boston, as in New York, the Irish were not always welcomed by earlier
immigrants. They established themselves in the Dorchester area that is now
South Boston and developed political power only gradually. In this century,
of course, ethnic Irish in Boston came to dominate local politics, electing
many of their own to public office-including former Mayor Raymond C.
Flynn, who handled the question of gay and lesbian participation in the
parade in recent years. The annual parade in Boston, then, has many of the
same paradoxical implications as does the parade in New York. It both
marks the separate heritage and culture of the Irish people and claims their
acceptance into the pluralistic mainstream of city society generally. Given
its decidedly American origins, however, the Boston parade has not typically
focused on the Northern Ireland dispute that has so dominated the parade in
New York. Nor has it developed serious religious significance. There is no
Cathedral, no special mass; unlike Cardinal O'Connor, Cardinal Bernard
Law has issued no public statements concerning the parade.20 4
In Boston, it is the vicinity in which the parade is conducted that is important-far more important than any political or religious overtones. The
New York parade moves through comparatively well-heeled commercial
and residential sections of Manhattan, where, it used to be said, the wealthy
looked out their fashionable windows and watched their servants pass by.2 °5
By contrast, the Boston parade is situated entirely in old "Southie" and, in a
real sense, is a cultural artifact of that economically depressed, but fiercely
independent, neighborhood.20 6 It was in South Boston twenty years ago that
resistance to racial desegregation was often vehement and sometimes violent.20 7 And it is in South Boston today that resistance to openly gay and
201
202

Van Ness Affidavit, supra note 199, at 4.
Chris Reidy, The Greening of America; St. Patrick's Day Has Become More US

Than Irish, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1993, at A19 (quoting Professor Thomas Brown of
the University of Massachusetts at Boston: "Over the years, the Irish took advantage of
Evacuation Day.").
203 E.g., Letter from Thomas J. Lyons, Chief Marshal, and Gene Vaillancourt, Parade
Adjutant, to Barbara [sic] Kay, Leader, Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group of Boston (Nov. 18, 1991) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter Lyons Letter].
204 Telephone Interview with Lois Kelly, Archdiocese of Boston, Office of Communications (July 6, 1993).
205 See Carroll, Rein, supra note 115, at 20.
206 See J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND 81, 227 (1986) (describing the other
significant annual parade in Boston-conducted in Charlestown on Bunker Hill Day).
207 Id. at 241.
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lesbian citizens seems unfortunately to flourish. This is scarcely to say that
bigotry is more common or more pronounced in Southie than in other communities; indeed, many accounts suggest that South Boston little deserves its
unsavory reputation.2"' If that is the case, however, it only exacerbates feelings already scraped raw by past experiences. So it is that in yet another
twist on the exclusion/inclusion paradox that follows both of the parades we
are exploring, some residents of South Boston regard the attempt by a gay
and lesbian group to join "the" Evacuation Day parade through the streets
in front of their homes as one more assault on the integrity of their community--one more effort to condemn Southie, to embarrass Southie, and thus to

excoriate its inhabitants as backward, ignorant, and xenophobic.2 0 9 The dispute over gay and lesbian participation in the Boston parade is thus attached
to strong claims to local autonomy and self-identification.
Moreover, as with the Irish community in New York, generational splits
within South Boston's social and political life are also reflected in the battle
over the town's traditional parade. By some accounts, the neighborhood is
racked by an "internecine struggle" for the authority to "speak[] for
Southie." ' 0 Younger, politically moderate residents accept change rather
well, while "old-guard community activists" defend "Southie's time-honored
tradition of fierce, unquestioning loyalty to the status quo.''2 In this vein,
one holdover from the desegregation fight, the South Boston Information
Center, recently issued a public warning to all "agents of social change" in
Southie: "This organization will actively expose and oppose any attempt to
trivialize South Boston's heritage or culture or tamper with our traditions. ' ' 21 Again, as we have seen in New York, local newspapers in Boston
reflect these same social divisions, with the Boston Globe counseling the
20

E.g., Marching Through South Boston,

BOSTON GLOBE,

Jan. 4, 1993, at 10 (antici-

pating that a gay and lesbian contingent in the parade "would be welcomed by many
along the parade route"); Letter to the Editor from Kevin Devlin, BOSTON HERALD,
May 16, 1993, at 32 (recognizing that "intolerance" is "alive" in South Boston just as
anywhere else but insisting that the "majority" of the people in Southie are concerned
only about violence). According to David Scondras, a gay former city councilor:
I honestly think that most people who live in South Boston don't care if a few gay
people march in the parade so long as they're not trashing the Irish traditions or
people who live in South Boston. I know this because I've marched in the parade
and I've been treated with respect. People are there to have a good time.
Ed Boyce, St. Patrick'sDay Controversy Erupts in Boston, IN NEWS, Mar. 10, 1992, at 4
(quoting Scondras).
209 See Kevin Cullen, A Community of Contradictions,BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 22, 1993,
at 13 (contending that the parade dispute illustrates the way in which "a good many
people in South Boston" hold "outsiders responsible for their problems" as though busing, drugs, and traffic snarls were "foisted by strangers upon the Town").
210

Id. at 16.

211

Id.
Id.

212
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admission of gay and lesbian participants and the Boston Herald siding with
the resistance. 1 3
Within this complex picture, Mayor Flynn, a life-long resident of Southie
who had initially come to public attention as a leader of the anti-busing
movement, 214 cut an ambiguous figure. On the one hand, he was regarded
by liberals as a progressive urban leader who had matured in office and now
typically championed minority interests, including the interests of gay and
lesbian Bostonians. On the other, he owed much of his personal and political support to Old Town traditionalists-for whom gay and lesbian participation in the Evacuation Day parade posed another in a series of threats.2 5
To make matters worse, Flynn found himself flanked by competitors attacking his positions from both directions at once. While the conservative
Republican Governor, William Weld, actively sought support in the gay
community, 21 equally conservative Democrats like City Councilor James
Kelly, also from South Boston, vehemently resisted gay and lesbian interests.217 In hard political terms, then, Flynn was caught in the middle-and
may well have suffered serious political damage when he ultimately chose to
21 8
support gay participation in the parade.
Over the years, the celebration in Boston has blossomed into another massive spectacle, attracting 20,000 marchers, dozens of vehicles and floats, and
as many as 700,000 spectators. Politicians are always on hand, as are units
of city fire fighters and police officers. As in New York, there are numerous
bands and other musical groups. Since schools, city and state facilities, and
many businesses are closed for the official holiday, public school children
often march-typically with school organizations and bands. Unlike New
York, however, participants promoting commercial products and political
causes are common. In 1992, Raytheon Corporation dragged a Patriot Missile along the route-followed by clowns dressed as "Teenage Mutant Ninja
Turtles;" a contingent of the Boston Stockbrokers Association; Miss "Ice-OCompare Marching Through South Boston, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 1993, at 10
with A Parade,Not Propaganda, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 4, 1993, at 32.
214 LUKAS, supra note 206, at 248.
215 Don Aucoin, Flynn's Two Realms Collide over Parade Ban on Gays, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1992, at 77 [hereinafter Aucoin, Two Realms]; Chris Reidy, Flynn Backs
Gays on St. Patrick'sParade, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 1992, at 1, 32.
218 See Frederic M. Biddle, Weld Earns High Profile with Pro-Gay Rights Stand,
BosTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 1991, at 1, 11 (identifying a "consensus" that Weld's record on
"gay rights" was "emerging as the most progressive of any governor in the nation"); cf.
Brian C. Mooney, Gay Activists March from BU to Protest Outside Silber's Home, BosTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 1990, at 14 (describing a gay and lesbian demonstration outside the
home of Weld's opponent in the 1990 gubernatorial campaign).
217 See Don Aucoin, City Councilor Facing Civil Rights Complaint, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 24, 1992, at 27 (reporting a civil rights complaint filed by a gay activist charging
Kelly with threatening him during a taped interview on gay and lesbian activities in the
city).
218 Flynn later decided not to seek reelection in Boston.
213
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Rama;" a POW/MIA float; a team of Clydesdale horses; floats sponsored by
Pepsi-Cola, Hub Video, Shubert's Smoke Shop, and the Mt. Washington
Cooperative
Bank; a Little League baseball team; and the "McGruff Crime
9
Dog.

21

From the earliest times, a service club in the city has had at least some
responsibility for organizing and conducting the annual parade. First it was
the City Point Improvement Association, then the South Boston Citizens'
Association, and, for the last forty-seven years, it has been the South Boston
Allied War Veterans Council. That organization routinely obtains a permit
to hold the parade-much like the permit issued to the Hibernians in New
York.22 ° In Boston, however, the city typically provides financial support
for the parade ($8000 in 1992).221 Moreover, as we will see in a moment,
city authorities in Boston figure significantly in the planning and conduct of
the parade-a difference between the Boston case and the case in New York
that, in many minds, draws a telling distinction. Recall that the NYCLU
has sided with the Hibernians. The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts
(CLUM), by contrast, has taken the part of gays and lesbians-giving as its
reason that the Boston parade is a truly public affair and thus subject
to the
222
Fourteenth Amendment prohibition on irrational discrimination.
2. The Current Controversy
In Boston, as in New York, the catalyst for the current dispute over gay
and lesbian participation may have been a contentious demonstration by gay
activists. In the summer of 1990, ACT-UP/Boston disrupted the ordination
of several young priests at the Holy Cross Cathedral in the South End. The
protestors staged a mock gay wedding, shouted vulgarities, and threw condoms at priests and their families.2 23 By some accounts, that incident deeply
disturbed Southie's Catholic community and stiffened local resolve to resist
other efforts by gays and lesbians to gain "acceptance from the wider
world. ' 224 The attempt by a different organization, employing markedly
St. Patrick's Day Parade Formation Statement, S. BOSTON TRIB., Mar. 12, 1992, at
l(a), 4(a). For a more extensive review of the parade and the 700,000 attendance figure,
see Ward v. South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, Docket No. 92-BPA-0014, slip
op. at 11-12 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination Oct. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Ward
MCAD Decision].
220 E.g., City of Boston Request for Parade Permit, Nov. 18, 1991 (copy on file with
the Boston University Law Review); City of New York Parade Permit Application, Nov.
22, 1992 (copy on file with the Boston University Law Review).
221 John "Wacko" Hurley, Answers to Interrogatories at 3, Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v. City of Boston, Civil No. 92-1518-A (Mass. Super. Ct. filed
Nov. 10, 1992) (No. 92-1518-A) (copy on file with the Boston University Law Review)
[hereinafter Hurley Answers].
222 Id.
223 Don Aucoin, Queer Nation at Center of Parade Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11,
1992, at 1, 11 (hereinafter Aucoin, Queer Nation).
224 David Nyhan, All Together for St. Pat, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 1992, at 17; cf.
219
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more conciliatory strategies, to participate in the Evacuation Day parade
may well have fallen victim to hard feelings developed long before in a clash
that simply refused to be forgotten.
Early in 1992, several lesbian women and one gay man, Patrick Ward,
formed a new local organization, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB), which promptly decided to participate in
the Evacuation Day parade that year.225 According to uncontradicted testimony, one of the GLIB leaders, Barbra Kay, approached John Meunier, a
member of Mayor Flynn's staff responsible for relations with the gay and
lesbian community. Meunier responded favorably, but he cautioned Kay
that Thomas Lyons, an employee in the city's Veterans' Services Department who served as grand marshal for the 1992 parade, had some "concerns"-namely that GLIB's participation would turn out to be another
demonstration by Queer Nation.226 Lyons was willing to talk to GLIB, however, and for that purpose Meunier passed along Lyons' office number. Kay
phoned Lyons during business hours, and he promised to send the necessary
registration forms.22 7 On February 3, about a month and a half before the
parade, Kay received a letter from Lyons on letterhead stationery, which
displayed the city's seal and name at the top, identified three honorary marshals for the parade (Mayor Flynn, U.S. Rep. Joseph Moakley, and William
M. Bulger, President of the Massachusetts State Senate), and listed Lyons
and others as parade officers. While the letterhead showed one apparent
officer as Commander of the Veterans Council, it nowhere identified that
organization as the parade sponsor. The letter "cordially invited" Kay and
her group to march.228
Initially, then, there appeared to be no objection to GLIB's participation
in the Boston parade. Kay promptly mailed in the registration form she had
received from Lyons, accompanied by her check in the amount of the registration fee; Lyons, for his part, promised to send her further information
about the parade route.229 Yet within a few days things began to fall apart.
In the third week of February, Kay met with a battery of city and parade
Letter to the Editor from Tim Daley, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 14 (complaining
that the Globe had erroneously ascribed responsibility for "stuffing condoms into church
poor boxes" to all gays and lesbians and particularly to those who wished only to march

in the Evacuation Day parade).
225 Affidavit of Barbra Kay at 2, Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group (Civil
No. 92-1518-A) (copy on file with the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter Kay
Affidavit]. Kay, a social worker, had been educated in Catholic schools in Ohio.
Another original GLIB member, Patrick Ward, had founded the Log Cabin Club, an
organization of gay Republicans. See Chris Reidy, Kay Stepped out of Anonymity, into
the Spotlight, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1992, at 26.
226 Kay Affidavit, supra note 225, at 2.
227 Id. at 3.
228 Lyons Letter, supra note 203. The letter was evidently a form prepared in the fall
of 1991, which accounts for its date.
229 Kay Affidavit, supra note 225, at 4.
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officials, including Meunier and Lyons, as well as Robert Jackson, the police
department's liaison with the gay community, and John O'Sullivan, Mayor
Flynn's liaison with South Boston. 2 0 According to Kay, O'Sullivan anticipated that "people in Southie" would think that "other people" were
"encroaching on their territory" in an attempt to force change that was "difficult" to accept-like "busing and housing desegregation. ,231
Reports are divided regarding what happened next. Lyons recalls asking
Kay for assurances that GLIB would act in a "non-confrontational" manner
and that Kay said she could make no "guarantee., 23' Kay does not recall
being asked for a "guarantee,, 23 3 but does recall saying that GLIB meant to
conduct itself in a "responsible" and "respectful" manner and that it would
be "foolish" to think that a small group of gay and lesbian marchers would
"behave or dress provocatively." 234 Lyons understood Kay to mean that her
group would "make no effort to control the activities and conduct of its
members along the parade route." 23 5 In any case, Lyons said that the Veterans Council would have to vote on GLIB's involvement. At a hastily called
meeting a few days later, the Veterans decided to exclude GLIB. At that
point, two grounds were given: concerns about "public safety" and doubts
respecting the "legitimacy of this Irish-American gay group. "236
By common account, many of the Veterans who voted against GLIB's
participation regarded that group as, in fact, Queer Nation or ACT-UP, sailing under false colors. Kay herself made no secret of her association with
Queer Nation, and, in some minds, it followed that in pressing GLIB's cause
she and her colleagues were misrepresenting who they were and what they
intended to do. While they insisted they wished only to express pride in
their identity as gay and lesbian Irish-Americans, many Veterans feared
that, in fact, they meant to stage a "publicity stunt."2'37 James Kelly, for
example, insisted that GLIB's "purpose" was, first, "to create a problem,"
230
231

Id. at 4-5.
Id.

232 Respondent's Answer at 5, Ward v. South Boston Allied War Veterans Council,

Docket No. 92-BPA-0014 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination filed Apr. 1, 1992)
(copy on file with the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter Veterans Answer,
MCAD].

233 Kay Affidavit, supra note 225, at 5.
Id.
235 Veterans Answer, MCAD, supra note 232, at 5.
236 Marc S. Malkin, St. Pat's Parade Controversy Moves Its Way into Boston, BAY
234

WINDOWS, Mar. 5-11, 1992, at 1, 16 (quoting Lyons after the vote). Lyons later returned
Kay's registration form to her, with a handwritten note: "Dear Ms. Kay, Your applica-

tion has been declined for safety reasons and insufficient information regarding social
club." Parade Registration Form, Evacuation Day Parade Mar. 15, 1992, Irish, American, Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (copy on file with the Boston University
Law Review).
237 Don Aucoin, Gays May Sue Organizers over St. Patrick's Parade Ban, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Aucoin, Gays May Sue].
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and then "to create media attention. ' '238 In this, the Veterans attempted to
disclaim the charge that GLIB was being excluded on the basis of the sexual
orientation of its members and their message, implicit or explicit. Rather,
according to the Veterans, GLIB would not be permitted to participate for
the ostensibly neutral reason that its appearance in the parade would
amount to purposeful provocation-the creation of a potentially violent episode for its own sake.23 9 One parade organizer, John "Wacko" Hurley put it
simply: "I don't believe it is a sincere movement., 240 Whatever anyone actually thought, the Veterans' vote drew a line in the dust. Gay actiists now
thought the Veterans were bigots, "and calling someone from Southie a bigot
[could] stick.",241 Many Veterans, in turn, thought that "gay activists who
pelted priests and their families with condoms at the Cathedral [were] also
bigots. "242
Prominent political figures in Massachusetts generally condemned the
Veterans' action. Governor Weld said that it would be "wrong" and "discriminatory" to bar GLIB from the parade and urged the Mayor to intercede; 243 the Boston Globe said that in the spirit of "diversity," participants
244
and spectators should "welcome the gay contingent into the march.,
Mayor Flynn rejected Weld's characterization of the Veterans' action as discriminatory, but he nonetheless called Kay and the Veterans' representatives
together and encouraged them to negotiate a settlement that would avoid the
kind of strife Southie had seen before. 245 Flynn pressed for a quick resolution both to ensure that the parade, now only days away, would not be disrupted, and also to blunt media attention. 24' At his insistence, the parties
held a press conference at which they announced that Kay had signed an
agreement promising that if GLIB were allowed to participate, it would be
represented by a group of only twenty-five marchers, who would conduct
themselves properly and would fly only the GLIB banner-not insignia connoting ACT-UP or Queer Nation. 247 The police gave assurances that order
could be maintained on that basis, and it seemed that when the Veterans
231

Id. at 29 (quoting Kelly).

239

Id.

240

Kevin Cullen, Shades of Green, No Shade of Gray, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1992,

at 21 (quoting Hurley).
241 Id.
242

Id.

Aucoin, Gays May Sue, supra note 237, at I.
A Parade of Troubles, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1992, 10.
245 Don Aucoin, Gays Offer to Limit Their Parade Role, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6,
1992, at 1 [hereinafter Aucoin, Gays Offer].
246 Kay Affidavit,'supra note 225, at 7-8.
247 Agreement, Mar. 6, 1992 (copy on file with the Boston University Law Review). A
final item in the agreement specified that neither side would institute legal proceedings
with respect to the Veterans' initial decision to exclude GLIB from the parade. See
Aucoin, Gays Offer, supra note 245, at 1.
243

244
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revisited the question of GLIB participation, concerns for public safety
2 48
could not justify another negative result.
The agreement was controversial within some quarters of the gay community, where Kay was criticized for surrendering both to unfounded fears that
homosexuals were inclined to be violent, 249 and to equally unfounded concerns that the "good people of Southie" would respond with violence to the
mere presence of a GLIB contingent in the parade.2 ° On the whole, however, the undertaking was thought to be justified in order to lay the public
safety issue to rest on this occasion, so that in future years gay and lesbian
participation in the parade might become unexceptional.2 5 ' In the interest of
compromise, GLIB itself promised to postpone legal action until the Veterans had an opportunity to revise their earlier decision in light of the new
agreement-albeit one GLIB member, Patrick Ward, immediately filed a
complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
(MCAD).25 2 For two days, Mayor Flynn straddled the divide between
GLIB and the Veterans, declaring that GLIB should be allowed to march so
long as its representatives followed "the rules," but also defending the
Southie Veterans against the charge of bigotry.25 Ever the effective politician, he joked that if he could not resolve the parade issue, he might be safer
in Northern Ireland (where he would be on the day of the parade) than in his
own home town. 254 At week's end, however, the Mayor took GLIB's part
and urged the Veterans to relent.255
When the Veterans met to reconsider GLIB's application, a crowd of
South Boston residents surrounded the hall, holding signs to express their
opposition: "Stand up for South Boston," and "Vote No-Protect Our
248 Don Aucoin, Southie Veterans to Vote Tonight on Gay Marchers, BOSTON GLOBE,

Mar. 9, 1992, at I [hereinafter Aucoin, Vote Tonight] (quoting a parade adjutant, Gene
Vaillancourt, confirming that "[tihe public safety issue is settled"); see Kay Affidavit,
supra note 225, at 8 (quoting a telephone call from the police department expressing
confidence that order could be maintained).
249 Aucoin, Vote Tonight, supra note 248, at 1 (quoting Barbra Kay).
250

Boyce, supra note 208, at 4.

GLIB Did the Right Thing, BAY

WINDOWS, Mar. 19, 1992, at 6.
Complaint, Ward v. South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, Docket No. 92BPA-0014 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination filed Mar. 5, 1992); Letter from Ellen
K. Wade, Attorney at Law, to Raymond L. Flynn, Mayor of the City of Boston (Mar. 7,
1992) (copy on file with the Boston University Law Review) (explaining GLIB's intention
to postpone legal action).
251

252

253

Aucoin, Gays May Sue, supra note 237, at I (describing Flynn's conflicting

loyalties).
254

Aucoin, Two Realms, supra note 215, at 77.

255 Aucoin, Vote Tonight, supra note 248, at 1. Flynn generally drew praise in the gay
community, both for his ultimate position and for previous attempts to negotiate a settlement. E.g., What a Shame, BAY WINDOWS, Mar. 12, 1992. By most accounts, the outcome of the upcoming vote was much in doubt. See, e.g., Aucoin, Vote Tonight, supra
note 248, at 1 (reporting that "no one" professed to be "certain").

1993]

PARADING OURSELVES

Rights." 2" James Kelly delivered an impassioned speech in which he again
linked GLIB with Queer Nation and charged its members with being
"provocateurs" and "agitators"-"haters" who had no "right to jump in
someone else's parade. 2 57 When the Veterans again voted to exclude GLIB,
the crowd outside sang "God Bless America., 258 Setting aside any further
concern regarding public safety, Lyons now told the press that GLIB would
be excluded because Kay still had not supplied adequate information about
her group and because a majority of the Veterans were unsure that GLIB
was "a bona fide Irish-American organization entitled to march.

25 9

Critics

quickly pointed out that the Veterans had never before proposed that a
group must be Irish-American to participate. 26 Nevertheless, "Wacko"
Hurley insisted that, if necessary, the Veterans' position could be defended
in court.26'
Hurley was soon proven wrong. With the assistance of CLUM and the
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), GLIB immediately
filed suit in the local state superior court, naming Mayor Flynn and the City
of Boston, as well as the Veterans Council, as defendants.262 The theory was
straightforward: the Evacuation Day parade was itself a public forum, from
which GLIB could not be excluded. 263 The Veterans resisted that argument
on three grounds. First, they repeated the charge that Kay and others were

using GLIB as a cover for Queer Nation, an "anti-religious and anti-Catholic" group that had employed offensive tactics in the past and would likely
do so again if permitted to march in the parade"-a charge that Kay flatly
denied.2z Second, they revived the claim that Kay had refused to guarantee
256 Don Aucoin, Veterans Bar Gay Groupfrom St. Patrick Parade, BOSTON GLOBE,

Mar. 10, 1992, at 1.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.

260 See Hurley Answers, supra note 221, at 1I (stating that "[tihere is no requirement
that a group be a bona fide Irish or Irish-American Group" and that "[i]t is the belief of
the [Veterans] that all people are 'Irish' on St. Patrick's Day").
261 Marc S. Malkin, Irish Gay Group Wins Its Right to March, BAY WINDOWS, Mar.
12/18, 1992, at 1.
262 Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v. City of Boston, Civil No. 921518-A (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 1992).
263 Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order at 3, Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group (Civil No. 92-1518-A) (copy on file with the Boston University
Law Review).
264 Aucoin, Queer Nation, supra note 223, at I (quoting Veterans' counsel declaring
that GLIB was a "Trojan horse that this Queer Nation group wants to roll down the
streets of South Boston" and reporting Kay's denial of those charges). In an effort to
prove that GLIB was, in fact, Queer Nation, the Veterans introduced evidence that the
national "Queer Nation Hotline" had recently answered with a recorded message suggesting that callers interested in the Boston parade should phone another number, which
answered with a recorded message from GLIB. Id.; see also Affidavits of Mary L.
Bonauto, Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group (Civil No. 92-1518-A) (copies
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the good behavior of GLIB marchers26 5-- the very concern that the agreement had been meant to address. Third, the Veterans declared that the
"principle" [sic] reason for excluding GLIB was that the inclusion of gay
and lesbian marchers was "not consistent" with the Veterans' own views,
"embodied in their parades"-views they described as "traditional" values,
reflected in appearances by "little league champions" and "topical media
figures such as the Ninja Turtles. ' 266 In this last, of course, the Veterans
asserted their own First Amendment right to use the parade to advance a
private agenda, and, within that argument, effectively claimed that they need
specify no particular message other than what was implicit in ad hoc decisions to include some groups and exclude others.267 Judge Hiller Zobel
on file with the Boston University Law Review) (reporting the texts of the recorded
messages).
265 Hurley Answers, supra note 221, at 7.
266

Id.:

The Respondent's membership denied GLIB permission to march in the parade
because the group had misrepresented itself in its initial application and contacts
with the Respondents. Barbra Kay "assured" the Respondents that GLIB was not
Queer Nation .... It was stated in the Boston Herald, on January 20, 1992, that
while Cardinal John O'Conner [sic] was the keynote speaker at a Massachusetts
Citizens for Life Service, at the Sheraton Boston, members of Queer Nation and/or
ACT-UP protested outside. In particular, Barbra Kay is quoted as calling Cardinal
O'Conner [sic] a "misogynist and a homophobe. We don't want him in our city."
Most revealing is that, on January 20, 1992, Barbra Kay identified herself as a member of Queer Nation. Was Barbra Kay a member of Queer Nation, ACT-UP or
GLIB, or were these organizations simply synonymous with one another.... The
principle [sic] representative of the group, Barbra Kay, indicated that she could
guarantee only her own demeanor and provided no assurances regarding the
demeanor of the other members of GLIB/Queer Nation/ACT-UP who would be
marching with her....
However, the principle [sic] reason for rejecting GLIB/Queer Nation/ACT-UP
was that including them in the parade was not consistent with the views of the
Respondents, which are embodied in their parades.
Id. at 2:
The "standards for participation" and/or "criteria" employed by the Respondents
in determining which groups or individuals are solicited to march in the South Boston Evacuation Day/St. Patrick Day Parades, are those that have traditionally
applied and deemed to reflect the last forty-seven years of experience by the South
Boston Allied War Veterans Council. Generally, the standards could be characterized as the desired expression of the Veterans reflected in their parade.
For instance, the current little league champions and various Holy Name societies
which, within the South Boston community during a given year, are solicited to
participate. The emphasis is on encouraging marching bands to participate in the
parade.
Basic standards are those of a "traditional" parade. Organizers seek such participants as marching bands and topical media figures such as the Ninja Turtles.
267 Id. ("In summary, the principle [sic] standard in the parade is that each group, and
collectively the total parade, reflects the views of the South Boston Allied War Veterans,
since it is an event staged by Respondents to reflect and illustrate its [sic] values.").
The Veterans acknowledged that they had no written standards for evaluating requests
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would have none of this. Speaking from the bench, he rejected the Veterans'
argument that they had a constitutional right to keep GLIB out of the
parade and held, by contrast, that GLIB had a constitutional right to be in
it. Accordingly, he ordered the Veterans to accept GLIB's representatives,
provided they followed the agreement that Kay had previously signed on
their behalf.2" Neither the city nor the Veterans appealed. 9
Under state court order, then, twenty-five GLIB members marched under
their own banner in the 1992 Evacuation Day parade in Boston. Reaction
was mixed. Both GLIB and the Veterans, as well as Mayor Flynn, issued
pleas for calm. A few organizations and school bands stayed away, citing
fears of violence; two radio stations declined to cover the event in order to
protest the Veterans' behavior.27 Many spectators along the route yelled
obscenities, insults, and threats, and a group of young men taunted the
GLIB marchers all the way, "sometimes urged on by older spectators yelling
'get them.' "271 Others braved rebukes from their neighbors and openly
cheered the GLIB group as it passed by. The marchers were escorted by two
to participate, abstracted from their decisions in individual cases, and that responsibility
for making such individual judgments rested with "all members" of their organization.
Id. They claimed, however, that other groups had previously been denied permission to
march, among them the Ku Klux Klan, the Irish Republican Army, ROAR (an antibusing group); and Massachusetts Citizens for Life (an anti-abortion organization). Id.
at 5, 8.
Looking back at the 1992 parade, an MCAD hearing officer, Shirley S. Lee, found that
"[t]he persons or groups authorized by Respondent [the Veterans] were very diverse and
reflected no particular consistent viewpoint, belief, [or] value." Nor, according to Lee,
did the participants convey "any particular coherent message." In fact, by Lee's account,
the Veterans "did not exercise any genuine selectivity in passing on applications for permission to march in the Parade." Ward MCAD Decision, supra note 219, at 13.
268 Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v. City of Boston, Civil No. 921518, slip op. at 1-3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 1992) (copy on file with the Boston University Law Review).
269 Don Aucoin, Judge Lets Gays March in Parade, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1993, at
1 (reporting the Veterans' decision not to appeal and reviewing the events of recent days).
270 Don Aucoin, Concernedfor Safety, Five Groups Quit Parade, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 13, 1992, at 1; Don Aucoin, ParadeOrganizers, Gay Group Unite in Urging Peaceful
March, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15, 1992, at 36; Brian McGrory, Officials Try to Ease
Parade Fears, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1992, at 29.
271 Don Aucoin & Andy Dabilis, Jeers, Threats Greet Gays in South Boston Parade,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1992, at 10 [hereinafter Aucoin & Dabilis, Jeers] (reporting
that one group of spectators chanted "We hate you" and that one onlooker yelled "You
bunch of fags"); see also Ed Boyce, St. Patrick'sDay ParadeHailed a Success, IN NEWS,
Mar. 17/23, 1992, at 1 (reporting that the GLIB marchers "never lost their smiles" even
as they were pelted with both "cheers" and "jeers"-and occasional beer cans and firecrackers); Marc S. Malkin, A Day of Hatred and Hope, BAY WINDOWS, Mar. 19/25,
1992, at 1 (reporting that a "white-haired grandmother holding her grandchild"
screamed "Kill the faggots"); Dawn Schmitz, Boston's Irish Get a Taste of Pride, GAY
COMMUNITY NEWS, Mar. 22/Apr. 4, 1992, at 1 (reporting similar episodes).
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trucks bristling with Boston police officers in riot gear, accompanied by
scores of foot patrols imported from New York. Still more officers appeared
on motorcycles and horses. There was little actual violence, albeit the police
made several arrests for assault. On his return from Northern Ireland,
Mayor Flynn criticized those who had shouted "hateful comments," but in
the main declared himself satisfied that "the overwhelming majority of
parade watchers and marchers brought great credit to themselves and their
'
community."272
GLIB leaders vowed to return the following year, but the
Veterans threatened to sever their ties to the city and thereby attempt to
make the Boston case fit the analysis adopted by Judge Duffy for the case in
New York. 3
Judge Zobel did not purport finally to resolve the issues in GLIB's lawsuit, but only to impose a short-term solution, with the expectation of getting
to the bottom of things before the next parade in 1993.274 In the wake of the
March 1992 parade, however, matters lay in repose until December, when
the Veterans filed their usual request for a permit to conduct another parade
the following spring.2 7 5 City authorities agreed, but on one condition: the
Veterans could conduct the parade only if they cooperated with the police in
developing a "public safety plan" for responding to any difficulties that
GLIB marchers might have in 1993-a contingency the city said it was "reasonable to expect. '271 Just how reasonable soon became clear. A few hours
later, MCAD issued a formal finding of probable cause to pursue Patrick
Ward's complaint that the Veterans' exclusion of gays and lesbians would
272 Michael Rezendes, Flynn Decries Heckling of Gays, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18,
1992, at 17; Aucoin & Dabilis, Jeers, supra note 271, at 10. South Boston residents inter-

viewed after the parade criticized the press for making it appear that the event was
marked with invective and violence when, in their view, it had been nothing of the kind.
Chris Reidy, South Boston Residents Call Media's Coverage Distorted, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 17, 1992, at 4; cf. Ed Boyce, Bisexual Activist Says He Was Forcedout of Job over St.
Patrick'sDay Participation,IN NEWS, June 9, 1992, at 4 (reporting an allegation that one
of the GLIB marchers had lost his job over the episode).
273 Don Aucoin, In Aftermath of Parade, Groups Plan for Future, BOSTON GLOBE,

Mar. 17, 1992, at 1; Luz Delgado, Group Vows to Return Next Year with Others, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1992, at 14.
274 Accordingly, Judge Zobel held in abeyance a motion to dismiss the action, filed in
April by Mayor Flynn and the Hibernians. Oddly, however, Judge Zobel revisited that
motion in December 1992, and at that point declared the issues moot. See Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for a Prelimiary Injunction and in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 6, Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v.
City of Boston, Civil No. 92-1518-A (Mass. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 12, 1993) (on file with
the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter GLIB Memorandum].
275 Letter from John J. "Wacko" Hurley, Parade Adjutant, to Transportation Dep't
(Dec. 3, 1992) (copy on file with the Boston University Law Review) (declaring the Veterans' intention to hold "a parade to observe the annual St. Patrick's Day/Evacuation Day
festivities" and requesting a permit to use the traditional route through Southie).
276 Parade Permit, Dec. 23, 1992, Appendix A (copy on file with the Boston University
Law Review).
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violate state anti-discrimination law. 277 City authorities thus plainly sent a
strong signal that they expected the Veterans to allow GLIB to march and
that there would be consequences if they refused. 278 Nevertheless, the Veterans did refuse to admit GLIB, now saying that they had taken yet another
vote and decided to exclude all groups with "sexual themes" and, in that
way, to underscore the point that the parade was meant to express their own
"religious and social values., 279 A few weeks later, a Ku Klux Klan group
from Connecticut was also reportedly turned away.28 °
GLIB responded on two levels-first by filing its own complaint with
MCAD and, then, by removing the new GLIB complaint to Judge Zobel's
court for immediate judicial attention.28 ' Once again, GLIB contended that
the Veterans were violating both state law and the First Amendment-and
setting up still more pretextual explanations for their actions. GLIB insisted
that the Veterans had no genuine standards and procedures for deciding
which groups could participate in the parade and had excluded GLIB ad
hoc, that the Veterans had failed to articulate any "specific ideas and values"
that would be diluted by GLIB's mere presence, and that, in truth, the
exclusion of GLIB marchers violated their First Amendment right of access
to a public forum.282
Recognizing that this last argument depended on the establishment of
state action, GLIB contended that city officials were planning the parade
with the Veterans just as they always had in the past and that the "conditional" permit the Veterans had received made it clearer than ever that the
city played a critical role. 2 3 Finally, according to GLIB, even if city author277 See Ward MCAD Decision, supra note 219, at 1-2; Michael Rezendes, Gays Gain

Ground for St. Pat's Parade, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 24, 1992, at 15 (reporting the
sequence of events). Later, a commissioner sustained Ward's complaint on the merits
and awarded him compensation for "emotional distress" as a result of the Veterans'
refusal to permit GLIB to join the 1992 parade. Ward MCAD Decision, supra note 219,
at 34-37.
278 See Ed Boyce, Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade Permit Mandates Admittance of
Gay Marchers, IN NEWS, Jan. 11, 1993, at 6 (reporting that GLIB understood the "conditional permit" to require the Veterans to include gay and lesbian participants and that
John Meunier appeared to be promoting that understanding); Michael Rezendes, City
Hall Red Light Halts St. Pat Parade, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 1992, at 64 (reporting
that city authorities were "seeking assurances" from the Veterans that GLIB would be
allowed to march).
279 Letter from Chester Darling, Attorney for the Veterans, to Mary L. Bonauto,
Attorney for GLAD and GLIB (Jan. 14, 1993) (copy on file with the Boston University
Law Review).
280 Joe Sciacca, Southie Parade Sponsors Nix KKK Bid to March, BOSTON HERALD,
Feb. 1, 1993, at 5 (quoting Chester Darling). The Klan group did not take legal action.
Id.
281 Letter from Michael T. Duffy, Investigating Commissioner, to Cathleen Finn (Feb.
1, 1993) (copy on file with the Boston University Law Review) (approving the removal).
282 GLIB Memorandum, supra note 274, at 9.
283 Id. at 22-23.
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ities themselves attempted to disclaim responsibility for the parade, they
should be charged with trying to delegate public responsibility to a private
group for the illegitimate purpose of avoiding Fourteenth Amendment
restraints-such that state action still should be found. 8 4 In response, the
Veterans pressed the arguments they had advanced previously, adding only
that, this year, they had declined any cash subsidy from the city in hopes of
undercutting GLIB's state action argument. 85 CLUM, for its part, softened
its support for GLIB this time around-amid internal disagreement regarding the side a civil liberties group should take in the parade case, now that
monetary subsidies were terminated. 8 6
Again, Judge Zobel was unimpressed-unimpressed by the Veterans'
argument that the parade was a private, religious observance rather than a
"secular, civic event," and equally unimpressed with the contention that the
Veterans meant the parade to convey a message that would be affected by
GLIB's participation." 7 When, indeed, he asked counsel to specify the precise "views" the parade embodied, he received only what he called a "litany"
of "traditional values," including "the Red Sox and apple pie."288 Accordingly, Judge Zobel made final the judgment that previously had been only
tentative: GLIB must be permitted to field a small group of parade participants who would march under the same guidelines that had been followed in
1992.289 Heavy snowfalls forced the postponement of the parade in 1993allowing time for the Veterans to appeal Judge Zobel's order in state court
and even to seek injunctive relief from the federal courts in Boston. Those
efforts were fruitless, however, and, in the end, GLIB's little band of marchers once again joined the procession in Southie.2 9 °
284

Id. at 22 n.3 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (declining to allow a

city to turn a public park over to segregationists and on that basis to justify the continuation of race discrimination)).
285 See Tonya Knudsen, Zobel Rules GLIB Will March in the 1993 Parade, IN NEWSWEEKLY, Mar. 1, 1993, at 1, 15 (quoting Chester Darling); cf. James Vaznis, City Councilor Urges Judge to Withdraw from Parade Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 1993, at 1
(reporting that James Kelly had asked Judge Zobel to recuse himself for bias).
286 Doris S. Wong, Backers of '92 Gay ParadersStep Aside, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16,
1993, at 22; see Harvey Silverglate, Vexed Vets.- Why Anti-Gay ParadeOfficials May Have
the Law on Their Side, BOSTON PHOENIX, Mar. 12, 1993, § 1, at 23-24 (attempting to
explain to a civil liberties audience that the Veterans might now have the better of the
argument). Despite these reservations, CLUM lawyers remained formally involved.
287 Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v. City of Boston, Civil No. 921518-A, slip op. at 2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 1993) (copy on file with the Boston
University Law Review).
288 Id.
289 Id.

at 5-6.

290 See Joe Heaney, Gay March Foes Credit "White Shamrocks"for Parade Delay,

BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 15, 1993, at 21 (reporting delays caused by bad weather). The
Veterans appealed first to Appeals Court Justice Roderick Ireland, sitting alone, who
declined to upset Judge Zobel's judgment. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
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The 1993 parade went much like the 1992 event, although the bad
weather may have combined with fears of violence to reduce the number of
spectators to about 200,000.A Again there was a large police escort; again
there were firecrackers, smoke bombs, and other missiles. 2 The GLIB
marchers were alternatively jeered and cheered; some placards spewed vitriol ("Hell's Lined with Homosexuals")," some preached tolerance ("Stop
the Hate").'
John Meunier walked with GLIB over the full route-the
better to demonstrate the city's support.29 Most GLIB marchers reported
that their experience was less distressing and more fulfilling. Every year,
predicted one participant, the people of Southie would see gays and lesbians
as "a bit more human," perhaps even "a bit more Irish."'2' The scene in
South Boston thus contrasted somewhat with events in New York, where
Judge Duffy's order prevented ILGO from marching and left gay and lesbian protestors to be arrested in the course of their counterdemonstration.297
The battle continues in Boston. Occasionally, there are signs of moderation. Rep. Joe Moakley, who represents Southie in Congress and served as
an honorary marshal for the Boston parade in 1992, said just before the 1993
parade that he had changed his mind and now thought it would be best if
gays and lesbians were allowed to march-so long as they "act and dress like
anybody else.", 29' The Veterans, by contrast, remain as strident as ever: "We
don't want their sexual preferences pushed in people's faces;" GLIB is a
"crazy, outrageous group.... [I]f they [sic] don't like the [parade's] tradiGroup v. City of Boston, No. 93-J-138, slip op. (Mass. App. Ct. Mar. 12, 1993). Thereafter, they appealed to Supreme Judicial Court Justice Herbert P. Wilkins, also sitting
alone, who similarly denied relief. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v.
City of Boston, No. SJ-93-0081, slip op. (Mass. Mar. 13, 1993). After the full Supreme
Judicial Court declined to hold an emergency session on the case, Doris S. Wong, SJC
Declines Hearing on St. Patrick's Parade, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1993, at 13, the
Veterans sought an injunction against Judge Zobel's order from Judge Mark L. Wolf in
the federal district court in Boston. Judge Wolf declined to act for want of jurisdiction
under the Rooker/Feldman doctrine and out of deference to state proceedings under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v.
Zobel, C.A. No. 93-10509-WF, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3631 (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 1993).
291 Marc S. Malkin, Less Hatred Seen at St. Pat's Parade, BAY WINDows, Apr. 1,
1993, at 1.
292 Beverly Ford, Jeers & Cheers Greet Gay Irish Marchers in St. Pat's Parade, BosTON HERALD, Mar. 29, 1993, at 8.
291 Bob Hohler & Philip Bennett, Abuse, Cheers for Gay Marchers, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 13.
294 Malkin, supra, note 291, at 4.
295 Ed Boyce, Subdued by Comparison, IN NEWSWEEKLY, Apr. 5, 1993, at 5.
296 Malkin, supra note 291, at 1.
297 See Tom Mashberg, Gays and the Parade.Boston, NYC, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18,
1993, at 3 (drawing the comparison); supra note 197 and accompanying text.
298 Wayne Woodlief, Rep: Let Gays March if They Don't Act Up, BOSTON HERALD,
Feb. 11, 1993, at 13.
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tional theme, tough."29 Gay and lesbian opinion is typically more moderate, but can sometimes be equally harsh: If "a small contingent of gays and
lesbians marching in the parade has become such a landmark event," the
Veterans have only "their zealous bigotry to blame." 3" Thus in Boston, as
in New York, the struggle over the St. Patrick's Day parade has clearly not
been settled by the actions taken to date and will inevitably come alive again.
III.

THE MESSAGE IN THE PARADES

Bracing for the future, we do well to consider what the history of these
two parades can teach us. On examination, it is experience, not abstract
doctrine, that best informs our understanding of the character and power of
the Hibernians' and Veterans' claims that they are constitutionally entitled
to take the position they do with respect to ILGO and GLIB. Ordinarily,
the validity of citizens' opinions, and certainly the sincerity of their religious
convictions, are matters left to the individuals involved-free of governmental second-guessing, even by the courts.3 0' Building on this base, it may
fairly be proposed that city authorities in New York and Boston act at their
peril when, and if, they discount the Hibernians' and Veterans' contention
that the parades they conduct embody the message that homosexual behavior is immoral. The implication, then, is that we must ignore whatever evidence there may be to suggest that the parades are better understood to be
large public events (and there is a great deal of evidence in that direction)
and accept, instead, the organizers' characterizations. This, indeed, is precisely the argument advanced in the cases in support of an easy victory for
the Hibernians and Veterans.30 2 For once it is posited that the parades must
be treated as the expression of private homophobic opinion, which, however
improbable or distasteful, cannot be questioned, it seems to follow, virtually
as a logical imperative, that those who insist they hold such views must
prevail.30 3
299 Doris S. Wong, Arguments Heard on St. Pat's March, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17,
1993, at 22 (quoting "Wacko" Hurley and Chester Darling).
300 Gay Pride on Green Turf, IN NEWSWEEKLY, Mar. 15, 1993, at 10.
301 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
302 E.g., Hibernian Memorandum, State Court, supra note 95, at 47:

For First Amendment purposes, however, it is the view of the person being
silenced or compelled to speak that must be controlling. How others view the
Parade is irrelevant. It is the sponsor's message that is at issue, and only the sponsor
can say what that message is. For the state to tell a private citizen what that person
is saying is as odious as the state telling him what he should say.
See also Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of the Rabbinical Alliance of America et al. at 910, Beirne v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, Index No. 92-29840 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. filed Dec. 12, 1992) (insisting that "the sponsors of the parade, not government,
define the purpose of the Parade" and that "[it is the AOH and not the City which
decides whether the positions on homosexuality espoused by ILGO are in conflict with
the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church" (citations omitted)).
303 NYCLU Memorandum, HRC, supra note 79, at 13-14:
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By this account, it seems inadequate to respond that such pristine free
speech, religious, and associational freedoms must defer to access claims on
the part of gay and lesbian groups. If the parades are truly private affairs
organized by private associations, then it seems to follow that the Constitution of its own force cannot require those private organizers to conform to
standards fixed for public authorities. And if the Hibernians and Veterans
are truly expressing sincerely held personal views, it seems to follow that the
forced inclusion of ILGO and GLIB would compromise their message. The
argument on this point may sound like double-talk on first hearing, but there
is some substance to the claim that the exclusion of gay and lesbian groups,
as opposed to individual homosexuals marching with other units, is not discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation at all, but rather is discrimination on the basis of the point of view that ILGO and GLIB represent. Those
organizations do have a message of their own, namely the message that
forms their raison d'&tre-the message that makes intelligible both the exercise of associational freedom they reflect and the First Amendment claim
they assert in seeking access to the public streets in the first place.3a 4 To be
sure, conventional legal doctrine treats discrimination on the basis of expression roughly like discrimination on the basis of race."0 5 Yet in this particular
First Amendment context, where speech claims are set over against each
other, it seems perfectly reasonable, even essential, that those who command
the public forum be permitted to bar those with conflicting views.
I want to suggest, however, that things do not necessarily fall out this
way. For one thing, it just isn't true that bald assertions of opinion or even
religious faith are absolutely invulnerable to investigation. Constitutional
rights are not to be abused as pretexts for avoiding the effects of public policy. 306 For another, one does not have to contest the sincerity of anyone's
personal views regarding homosexuals or homosexual behavior, nor even a
group's shared opinion on that score, in order to question whether these two
massive events are genuinely the expressive activities the organizers profess
them to be. Let's first explore the case for a sincere religious objection to
By arrogating to itself the right to define and to determine the message intended to
be conveyed by the Parade, and by compelling the Parade Organizers to include a
group expressly found objectionable on cultural, ideological and religious grounds,
the City has directly and seriously impaired the Organizers' fundamental First
Amendment freedoms of expressive associational speech.
s4 As the Hibernians have pointed out, ILGO pressed its own First Amendment
claim on Judge Leval. That had to mean that ILGO wished to "express something," and
that something must be "gay and lesbian orientation." So when ILGO was barred it was
"not due to the sexual preference of its members" but instead the group's desire to "make
a statement." Hibernian Memorandum, State Court, supra note 95, at 28-29.
305 Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (discrimination based on race)
with Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1976) (discrimination based on the content of desired expression).
306 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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homosexuality and then consider the claim that the St. Patrick's Day
parades constitute manifestations of such objections.
A.

Catholics and Homosexuals

There is nothing necessarily Catholic about St. Patrick or the day traditionally marked for recalling his contribution to the spread of Christianity.' ° ' Certainly, there is nothing to say that Catholics are obliged to
conduct a sectarian parade on that day. There is, however, undeniable merit
in the claim that the Catholic Church considers homosexual activity to be
mortal sin.3"' This does not mean, of course, that any Catholic who commits a homosexual act is thereby condemned to oblivion. Human beings do
lots of sinful things. As long as Catholics struggle against their sins and
genuinely try to live according to Church teachings, they may be forgiven.30 9
By tradition, priests counseling parishioners who profess gay or lesbian sexual relations are to explain that their behavior is contrary to the revealed will
of God and to advise one of two options: either "conversion" to exclusively
heterosexual relations or "total abstinence from all sexual expression. 's 310 If
a Catholic follows one course or the other, the priest may administer absolution. If, however, he persists in homosexual activity in the face of counseling, absolution may be denied.31 ' Put bluntly, then, no believing Catholic
can "condone, endorse, approve or be neutral about" homosexual
behavior.312
This orthodoxy invites criticism. Initially, it is plainly hurtful to great
numbers of people and on that ground alone would seem to require
extremely persuasive justifications to be satisfying. 3 The justifications that
307

Letter to the Editor from Leland J. White, Professor of Religion and Culture, St.

John's University, N.Y.

TIMES,

Jan. 29, 1993, at A26 (explaining that St. Patrick lived

centuries before the Reformation and that the Hibernian Society in Charleston alternates
between Catholic and Protestant leaders).
308 See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (Oct. 1, 1986) (copy on file with
the Boston University Law Review). An addendum to the 1986 letter reported that the
Pope had personally approved it and ordered its release. Testimony in the New York

parade case was to the same effect. Accordingly, the Hibernians were on solid ground in
their claim that within Catholic doctrine homosexual activity is always immoral. Hibernian Memorandum, State Court, supra note 95, at 37 n.26.
309 Cf. Lisa S. Cahill, Moral Methodology.-A Case Study, in A CHALLENGE TO LOVE:
GAY AND LESBIAN CATHOLICS IN THE CHURCH 78-79 (Robert Nugent ed., 1983) [hereinafter CHALLENGE] (explaining that a gay or lesbian individual may be understood to
wrestle with his or her sexual inclinations much as any Christian grapples with any other
form of sin).
310 JOHN J. MCNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 1
311
312

banc).
313

(1976).

Id. at 8.
See Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 15 (D.C. 1987) (en
Orthodox Catholic teaching regarding homosexuality has divided the faith like
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are forthcoming, however, lack solid support in rational science and depend,
instead, upon authoritative interpretations of scripture and Catholic tradition. Those interpretations, in turn, are open to question, both without and
within the Church, precisely because they seem to ignore modern learning
that renders already ambiguous primary materials all the more difficult to
decipher. Finally, the disingenuous ways that believers, the Hibernians
included, finally explain their reliance on Church doctrine suggests that that
reliance is more convenient than real. I do not mean to offer in this small
space a thoroughgoing critique of Catholic teaching on homosexuality. Nor
do I mean to launch a superficial, ad hominem attack on the religious beliefs
that many Catholics sincerely hold. Nor, certainly, do I mean to challenge
the very foundation of religious liberty-the idea that men are free to believe
what they cannot prove and have no duty to offer explanations that satisfy
others. In an effort to get to the bottom of the parade cases, however, I am
obliged to ask whether the fragility of Church doctrine as the basis for the
Hibernians' rejection of ILGO suggests that there are other reasons,
independent of religion, in the mix.
To begin, there is a sizeable range of opinion concerning Church doctrine.
Many religious leaders, like Cardinal O'Connor, defend the status quooften stridently.314 Other theologians and scholars elaborate the doctrine in
a way that tends to blunt its condemnatory force-distinguishing, for example, between homosexual behavior (which the Church condemns) and homosexual orientation (which Catholics can tolerate).3" 5 Still others are openly
critical, albeit in varying degrees. Moderates like Charles Curran suggest
that while "[h]omosexuality can never become an ideal," and while
"attempts should be made to overcome this condition if possible," there may
be circumstances in which "one may reluctantly accept homosexual unions
as the only way in which some people can find a satisfying degree of humanity in their lives.",316 More aggressive critics like John J. McNeill argue that
nothing else save abortion. Consider John Politano in Boston, whose son turned out to be
gay-and then died of AIDS:
When I first found out Johnny was gay, I called up my priest and asked him for help
....The first thing he said was, "It's a mortal sin." I hung up on him. My son was
a good boy, a nice boy, everybody loved Johnny. I consider myself a good Catholic,
but I think the church is out of order with gays and it has its head in the sand about
AIDS.
Bella English, In Love's Power, A Chance For Life, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 1991, at 17
(quoting Politano).
314
315

See supra notes 127-28, 163, 179, 182-83 and accompanying text.
See RICHARD P. McBRIEN, 2 CATHOLICISM 1027-33 (1980) (recognizing the "offi-

cial" church position as one of three general approaches found in the theological literature); THE VATICAN AND HOMOSEXUALITY: REACTIONS TO THE LETTER TO THE
BISHOPS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ON THE PASTORAL CARE OF HOMOSEXUAL
SONS

PER-

(Jeannine Gramick & Pat Furey eds., 1988) (presenting a range of intramural

criticisms).
316 CHARLES CURRAN, CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY IN DIALOGUE

217 (1972).
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"the homosexual condition" is consistent with the will of God and that
"morally good homosexual relationships" are entirely possible. 17
If the official Church position were consistent with empirical evidence or
scientific theory, it would presumably weather critiques more easily than it
does. But science, suffice it to say, is fast forming ranks with dissenters.
Initially, there are intractable problems of definition. We are not entirely
sure that there are only two biological gender assignments (male and
female), rather than perhaps five (males, females, "true" hermaphrodites,
male pseudohermaphrodites, and female pseudohermaphrodites), or, indeed,
whether human gender is not better understood as a continuum along which
individuals are located at vaguely differentiated intervals."' If we lay aside
that uncertainty, focus on the conventional categories (male and female),
and assume that "heterosexuals" represent the norm, we cannot be sure
what counts as doing "homosexual" things or, certainly, "being" homosexual. 19 It is only practical to recognize that we must use common terms like
"homosexual" and "homosexuality" in order to conduct a discourse at all. I

certainly accept that practical point in this Article. 2 ' Still, same-sex exper317 MCNEILL,

supra note 310, at 193-96. In a celebrated confrontation with church

officials over the publication of his book, McNeill was expelled from the Society of Jesus.
Edward Tirnan, Homosexuals and the Churches, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1987, at 84.
318 Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes, THE SCIENCES, Mar./Apr., 1993, at 120;
accord Judd Marmor, Notes on Some Psychodynamic Aspects of Homosexuality, in
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY, FINAL
REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS 55 (1972) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
319 See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 318, at 2:

Homosexuality is not a unitary phenomenon, but rather represents a variety of phenomena which take in a wide spectrum of overt behaviors and psychological experiences. Homosexual individuals can be found in all walks of life, at all
socioeconomic levels, among all cultural groups within American society, and in
rural as well as urban areas. Contrary to the frequently held notion that all homosexuals are alike, they are in fact very heterogeneous.
See also RICHARD R. TROIDEN, GAY AND LESBIAN IDENTITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 15 (1988) (describing "a heterosexuality-homosexuality continuum" ranging from "a
minimal to a predominant or exclusive sexual interest" in members of the same sex);
Evelyn Hooker, Homosexuality, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 318, at 11 (explaining that "[h]omosexuality ...includes an extraordinary diversity of dyadic relations and
of individual mental states and action patterns").
320 With apologies to more precise observers. E.g., JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY,
SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM
THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

41-59 (1980)

(elaborating subtle distinctions that I am overlooking); CHRISTINE DOWNING, MYTHS
AND MYSTERIES OF SAME-SEx LOVE 3-12 (1989) (explaining the pitfalls of lumping gay
men and lesbians in a single "homosexual" category). I also lay aside concerns that all of
us have when we write about matters of vital concern to others-for which we can never
feel fully appreciative. Cf. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (exploring the role of perspective in
legal analysis). Compare MOHR, supra note 2, at 15 (expressing a gay male's hesitancy to
write about lesbians) with DOWNING, supra, at xvii-xix (expressing doubts that lesbians
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iences are so diverse and nuanced that any attempt to derive genuine rigor
from such terms is futile.3 2 ' If we lay aside that problem, too, and insist on
placing individuals in "homosexual" categories, we risk misleading (and personally offensive) stereotypes that only fuel misunderstanding. Whatever
anyone may think about the morality of homosexual relationships, no one
seriously believes that an individual's full being is determined and expressed
by and through his or her sexual behavior or orientation. 22
Definitional difficulties are exacerbated, in turn, by problems of derivation. We very simply do not know what biological, experiential, or volitional
factors may contribute to the development of homosexual behavior or orientation. 2 Scientific studies are few in number, often methodologically questionable, and always inconclusive. 24 We do know, however, that individuals
do not simply choose their sexual orientation as a matter of taste. Sexual
identity is immutable, and almost certainly genetically influenced. 2 If
can write sensibly about male homosexuals) and Ruthann Robson, Posner's Lesbians:
NeitherSexy nor Reasonable, 25 U. CONN. L. REV. 491, 498-501 (1993) (pointing out the
stereotypes that straight writers may bring to their work). See generally Robson, supra,
at 501 n.43 (collecting recent books by and about lesbians that may offer a more accurate
picture).
321 Alan Bell, Homosexuality, An Overview, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH: A SYMPOSIUM 9 (Harold L. Twiss ed., 1978) [hereinafter SYMPosIUM]
(proposing that careful thinkers should refer to "homosexualities"); accord JOHN H.
GAGNON, HUMAN SEXUALITIES 235-37 (1977).
322 See Marc Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling and Gay
Rights, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 546-47 (1992) (refuting any suggestion that anyone's
identity is "reducible to sexual acts" or that "sex is all there is to being gay"). I do not
mean in this to deny the role that one's sexual orientation quite obviously plays in the
various arenas of life. Nor, certainly, do I doubt that one's politics can be, and often are,
charged by sexual orientation-and reasonably so.
323 See, e.g., John Money, Sexual Dimorphism and Homosexual Gender Identity, in
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 318, at 42; cf. Michael D. Guinan, Homosexuals: A
Christian PastoralResponse Now, in CHALLENGE, supra note 309, at 70 (pointing out
that the "causes" of heterosexual orientation are equally obscure).
324 William Byne & Bruce Parsons, Human Sexual Orientation: The Biological Theories Reappraised, 50 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 228 (Mar. 1993). There are, of
course, some good, if inconclusive, studies on point. E.g., J. Michael Bailey et al., Heritable Factors Influence Sexual Orientationin Women, 50 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY
217 (Mar. 1993).
325 Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1993, at 47 [hereinafter Burr, Homosexuality] (sketching the experiments conducted in
recent years and the evidence they have produced). Genetic markers have a lot to do
with homosexual orientation. SIMON LEVAY, THE SEXUAL BRAIN 105-30 (1993). But,
again, the genetic roots that now seem apparent scarcely conclude the social questions
with which we are faced. See Chandler Burr, Genes vs. Hormones, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
1993, at AI5 (insisting that most scientists concluded a long time ago that sexual orientation is not "chosen"-but have continued to do studies as part of the larger project to
understand human sexuality more fully); Ruth Hubbard, False Genetic Markers, N.Y.
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chromosomes, hormones, and prenatal development are not the exclusive
determinants, then post-birth experiences of which one is unconscious are
the most likely candidates next in line.a26 Some theorists suppose that
"[h]omosexual interest" may on occasion be a "transient stage," and, indeed,
that in some instances it may "emerge late in life." In the main, however, it
3 27
is now widely understood that "the dominant pattern is set early.
Of course, if homosexuality is in the genes, then it is ever so difficult 3 to
28
ascribe moral significance to any individual's gay or lesbian inclinations.
The notion that same-sex liaisons are pathological and thus to be "cured,"
becomes unworkable-itself open to criticism as immoral . 29 Anyone who
defends a blanket condemnation of gay and lesbian relationships must resist
organic explanations and insist, against all the evidence, that homosexuality
is a product of will. 330 That argument, of course, ultimately turns back on
Aug. 2, 1993, at A15 (pointing out that the biological determinants of homosexual orientation are only part of the general story of human sexual relations in any and all
forms).
326 See BARNETT, supra note 68, at 223 (explaining that to the extent homosexuality is
rooted in post-birth experience "the majority of homosexuals never consciously realize or
admit to themselves what is happening to them until the die is already cast"); Burr,
Homosexuality, supra note 325, at 64-65 (reporting conversations with investigators
engaged in current studies). See generally RICHARD C. FRIEDMAN, MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE (1988) (analyzing a wealth
of recent scholarship).
327 WOODS, supra note 1, at 61. Moreover, if we set aside questions regarding the
determinants of homosexuality in the first instance and focus on human development in
society, the implications of homosexual orientation lend themselves to a sociological analTIMES,

ysis running as follows:
People are not born with perceptions of themselves as homosexual, ambisexual
. , or heterosexual. Before they can identify themselves in terms of a social condition or category, they must learn that a social category.., exists ... ; discover that
other people occupy the social category ... ; and perceive that their own socially
constructed needs and interests are more similar to those of persons who occupy that
social category than they are different. In addition, they must begin to identify with
those included in the social category; decide that they qualify for membership... ;
elect to label themselves in terms of the social category ... ; and incorporate and
absorb these situationally linked identities into their self-concepts over time.
TROIDEN, supra note 319, at 1-2.
328 MOHR, supra note 2, at 188-89; accord McNEILL, supra note 310, at 41. Of
course, if gays and lesbians are locked into their sexual urges by biological forces beyond
their control, then in many minds it may be more difficult to regard homosexual behavior
and status as part of an individual's self-definition.
329 See BARNETT, supra note 68, at 236 (explaining that the homosexual "impulse"
can rarely be redirected); WOODS, supra note 1, at 106-09 (doubting the success of any
attempt to "cure" homosexuality and warning that attempts may do "lasting personal
damage").
3 E.g., Lynn R. Buzzard, How Gray is Gay?, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 321, at 47,
53 (referring to mysteriously uncited "evidence" that homosexuals "can change if they
really want to").
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itself...' There may be something intuitively attractive in the notion that
same-sex liaisons are "unnatural" in the sense that they cannot produce offspring. 33 2 Yet there is no self-evident basis for insisting that sex can have
only one function or, indeed, that it has to be functional at all. It just isn't
true that the only "natural" use of human genitals is reproduction; if that
were true, then a host of common behaviors, among them masturbation and
postmenopausal sex, would equally offend the natural order.3 33 In an atmosphere of uncertainty, mainstream professionals typically discourage social
policies that impose burdens on individuals because of their homosexual
behavior or status.3 3 4
Coming at the problem in an entirely different way, Michel Foucault proposed that the idea of homosexuality is, in fact, a socially constructed phenomenon, assembled as one of a number of instruments for the exercise of
coercive power in human society. This is not the place to attempt a serious
evaluation of the constructionist case. It is enough for our purposes merely
to note that the condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual behavior
has undeniable social functions. By defining that which is deviant, the dominant forces in society define as well that which is oppositional to deviance,
namely the norm, and appropriate that norm as a circular justification for
dominance.335 In this fundamental sense, it may be that the homophobe's
attitudes do not merely reflect anxiety about his or her own latent homosexual tendencies, or even fears that the very existence of homosexuals presents
331

Of course, if, and to the extent that, homosexual orientation is a matter of

"choice," one's "decision" is scarcely like selecting a restaurant for dinner. Given the
penalties, formal and informal, for being gay, no one would take the matter lightly. See
MOHR, supra note 1, at 39-40.
332 This understanding is typically ascribed to Thomas Aquinas. See, e.g., Edward A.
Malloy, Point/Counterpoint, in CHALLENGE, supra note 309, at 109.
333 MOHR, supra note 1, at 36, 113 ("[It is not merely as a need that sexual pleasure is
central to human life; in intensity and in kind it is unique among human pleasures; it has
no passable substitute from other realms of life. For ordinary persons-not mystics or
adolescent poets--orgasmic sex is the only access they have to ecstasy.").
334 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 318, at 5-6. The American Psychiatric Association does not include homosexuality in its list of mental disorders. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 281
(1980); cf. Robert Pear, Doctors Add Homosexuals to Group's Anti-Bias Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 1993, at A23 (reporting that the American Medical Association has
amended its by-laws to make it clear that it will not discriminate among members on the
basis of sexual orientation). What I have said about our law of free speech can equally be
said of our law touching homosexuality. There is no "grand theory" that can discipline
the majority's desire to regulate sexual orientation or activity. Rather, we must "work
with a more rich and complex view of human nature that takes into account the human
need to belong, to be different, to contribute, to remain faithful to some sense of oneself,
to change, [and] to pursue noble goals." Katharine T. Bartlett, Rumpelstiltskin, 25 U.
CONN. L. REV. 473, 489-90 (1993).
3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 35-48 (1980). For an analysis
of Foucault's theory, see DOLLIMORE, supra note 4, at 222-27.
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a challenge to his or her masculine or feminine nature. Instead, or in addition, homophobia rejects same-sex liaisons because, for example, they underto conceive,
mine the rigid male/female dichotomy that makes it possible
33 6
and certainly to perpetuate, the idea of male superiority.
Vexing questions regarding definition and source, in turn, befuddle
attempts to glean the biblical import of homosexual relations. Most authorities acknowledge that both the Old and New Testaments consistently condemn homosexual acts. 3 7 Nevertheless, scholars like Derrick Bailey protest
that since we now know that human sexualities defy simple categories, it is
impossible to pin down the precise meaning that ancient texts meant to convey when they addressed same-sex relations as then understood.3 38 According to Bailey, those texts cannot sensibly be allowed to make moral issues
out of things that, in light of modern evidence, may be much more complex.33 9 In this, too, the acknowledged attention in biblical sources to samesex acts, as opposed to more generalized orientation or status, is all the more
problematic. A distinction does seem clearly to have been drawn, but the
nature of that distinction, and certainly its purpose, loses something in translation. For example, since the authors of ancient scripture did not appreciate homosexuality as a morally neutral "psychological condition," they may
well have been referring to what modern writers would call "perversion"336

See MCNEILL, supra note 310, at 95-96 (referring as well to Aquinas' commitment

to the inferior status of women); cf. David Gelman, Homoeroticism in the Ranks, NEWSWEEK, July 26, 1993, at 28 (speculating on the implications of a variety of sexually erotic

rituals in which military personnel are known to engage).
"I William Muehl, Some Words of Caution, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 321, at 79. Of
course, there are not many scriptural references at all respecting male homosexualityand almost none respecting lesbianism.
338 DERRICK S. BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION 3-4 (1955); accord McNEILL, supra note 310, at 38-39. Bailey, for example, disputes the conventional understanding that God destroyed Sodom because its citizens
surrounded Lot's house and demanded that angels sent to investigate the city's wicked
reputation be brought out so that the citizens might "know" them. Where orthodox

interpretation takes "know" in the key passage to mean "engage in coitus," Bailey argues
that that is not a necessary inference and that "know" may be understood in its ordinary,
BAILEY, supra, at 2-4; see McNEILL, supra note 310, at 49 (contending
that the "sin of Sodom ... was primarily one of inhospitality").
339 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 318, at 2, 6-7:

modern sense.

Homosexuality presents a major problem for our society largely because of the
amount of injustice and suffering entailed in it not only for the homosexual but also
for those concerned about him. ...
We believe that most professionals working in this area-on the basis of their
collective research and clinical experience and the present overall knowledge of the
subject-are strongly convinced that the extreme opprobrium that our society has
attached to homosexual behavior, by way of criminal statutes and restrictive employment practices, has done more social harm than good and goes beyond what is necessary for the maintenance of public order and human decency.
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or "the indulgence in homosexual activity on the part of those who were by
nature heterosexually inclined.'0 4
Finally, critics fault the traditional Catholic attitude toward homosexual
behavior for its glaring inconsistency. Even if the scriptural references to
same-sex acts are read for all they are worth, they still are only selections
from the whole. Orthodox Catholic teaching does not fully explain why
these particular passages should be taken so literally, and should be
accorded such profound significance in Church doctrine, while other
passages receive dramatically less attention and respect. If the Church were
to be equally literal with respect to the rest of the Bible, Catholics "would
have to go on a kosher diet, support capital punishment, and advocate the
reinstitution of slavery." ' ' Critics contend, accordingly, that the real explanation for intolerance lies neither in scripture nor in tradition, but rather in
the ordinary, modem fears and anxieties that each of us has about human
342
sexuality.
B.

Catholic Teaching and the Parades

Against this background, it remains to ask, forthrightly and candidly,
whether the parades we are'investigating genuinely do constitute the expression of honestly held, constitutionally protected opinions regarding homosexuality in general or, at least, homosexual behavior. Once again, if we
have to take the Hibernians' and Veterans' word for it, they do. If, however,
we pause to look behind what those groups say to the courts and the press,
we find evidence pointing in the other direction.
Initially, there is every reason to think that many, if not most, participants
and spectators are largely ignorant of, or indifferent to, such a narrow sectarian view. At least they were before the current controversies captured the
headlines. If, then, we acknowledge what the Hibernians and Veterans insist
they want the parades to be, but also take account of what the parades
appear to be (to others), we may fairly conclude that they are not "private,
Catholic" events at all, but public street parties-to which ordinary citizens
believe they hold open invitations. After all, it is conceded that individuals
and groups need have no Catholic affiliation to participate and that many
units have no purpose to express any discernible message, least of all a fine
point of orthodox Catholic dogma. The Hibernians may and do respond
McNEILL, supra note 310, at 41-42.
David L. Bartlett, A Biblical Perspective on Homosexuality, in SYMPOsIuM, supra
note 321, at 33; accord BOSWELL, supra note 320, at 7; MOHR, supra note 1, at 33.
342 E.g., MOHR, supra note 1, at 34 (dismissing religious scruples as "a disguise for
340
341

some animus for which" those who voice them "have no reasons"). Duplicitous arguments that conceal actual motivations are the stuff of homophobia, as well as other forms
of prejudice and bias. E.g., Clifford Krauss, Senators Attack Housing Nominee, N.Y.

May 21, 1993, at A12 (reporting that some senators purported to oppose a lesbian
nominee for public office on the ground that she lacked the "temperament" to do a
proper job).

TIMES,
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that there is a difference between being "non-Catholic and being anti-Catholic," 4 ' and that surely is true. Yet the implication that anyone "[w]ho is not
against me is with me,",344 may prove too much-namely that the message in
the parades in gross is not neatly tied to any uniform ideology, but rather
harbors a richly diverse collage of interests. At least, it seems fair to say that
the speech value of the Hibernians' message is diminished as its content is
diluted into "anybody's-view-but-theirs."3 45
Next, the parades themselves, viewed in light of their history and modern
form, suggest the theme of inclusion, not exclusion. They have become, and
plainly were meant by their organizers to become, massive celebrations of
commonality-the acceptance of Irish immigrants and the societal cohesion
drawn from the merger of Irish sentimentality and American patriotism. If
we simply look at the parades and ask reasonably what they are, it is hard,
indeed, to answer that they underscore that many of the very people who
march along or wave from the sidewalk, i.e., gays and lesbians, are not legitimate members of the community that has gathered for an inspiring day in
the springtime. There are just too many noisy bands in the line of march for
that.
Finally, there is the tendency among organizers to rest their actions initially on other grounds and then to repair to religious explanations only
when pretexts are uncovered. We have seen this time and again as the
Hibernians have initially offered value-neutral administrative or other explanations for excluding ILGO, only to be pushed back to religious grounds
later.3 46 In a crude paradox, the religious argument they eschew in the first
instance, perhaps because they regard it as insubstantial, embarrassing, or
deceitful, turns out to be the best, if not the only, argument they have for
defending their position. Bluntly speaking, the Hibernians in Manhattan, no
less than the Nazis in Skokie, draw increasing strength in their First Amendment claims as the thesis they wish to pursue loses its appeal to others. In
this process, Catholic teaching necessarily suffers from the company it is
asked to keep.
I hasten to say that the stages by which the Hibernians have approached
their ultimate position provide only ambiguous evidence of what has actually
taken place. On the one hand, it is possible to reconcile their incremental
reliance on Catholic doctrine with genuine religious explanations for the
rejection of ILGO participation in the parade. Expressive associations can
be dynamic, evolving things-the essentials of which become clearer as the
group comes into contact (and conflict) with other belief systems. AccordHibernian Memorandum, State Court, supra note 95, at 36.
Mark, 10:40, quoted in Hibernian Memorandum, State Court, supra note 95, at 53.
345 Cf Ward MCAD Decision, supra note 219, at 20, 31-32 (concluding that the
diversity of the groups participating in the parade diluted "any message or values sought
to be conveyed by its sponsors" and that there was no "coherent message or value" in the
parade that could have been affected by GLIB's appearance).
343
34

346

See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
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ingly, by this account, the Hibernians may not have been forced back to the
ground they now occupy, but rather may have been drawn forward to it. As
they have reacted to ILGO's challenge, they may have come to understand
and appreciate what really does count for them-the ideas that, after all,
hold them together. If, this is to say, the gays and lesbians in ILGO are
seeking their own self-identification as legitimate members of the IrishAmerican community (and seeking access to the St. Patrick's Day parade to
further that purpose), then perhaps the Hibernians are also groping their
way toward their own identity (honestly and with no apology to those who
would have moved in another direction). Indeed, by this account, the troubling thought that arises from the Hibernians' ideological evolution is not that
it may be insincere, but rather that it elevates the expressive side of their
organization at the expense of its cultural aspects. As we noted earlier, the
sharper a group's expressive message becomes, the harder it may be to keep
the group together on the basis of personal or cultural ties. The emergence
of the Hynes Committee in New York is a case in point.347 Alternatively, of
course, the shifts we observe in the Hibernians' position can be taken as
evidence of duplicity. At some point, the painful question has to be asked: Is
Catholic teaching genuinely the explanation for what the Hibernians are
about or, instead, yet another rationalization for policies that
actually are
348
rooted in homophobia detached from religious commitment?
I would not suggest that the situation can accurately be described only in
one of these two ways or, indeed, that there is any fully satisfying single
explanation to be found. I do think, however, that on the basis of the experience we have, two propositions are in order. First, to the extent the Hibernians' reliance on religious doctrine is pretextual, that reliance should be
disregarded in any constitutional analysis that pretends itself to be realistic.
Second, to the extent sincere religious faith actually drives the Hibernians'
behavior, they should be encouraged to make the particulars of those religious commitments clear to all-notwithstanding that in so doing they may
imperil their ability to coalesce around nonideological, cultural themes.
Everywhere we look in these materials, balances have to be struck. Tradeoffs have to be made. If, in this instance, the Hibernians make adherence to,
or at least acquiesce in, orthodox Catholic teaching part of the price of
admission to the parade, they must expect that they themselves will pay a
price-if, and to the extent that, the demand for ideological discipline on
this issue within their own ranks risks divisions the group might otherwise
prefer to avoid. At this juncture, indeed, we begin to perceive a signal lesson
from the parade controversies. If our law is to sponsor an environment in
which citizens can respond as they will to the gay and lesbian civil rights
14 See discussion supra note 173-85 and accompanying text.
have focused in the text on the New York case, but a similar pattern is obviously
apparent in Boston. Ward, MCAD Decision, supra note 219, at 26 (concluding that the
reasons "articulated" by the Veterans for initially excluding GLIB were "not the real
reasons").
348 1
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movement, then bright and clear expression in all forms must predominate
over cultural attachments that might benefit from rather less attention to
doctrinal purity. Potential participants in the parade and spectators alike
have a compelling interest in knowing the nature of the celebration they (or
most of them) are invited to join, so that they can respond as they see fit. 49
IV.
A.

PARADE LAW IN ACTION

Reflections

Having explored our actual experience with the St. Patrick's Day parades
in New York and Boston, and having noted the way in which the courts
have reacted thus far, we now should step back from it all and attempt a
fresh assessment. As a first cut, we might at least consider the possibility
that the parades can get along well enough without the Constitution. After
all, they have been around for a long time, and, as we have seen, they have
weathered many storms already. When disputes have spawned litigation in
the past, nothing particularly good or memorable has come of it. Politics
(and local economics) may, accordingly, be able to go it alone, without any
constitutional meddling. As the gay and lesbian civil rights movement proceeds apace, gathering ever more support from younger and more progressive residents of Manhattan and Southie, the parades will either change or
die. Simple as that. Appealing as it may be to do nothing, however, that
course is no longer available. For one thing, we already have lawsuits, and
lots of them, that demand constitutional answers. For another, as I suggested some pages back, the right constitutional answers can structure not
only the way we meet the immediate problems the parades themselves present, but also the larger social adjustments that hover in the background-of
which the fight over gay and lesbian participation in the parades is merely a
symptom.
As a second cut, we should set aside any false confidence that the Constitution, properly understood, can knife through the parade cases with sharp
doctrinal clarity, making the answers we seek obvious for all to see. With
due respect, Judge Duffy's decision in the New York case contemplates that
kind of foolish simplicity. The very reach and rigor of his rhetoric, not to
mention the ferocity in which he deploys it, testifies not to the strength of his
analysis, but to its fundamental weakness. When you find yourself arguing a
point that vehemently, it may be time to ask whether you are not trying to
make decibels substitute for substance. No, it will not do either to keep the
Constitution out of the parades altogether or to insist that, when it is
applied, it neatly resolves the issues the parades present-simply handing
victory to those who claim an absolute entitlement to do what they wish to
the exclusion of all other people, interests, and values. Human experience is
not so tractable as that.
As a third cut, we should recognize that while the principle of neutrality is
"I See infra note 364 and accompanying text.
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the best tool we have, that idea is a lot more difficult to manage than may
initially appear. The key is to approach the parades at the proper level of
generality and, in so doing, to be clear about what counts as neutral at that
level. Here, too, our actual experience with these two great events should
inform our thinking-helping us to choose the analytic level at which the
parades should be approached. Recall that within conventional doctrine, the
public streets constitute a traditional public forum, the use of which (for
speech) may be regulated, in the main, only in a way that is neutral with
respect to content and viewpoint." ° At one level of generality, then, we
might take the public forum in question in these St. Patrick's Day cases to be
any and all of the streets in New York and Boston-and treat the Hibernians
and Veterans as no different from any other ostensibly private parade
organizers. This, of course, is the classic model that Judge Duffy seems to
invoke. All manner of applicants for parade permits show up at police headquarters, seeking permission to use this street or that, on this or that date.
City officials simply act as disinterested referees, orchestrating the dispersal
of permits in a way that minimizes the disruption of competing uses. Usually, no great difficulties arise. There are enough streets and dates to go
around, conflicts emerge only rarely, and, when they do, city officials can
resolve them on some equally neutral basis, typically first come, first served.
If this were a sensible way to approach the St. Patrick's Day parades, then
Judge Duffy's solution would seem to follow: Once one group has secured a
permit, that group is entitled to advance its own message via its own parade,
and government has no business interjecting different participants with conflicting ideas and voices.
Yet nothing about the parades with which we actually must contend suggests that this is the way to understand what is going on. These cases defy
the classic model. The Hibernians in New York and the Veterans in Boston
are not like (most) other private groups that periodically seek permits for ad
hoc parades through ordinary streets. They seek, nay demand, permanent
warrant to conduct massive, annual processions over traditional routeswhich turn out to be major thoroughfares through the heart of each city. 51
They attach vital significance to the time and place they march and refuse to
step aside or even to moderate their demands in order to accommodate competing groups like ILGO, GLIB, or, indeed, any other group that might seek
a permit to use the same routes on March 17. In short, the Hibernians and
Veterans refuse to wait patiently in line for the same chance to parade as any
other group, but rather claim a special purchase. If, then, we define the
public forum with respect to the parade cases at this level of generality, it
would seem to follow that city authorities can be neutral only if they reject
the claim that Judge Duffy insists they must sustain."5 2
See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
a51See supra parts II.A.1, hI.B.l.
352 The Hibernians themselves concede that the city might well change its policy, but
350

insist that the question at the moment is whether the Mayor can do so "on an ad hoc
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We probably reach the same result if we drop down to a different level,
now taking the public forum in question to be the particular streets used by
these two mammoth parades (rather than all the streets in the two cities).
This approach makes some sense. Neither New York nor Boston can afford
to open vital central corridors routinely to anyone who wishes to use them
for private speech, and nothing in the Constitution requires any such
thing."' 3 Yet if neutrality means in the context of administering Fifth Avenue alone what it means in the context of administering all the city's streets,
it would seem that focusing on this single thoroughfare makes no difference.
The practice of reserving a permit for the Hibernians as the "traditional"
sponsors of "the" St. Patrick's Day parade would appear to be illegitimate
favoritism. The evidence in Boston is virtually as conclusive on this point.
For if Boston authorities have been blindly distributing permits to use a particular route over South Boston streets on a neutral basis, it is going to be
hard to explain how the Veterans have lucked out for forty-seven consecutive years.35
Here again, however, there are complications in life that must inform the
law that can sensibly be brought to bear. Now that we are treating Fifth
Avenue and the South Boston route as themselves peculiar public forums,
we must recognize that the task of administering them is peculiarly difficult.
The competition for these choice routes is intense-for the very reasons city
authorities may give for setting them apart from other streets in the first
place. Many applicants may be just as happy to conduct their parades in
obscure neighborhoods. But many others will wish to command the premier
routes, which promise greater access to a large audience. If neutrality still
means turning a blind eye to content and viewpoint, then it would seem to
follow that Fifth Avenue itself, when it is made available for parades at all,
must be turned over to anybody who genuinely is lucky enough to draw a
permit on some random system. That result would be silly-and thus
5
scarcely something we should lightly assume is constitutionally required.
As we said previously, there are times when it is valid, indeed, essential to
recognize the link between a would-be speakers' message and a particular
public forum-in order to be neutral (as opposed to arbitrary) in the administration of that forum. Given the significance that Catholics attach to St.
Patrick's Cathedral and the Cardinal's reviewing stand, it only makes sense
that an application from a Catholic group should be entitled to consideration
basis, secretly, after the fact, and with the purpose of punishing a parade sponsor for
taking a political position contrary to the City's." Hartnett Affidavit, supra note 88, at

10. I would not reject that distinction out of hand, for there may be instances in which a
sudden shift in public policy can raise constitutional doubts. If, however, a policy is
constitutionally unsound in the first instance, it is hard to argue that city authorities act
invalidly when they discard it.
353 See supra note 19.
354 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
3-1 See Kerins Testimony, supra note 86.
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over a competing request from a group that wants to use Fifth Avenue to tell
everyone the circus is in town. I dare say I could write the brief defending
that kind of accommodation as content-neutral in any meaningful sense of
the term.
I hasten to say, however, that this kind of neutrality has not actually been
at work in New York. ILGO, too, attaches significance to the Cathedral
and, come to that, the Cardinal. It is only that ILGO wishes not to declare
relentless faith in orthodox Church teaching, but rather to contest it. The
Hibernians' claim that they are entitled to prevail over ILGO is therefore,
again, a claim not for equal (neutral) treatment (with due attention to their
special needs), but for special dispensation. The argument that their particular position regarding the Cathedral, the Cardinal, and Church doctrine
should prevail amounts to a claim to enjoy viewpoint discrimination. Of
course, the argument we are now exploring (and rejecting) on the part of
Hibernians and Fifth Avenue is even weaker with respect to South Bostonwhere the Veterans' attachment to their traditional route lacks serious religious foundation. 56
It is no answer that the Hibernians and the Veterans have had their way in
this for a long time and that the discrimination they seek to perpetuate is
between themselves (as "traditional" sponsors) and ILGO, GLIB, or others
(as newcomers). It hardly makes First Amendment sense to privilege a
point of view by adverse possession; chronic favoritism for a single message
is all the more objectionable inasmuch as it insulates the status quo from
dissent. Indeed, the New York ordinance is more troubling still in that it
prefers some groups on a seemingly neutral basis (exempting those that have
conducted parades for more than ten years), when everybody knows precisely who is affected. 57 The vices of vagueness and overbreadth are everywhere apparent. Moreover, there is an obvious tension between an argument
on the part of the Hibernians and Veterans that their "traditional" parades
may safely be preferred to the events that others would stage and their insistence that their parades are not the general public events they have always
appeared to be, but, instead, are narrowly focused celebrations of sectarian
attitudes not shared by many participants and spectators. By characterizing
their parades in this latter way, of course, the Hibernians and Veterans are
attempting to fit themselves into the classic framework we ascribed to Judge
Duffy. Yet any success they may have in making themselves over into isolated applicants who wish to advance a specific agenda undermines any
claim that they are the masters of "traditional" parades that can be distinguished on the ostensibly neutral basis of age and broad cultural import.
Nor is it an answer that as the traditional sponsors of these two great
occasions, the Hibernians and Veterans are the purveyors of Irish culture in
the New World. Here, again, to the extent such a claim rests on past practice alone, it has no substantive base. There is, however, a deeper point to be
356

357

See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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made of the salute to everything Irish that is so much in evidence in the two
parades-a point that damns the Hibernians' and the Veterans' position like
no other. If we posit, as we fairly can, that the St. Patrick's Day parades in
New York and Boston are celebrations of the Irish people and culture, it
follows that the inclusion of some participants and the exclusion of others
says something extremely important and powerful about who it is who can
claim title to that Irish heritage. To the extent the Hibernians and Veterans
insist on barring ILGO and GLIB, they assert for themselves the authority
to circumscribe the Irish community to which gays and lesbians, too, maintain they belong.
Herein, of course, the right of expressive association on which both traditional sponsors and newly arrived gay and lesbian groups depend gives way
to the right of cultural association-which, in turn, offers the really telling
insight into the affair at hand. For the Hibernians and Veterans do not simply argue that ILGO and GLIB have no place among their own clubbish
members (an arguable point, at least), nor even within the Catholic Church
(also a debatable matter). They declare that gays and lesbians have no place
in the wider Irish-American community. Such an assertion of cultural
hegemony cannot be taken seriously; nothing in the Constitution obliges
public officials to indulge it. To do so would be to take sides in multi-layered
conflicts under way between different generations of Irish immigrants in
Manhattan and South Boston-conflicts that run deep into individual and
group self-identification. On examination, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that the Hibernians and Veterans are trying to appropriate the parades as
vehicles for drawing their own definitional lines around a tradition they have
no intrinsic warrant to rule.
Finally, we may drop down to yet another level of generality and consider
the public forum at issue in these cases to be these two parades themselvesannual street processions over specified routes, celebrating St. Patrick's Day
in fact, if not always (in Boston) in form. This is more or less the approach
taken by Judge Zobel 5 s There is an immediate objection here, of course, in
that the parades may not be public at all. Recall the evidence. The extensive
involvement by officials in Boston makes the case for state action there
rather convincingly.359 The facts are different in New York, but it is far
from clear that they are different enough. Pursuant both to the controlling
city ordinance and to longstanding practice, New York has for years
reserved "the" permit for "the" St. Patrick's Day parade for the county
AOH. And it was the police department that insisted that the New York
parade should end by dark, thus laying the predicate for Judge Leval's conclusion that the parade was "full" and could not easily be enlarged to
accommodate ILGO.36 °
On the other side, however, it can scarcely be denied that the mayors in
3-s See supra note 287 and accompanying text.

"I See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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both cities have used their good offices in a genuine effort to bring ILGO and
GLIB into the fold. In an article meant to exalt the facts of experience over
abstract legal doctrine, I hesitate to say that David Dinkins and Ray Flynn
themselves committed the very discriminatory actions they worked so hard
to avert. I certainly would conclude that Dinkins and Flynn were responsible for what happened in the practical sense that they failed to do all they
might have to change the result. Yet current state action doctrine would
presumably find that argument insufficient-perhaps revealing the fundamental inadequacy of that doctrine when called upon in actual cases."'
Here again, the parades resist the definitions and categories that conventional doctrine offers. All that can fairly be said is that Mayor Flynn and
Mayor Dinkins, and other public officials as well, have figured in the mix of
actions at various points, responding as they would to the demands of both
principle and expedience. On examination, what we have in the parade cases
is not simply state action or no; it is urban politics as usual, albeit practiced
in this instance by politicians with a well developed understanding of the
direction in which the tide is moving-and should move.
The conventional binary choice between what is or is not state action fails
to appreciate fully the gradations and nuances that a serious, realistic
appraisal demands. We have seen already that the conclusion that the
parades are not themselves public functions, but rather are the exercise of
private right, does not necessarily mean that the Hibernians and Veterans
must win. Equally, we should not blithely treat the Hibernians and Veterans
as, in effect, the state and try by that means to wish our problems away.
Those groups remain stubbornly private, and as private organizations they
have their own constitutional claims to advance. If we accept that, as I
think we must, then we must listen to their arguments. Neither group insists
on barring individual gay and lesbian marchers; both object only to the
expression tied up in ILGO and GLIB participation as identified groups. It
is true that in ordinary Fourteenth Amendment analysis, classifications
according to the content or viewpoint of speech are said to be unreasonable
and, indeed, are regarded with the kind of suspicion usually reserved for
racial segregation. In these cases, however, in which the Hibernians and
Veterans press their own speech and association claims, the conflicting
message that ILGO and GLIB wish to offer is arguably what makes a rule
excluding them perfectly rational. 62
If we lay aside the idea that the parades themselves constitute a public
forum (from which would-be participants cannot be excluded), we come to
the different claim that they are not so private that they cannot be forced to
admit gays and lesbians under local anti-discrimination laws. Here, too,
conventional doctrine only presents us with more problems of characterization. It is rank foolishness to think that labeling a parade a place of "public
accommodation" deprives the organizers of any constitutional objection to
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admitting gay and lesbian groups. It is also foolish to believe that calling
these unruly street celebrations "parades" somehow renders them invulnerable to the state police power. Rigorous thought demands a close, fact-specific exploration of actual events. Just as we might disagree on the question
whether there is sufficient state action to invoke the Constitution of its own
force where these parades are concerned, we can equally disagree on this
issue-namely, whether the imposition of an anti-discrimination rule would
impermissibly infringe upon private organizers' speech and associational
freedoms. For my part, the chances of seriously diluting anyone's message
are greater in New York than in Boston, but, if the truth be told, I doubt
that those chances are great in either city. The point, in any event, is that
extant constitutional doctrine does not generate a clear answer, but only
beckons a difficult exercise in balancing-in every case and in every year.
B.

Prescriptions
At this point, I probably owe the authorities in New York and Boston
some specific advice. What, then, would I have us do with the parades? To
begin, we should worry rather more about the problems that can be observed
in the streets and rather less about related problems that can only be
imagined. It is enormously helpful to draw upon conventional legal doctrine
to guide our thinking and, in so doing, to reason by analogy to (and from)
less complex hypotheticals that focus attention on key issues. Yet we have
seen these two giant events refuse to be wedged into neat analytical categories. It is dangerous business, then, to approach the cases we have by conjuring up easier disputes and insisting that if we can agree on the way those
more tractable cases should be resolved, we can (and must) dispose of the
matters at hand in the same manner. Such an approach assumes that if we
once get our doctrinal ducks in order, clear constitutional rules and principles can sort all parade cases into a coherent, aesthetically pleasing grid-a
place for every parade and every parade in its place. It won't work. The
NAACP may try to horn in on a small, ad hoc Klan demonstration, but it is
a mistake to think that there is some pristine legal principle that can and
must resolve both that case and the far different disputes we are exploring.
Life and law are more complicated than that; we can't always hammer
unruly experience
into formal models, and we shouldn't lose heart if we try
36 3
and fail.
Next, we should be open to the expressive activities in which citizens wish
to engage and thus should attempt to settle disputes when they arise in a way
that promotes the free exchange of ideas. We will get nowhere if conflicting
ideas and aspirations are silenced and our collective response to, and participation in, the gay and lesbian civil rights movement is thereby skewed. Thus
we should be loath to credit the Hibernians' and Veterans' attempt to com363 See Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont,
700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1988); discussion supra note 192; cf. Baker, supra note 10, at
135 (counseling that we avoid the "rhetorical power of the worst case scenario").
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mandeer large community gatherings in order to eliminate free discussion of
matters they find unsettling. From the evidence, it appears that the Hibernians and Veterans do not so much want to advance their own attitudes
regarding homosexual behavior. They want, instead, to frustrate the views
that ILGO and GLIB represent-by discouraging any speech on the subject
and thus to make it appear, at least, that the matter is beyond debate within
the Irish-American community. They hope to make their own views the
norm by submerging those views in ostensibly seamless community celebrations. That will not do. We need more speech about human sexuality, not
less, and the First Amendment should be understood and applied in these
cases in a way that fosters that result.
In this spirit, the authorities in New York and Boston should not shrink
from their responsibility for the parades out of concern that official involvement somehow threatens the traditional organizers' private rights. By contrast, they should assume primary responsibility for planning and
conducting these large civic celebrations of Irish heritage and, in so doing,
should ensure that all members of the community can participate, irrespective of the disagreements that divide them. It may prove helpful and efficient
to enlist groups like the Hibernians and Veterans, or for that matter ILGO
and GLIB, to participate as joint venturers. But the involvement of private
organizers working in league with public administrators should have no
bearing on the inclusive nature of the events they help to orchestrate. Once
the parades are freed from the classic model that so blinded Judge Duffy,
and perhaps Mayor Dinkins and Mayor Flynn as well, they can be carried
on as the civic spectacles they have always been and appeared to be.
At the same time, the authorities should comb existing procedures for
allocating parade permits to groups that do fit the classic model-cleansing
existing law of the favoritism that has crept into the statute books and common practice over the years. Everyone should be put on an equal footing in
the competition for scarce public space. This does not mean that the authorities should ignore entirely the message that an applicant wishes to advance
and blindly pass out licenses on some random basis. By contrast, as we
noted previously, genuine neutrality may often demand that an applicant's
desire for a particular street or date be accommodated-all other things
being equal. When, then, the patch of Fifth Avenue in front of St. Patrick's
Cathedral is made available, groups like the AOH and ILGO alike should
receive due consideration for permits to use that street for their own, private
speech purposes. The Hibernians' exclusive occupation of that choice forum
cannot, however, be allowed to continue.
When a group seeks permission to march, it should be asked to specify
whether it means to comply with the ostensibly applicable anti-discrimination ordinance. If not, the group should be invited to explain why-that is,
to explain how its message would be affected if that law were brought to
bear. After all, if a group is constitutionally entitled to discriminate on a
basis that is ordinarily proscribed by state law, and the police will therefore
be expected to enforce that constitutional entitlement with the necessary

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:791

force, then it is only just and practical that the authorities get the situation
straight from the outset. Most groups will respond with alacrity and thus
take full advantage of this additional method for articulating and clarifying
their agenda-the better to attract participants and'spectators who wish to
press the same viewpoint. Some groups, however, will decline. I would not
suggest that city officials should demand a satisfying response, on pain of
withholding a permit from a group that resists. Nor, certainly, should the
authorities launch intimidating investigations of the bona fides of a group's
message and desire to preserve its purity at the price of discrimination that
would otherwise be barred. The First Amendment needs and deserves a fair
amount of breathing space, and if a group declines to articulate its message
in this way, or answers in obfuscating terms, we must accept that result.
When, however, a parade permit is granted with an exemption from the antidiscrimination ordinance, the public is entitled to know it and, where the
group itself provides an explanation, to know what that explanation is.
Accordingly, when the authorities have a group's own explanation, they
should publish it to the community-in the terms used by the parade
organizers themselves."6 4
With due notice of the exclusionary message that a parade purports to
advance, potential participants and spectators will be in a position to make
intelligent choices about whether to attend. Contending points of view will
thus be defined and sharpened; the issue or issues will be tightly joined; and
healthy debate can ensue. I understand and appreciate that in the process
cultural associations may suffer. Where organizations typically may hope to
play down internal doctrinal disputes and play up other ties that bind, the
scheme I have in mind invites greater attention to potential disagreements
that can threaten cohesion. Nevertheless, in a society that means to be free,
it seems to me that the greater value lies in the delineation of issues for
public appraisal.
I tend to think that most citizens will give wide berth to parades for the
purpose of condemning homosexuality or homosexual behavior. Tolerance
in these matters is the wave of the future. I even hope that parade organizers
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An organization entitled

has been granted a permit to conduct

a street parade over the following route,

, on

By the organizers' account, the message they wish to convey by way of the parade is
that the Catholic Church considers homosexual behavior to be mortal sin. Because
the organizers' have made a reasonable case that the participation by organizations
that promote homosexual behavior would be inconsistent with that message, they
will be allowed to exclude such groups from the parade, notwithstanding the provisions of

,

which usually prohibits discrimination on the basis of

sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.
The City of New York/Boston respects the constitutional right of the members of
to express their views in this way.
Cf. BAKER, supra note 10, at 149-50 (advocating a "voluntary" permit system that would
encourage would-be speakers to notify the authorities of their intentions but would not
require them to seek and obtain formal permission before using the streets for speech).
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who are not genuinely moved by religious commitments will take the withdrawal of others' support as an occasion for reflection on the basis and
strength of their own convictions--even if, again, the result is some loss of
cohesion within primarily cultural associations. Yet even if I am wrong in
the near term, I am content to let the chips fall where they may. For just as
it makes no First Amendment sense to silence the gay and lesbian civil rights
movement, it equally makes no sense to suppress the resistance to it. By
contrast, our societal ability to thrash out our differences depends on the free
and open clash of contending forces.
CONCLUSION

My ramble through the intricacies of the parade cases in New York and
Boston may appear to confuse, rather than clarify, the legal issues those
cases present. Then again, my thesis has been that abstract legal questions
must defer to unruly reality and that it can't work the other way around.
There will always be many and varied instances in which city officials, and
ultimately the courts, will have to fashion particularistic remedies groomed
to the circumstances of idiosyncratic cases. 36 5 Often, it will be far from easy
to accommodate conflicting private agenda-when, for example, groups
with genuine reason to prefer particular streets and dates compete for a
license that allows them to exclude their adversaries. That, too, is part of my
argument. Hard cases are inevitable-the product of our defective analytical
categories and our healthy, if disorderly, political system.' The examination
of the St. Patrick's Day parades we have just been through demonstrates, I
think, that there is trouble aplenty ahead. We are dealing with human
problems, and we are only human ourselves.

E.g., Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1986); see
discussion supra note 33.
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